Saturday, June 26, 2004
How many events will it take so that Europeans will understand the war is not about American power, nor American arrogance, nor oil? Todays's event should at least give them a hint:
I just heard that Sistani's spokesman announced that one of the four most senior clerics of the Najaf Hawza has been assassinated. He also launched a strong verbal attack against Al-Qaeda. Since it is obvious that it wasn't Sistani, then we have one of the other three, Sayyid Bashir Al-Najafi, Sayyid Mohammed Ishaq Al-Fayyadh, or Sayyid Mohammed Sa'id Al-Hakim. This isn't good at all.
I just heard that Sistani's spokesman announced that one of the four most senior clerics of the Najaf Hawza has been assassinated. He also launched a strong verbal attack against Al-Qaeda. Since it is obvious that it wasn't Sistani, then we have one of the other three, Sayyid Bashir Al-Najafi, Sayyid Mohammed Ishaq Al-Fayyadh, or Sayyid Mohammed Sa'id Al-Hakim. This isn't good at all.
The Allies Must Step Up
By Ivo Daalder and Robert Kagan
Sunday, June 20, 2004; Page B07
Critics of the Bush administration at home and abroad have long called for an early return of Iraqi sovereignty coupled with the internationalization of the assistance effort. The U.N. resolution that was passed unanimously June 8, though late in coming, does just that. What's more, the resolution reflects significant efforts by the Bush administration to meet the concerns of key nations that opposed the Iraq war in 2003. Iraq will enjoy full sovereignty after June 30, not limited sovereignty. Iraqi forces will be under Iraqi command, not the command of the multinational force. The mandate of the multinational force will expire once the political transition has been completed. And the forces will be withdrawn if the Iraqi government so desires.
One would think, therefore, that the new U.N. consensus on Iraq would offer real hope not only for putting Iraq on the right track but also for healing some of the rifts between the United States and its European allies. France and Germany demanded a significant U.N. role, and they've gotten it. They demanded a rapid turnover of sovereignty to the Iraqis, and they got that, too. With the two countries having gotten their way in the negotiations on the resolution, the time has come for them to pitch in and join in the effort to build a peaceful, stable, democratic future for Iraq. After all, French, German and other European officials have insisted all along that the success or failure of Iraq is as much a vital interest for them as for the United States. They've also insisted, understandably, that if the United States wanted their help, it would have to give them a say over policy in Iraq.
Unfortunately, now that the Bush administration has finally acquiesced to their requests, it appears that France and Germany are refusing to fulfill their end of the bargain. Leaders of both countries have declared they will not send troops to assist in Iraq under any circumstances. Still more troubling was French President Jacques Chirac's declaration at the Group of Eight summit last week that he opposed any NATO role in Iraq, even though the resolution France supported explicitly calls on "Member States and international and regional organizations to contribute assistance to the multinational force, including military forces."
The positions staked out by the French and German governments are an abdication of international responsibility.
Everyone knows success in Iraq will require a greater effort on the part of the international community than has so far been forthcoming. The United Nations will have to establish a major operation on the ground if it is to assist the Iraqi government through a difficult political transition over the coming months. Security inside Iraq will have to improve significantly for elections to proceed on schedule and for the economy to begin to grow. An intensive training and equipment program for Iraqi security forces -- including police, civil defense and regular military forces -- will ultimately enable the Iraqis to maintain security. But until then the task will fall mainly on the multinational forces. Thanks to bad planning by the Pentagon, there have never been enough troops in Iraq. At least in the short run, real security requires additional troops. Most of those troops need to come from the United States. But American friends and allies should be sending more forces as well.
Beyond the needs in Iraq, there are broader issues at stake. Above all, there is the question of whether there is any meaning left in the term "alliance." Admittedly the United States hasn't been the best of allies over the past two years. We have missed opportunities to work more closely with NATO countries. But it takes more than the United States to make the transatlantic alliance work. If some of the strongest NATO powers refuse to participate in vital security missions, such as that in Iraq, then it should hardly be surprising when Americans and their leaders begin to dismiss those nations as serious strategic partners. Good allies don't join only the causes that they choose and that are already going well. When the United States sent troops to Bosnia and later fought the Kosovo war, it was not because the Europeans had handled those situations well. Nor did a majority of Americans believe that Bosnia and Kosovo were their concern. Much of the reason the United States fought in the Balkans during the 1990s was for the sake of the alliance itself.
NATO officials, as well as some allied countries, argue that with the alliance already involved in Afghanistan, taking on Iraq as well is beyond the organization's capacity. But the truth is, if NATO cannot take on a mission such as Iraq, when the United States is providing 90 percent of the forces, then why should Americans continue to value the organization? Germany may be tapped out in Afghanistan and the Balkans, which is a sorry commentary on the state of that enormous and wealthy country's military capabilities. But surely France has several thousand troops to spare, if the French government wants to provide them.
Now that the Security Council has opened the door to internationalization in Iraq, the Europeans would be wise to step through. Alliance leaders meeting in Istanbul later this month should agree to take over the security training and equipping mission immediately, with a country such as Germany (which is already involved in training some police) perhaps taking the lead. They should also agree that NATO will take command of the Polish-led sector in southern Iraq immediately and begin planning for eventually placing the entire multinational force under NATO command.
It will be a deadly blow to transatlantic relations if NATO does not become involved in providing security in Iraq. Many Europeans believe their problem is only with the Bush administration. That's a dangerous miscalculation. If John Kerry wins in November, one of his first acts will be to request Europe's help in Iraq. If France and Germany are intent on saying no, then future American administrations, including Kerry's, will have to reconsider the value of the alliance. Do Europeans really want to sever their strategic ties to the United States? If not, they need to understand that the ball is now in their court.
Ivo Daalder is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Robert Kagan is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
By Ivo Daalder and Robert Kagan
Sunday, June 20, 2004; Page B07
Critics of the Bush administration at home and abroad have long called for an early return of Iraqi sovereignty coupled with the internationalization of the assistance effort. The U.N. resolution that was passed unanimously June 8, though late in coming, does just that. What's more, the resolution reflects significant efforts by the Bush administration to meet the concerns of key nations that opposed the Iraq war in 2003. Iraq will enjoy full sovereignty after June 30, not limited sovereignty. Iraqi forces will be under Iraqi command, not the command of the multinational force. The mandate of the multinational force will expire once the political transition has been completed. And the forces will be withdrawn if the Iraqi government so desires.
One would think, therefore, that the new U.N. consensus on Iraq would offer real hope not only for putting Iraq on the right track but also for healing some of the rifts between the United States and its European allies. France and Germany demanded a significant U.N. role, and they've gotten it. They demanded a rapid turnover of sovereignty to the Iraqis, and they got that, too. With the two countries having gotten their way in the negotiations on the resolution, the time has come for them to pitch in and join in the effort to build a peaceful, stable, democratic future for Iraq. After all, French, German and other European officials have insisted all along that the success or failure of Iraq is as much a vital interest for them as for the United States. They've also insisted, understandably, that if the United States wanted their help, it would have to give them a say over policy in Iraq.
Unfortunately, now that the Bush administration has finally acquiesced to their requests, it appears that France and Germany are refusing to fulfill their end of the bargain. Leaders of both countries have declared they will not send troops to assist in Iraq under any circumstances. Still more troubling was French President Jacques Chirac's declaration at the Group of Eight summit last week that he opposed any NATO role in Iraq, even though the resolution France supported explicitly calls on "Member States and international and regional organizations to contribute assistance to the multinational force, including military forces."
The positions staked out by the French and German governments are an abdication of international responsibility.
Everyone knows success in Iraq will require a greater effort on the part of the international community than has so far been forthcoming. The United Nations will have to establish a major operation on the ground if it is to assist the Iraqi government through a difficult political transition over the coming months. Security inside Iraq will have to improve significantly for elections to proceed on schedule and for the economy to begin to grow. An intensive training and equipment program for Iraqi security forces -- including police, civil defense and regular military forces -- will ultimately enable the Iraqis to maintain security. But until then the task will fall mainly on the multinational forces. Thanks to bad planning by the Pentagon, there have never been enough troops in Iraq. At least in the short run, real security requires additional troops. Most of those troops need to come from the United States. But American friends and allies should be sending more forces as well.
Beyond the needs in Iraq, there are broader issues at stake. Above all, there is the question of whether there is any meaning left in the term "alliance." Admittedly the United States hasn't been the best of allies over the past two years. We have missed opportunities to work more closely with NATO countries. But it takes more than the United States to make the transatlantic alliance work. If some of the strongest NATO powers refuse to participate in vital security missions, such as that in Iraq, then it should hardly be surprising when Americans and their leaders begin to dismiss those nations as serious strategic partners. Good allies don't join only the causes that they choose and that are already going well. When the United States sent troops to Bosnia and later fought the Kosovo war, it was not because the Europeans had handled those situations well. Nor did a majority of Americans believe that Bosnia and Kosovo were their concern. Much of the reason the United States fought in the Balkans during the 1990s was for the sake of the alliance itself.
NATO officials, as well as some allied countries, argue that with the alliance already involved in Afghanistan, taking on Iraq as well is beyond the organization's capacity. But the truth is, if NATO cannot take on a mission such as Iraq, when the United States is providing 90 percent of the forces, then why should Americans continue to value the organization? Germany may be tapped out in Afghanistan and the Balkans, which is a sorry commentary on the state of that enormous and wealthy country's military capabilities. But surely France has several thousand troops to spare, if the French government wants to provide them.
Now that the Security Council has opened the door to internationalization in Iraq, the Europeans would be wise to step through. Alliance leaders meeting in Istanbul later this month should agree to take over the security training and equipping mission immediately, with a country such as Germany (which is already involved in training some police) perhaps taking the lead. They should also agree that NATO will take command of the Polish-led sector in southern Iraq immediately and begin planning for eventually placing the entire multinational force under NATO command.
It will be a deadly blow to transatlantic relations if NATO does not become involved in providing security in Iraq. Many Europeans believe their problem is only with the Bush administration. That's a dangerous miscalculation. If John Kerry wins in November, one of his first acts will be to request Europe's help in Iraq. If France and Germany are intent on saying no, then future American administrations, including Kerry's, will have to reconsider the value of the alliance. Do Europeans really want to sever their strategic ties to the United States? If not, they need to understand that the ball is now in their court.
Ivo Daalder is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Robert Kagan is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Friday, June 25, 2004
But they can't kill Iraq.
As the sovereignty hand-over getting closer, the insanity of terrorists reaches an extreme so they gave Iraqis another dark, bloody day that shows the terrorists’ dark dreams and their disrespect for human life whether western’s or arab’s, Christian’s or Muslim’s as long as they get in their way to destroy civilization since it represent evil in their sick minds.
The increased severity of theses operations indicate that their greatest fear is democracy in the ME and building democracy in Iraq is the seed for it. It’s obviously not only us who believe this, the terrorists seem to get it too!
The terrorists have proved to be the dictators’ closest allies, especially Saddam. Why didn’t we see attacks from Al-Qaeda or other fanatics on Saddam’s regime? Simply because they were serving each other’s goals. They are not strategic allies (dictators and terrorists)but they have similar tactical goals.
People here are getting more anxious and more worried as the 30th of June gets closer and as the attacks’ frequency increases. But what Iraqis fear most is a pessimistic scenario that includes the US army leaving the cities and armed militias controlling the streets and then killings, looting and chaos return in a manner worse than ever taking advantage of the lack of strong authorities.
Such ideas are having their effect on the behavior of the people despite the cautious optimism they felt when the IP reinforced their presence in the streets. It may seem illogical thinking but many Iraqis find it very difficult to trust any authority after all they’ve been through and reasoning play little role if any here. They need to see solid changes before they regain their trust in the others.
Debates increased recently about a situation similar to that happened after the 9th of April when the police disappeared and the officials left their offices so everything was ready to be looted and burned.
I believe that this is a very pessimistic scenario and those who think things might go in that direction and those who suggest declaring martial laws in the country overlook many facts, and what happened in the last several days proves that the violence is still confined to limited spots that represent a small percentage of this country while in most Iraqi cities the situation is pretty calm. That’s why declaring martial laws-in my opinion-is a gain for terrorism that will make the war zone expand to involve the whole country.
The attacks in the last few days illustrate the spots of the terrorists presence and activity whom foreigners represent a high percentage of their count because of the close proximity of Diyla governorate to Iran and the close proximity of Anbar and Mosul governorates to Syria, the two countries that have the greatest interest in the failure of the democratic process in Iraq. That’s why those spots must be dealt with in a special way but for a very limited time. Besides, there should be active communications between the authorities and the people who live there and there should be also a strong presence of the security forces.
The world should understand that we’re not like what we used to be and we’re not like those around us; a military coup, then an emergency situation imposed for decades to protect the “revolution” that hijacked authority by force against the will of the people. Emergency situations has become the normal situation in these countries because such situations serve the government not the people. And we have the American and the Israeli examples, two nations that are primary targets for terrorism but in spite of all what they’ve been through they never used emergency laws, and these are the examples we have to learn from here.
We should present the best example and I am optimistic because I see the majority of Iraqis, and despite their fears, have decided to go on no matter what. Yes, we’ll give sacrifices and we’ll go through sad days but I’m totally convinced that nothing can stop the process. We’ll pay precious blood but it’s worth the sacrifice. The accomplishment will be a great victory and a turning point in history that will influence the region and the world.
Once again I address those who think that the war on terror was a mistake; take a look at the Iraqi field and you can see how the terrorists have gone crazy proving by themselves that the war is on them. Still they can kill some of us but they can't kill our dreams and they can't kill Iraq. No more martial laws and we're ready to give more sacrifices to achieve our ultimate freedom and build democracy.
-By Mohammed.
As the sovereignty hand-over getting closer, the insanity of terrorists reaches an extreme so they gave Iraqis another dark, bloody day that shows the terrorists’ dark dreams and their disrespect for human life whether western’s or arab’s, Christian’s or Muslim’s as long as they get in their way to destroy civilization since it represent evil in their sick minds.
The increased severity of theses operations indicate that their greatest fear is democracy in the ME and building democracy in Iraq is the seed for it. It’s obviously not only us who believe this, the terrorists seem to get it too!
The terrorists have proved to be the dictators’ closest allies, especially Saddam. Why didn’t we see attacks from Al-Qaeda or other fanatics on Saddam’s regime? Simply because they were serving each other’s goals. They are not strategic allies (dictators and terrorists)but they have similar tactical goals.
People here are getting more anxious and more worried as the 30th of June gets closer and as the attacks’ frequency increases. But what Iraqis fear most is a pessimistic scenario that includes the US army leaving the cities and armed militias controlling the streets and then killings, looting and chaos return in a manner worse than ever taking advantage of the lack of strong authorities.
Such ideas are having their effect on the behavior of the people despite the cautious optimism they felt when the IP reinforced their presence in the streets. It may seem illogical thinking but many Iraqis find it very difficult to trust any authority after all they’ve been through and reasoning play little role if any here. They need to see solid changes before they regain their trust in the others.
Debates increased recently about a situation similar to that happened after the 9th of April when the police disappeared and the officials left their offices so everything was ready to be looted and burned.
I believe that this is a very pessimistic scenario and those who think things might go in that direction and those who suggest declaring martial laws in the country overlook many facts, and what happened in the last several days proves that the violence is still confined to limited spots that represent a small percentage of this country while in most Iraqi cities the situation is pretty calm. That’s why declaring martial laws-in my opinion-is a gain for terrorism that will make the war zone expand to involve the whole country.
The attacks in the last few days illustrate the spots of the terrorists presence and activity whom foreigners represent a high percentage of their count because of the close proximity of Diyla governorate to Iran and the close proximity of Anbar and Mosul governorates to Syria, the two countries that have the greatest interest in the failure of the democratic process in Iraq. That’s why those spots must be dealt with in a special way but for a very limited time. Besides, there should be active communications between the authorities and the people who live there and there should be also a strong presence of the security forces.
The world should understand that we’re not like what we used to be and we’re not like those around us; a military coup, then an emergency situation imposed for decades to protect the “revolution” that hijacked authority by force against the will of the people. Emergency situations has become the normal situation in these countries because such situations serve the government not the people. And we have the American and the Israeli examples, two nations that are primary targets for terrorism but in spite of all what they’ve been through they never used emergency laws, and these are the examples we have to learn from here.
We should present the best example and I am optimistic because I see the majority of Iraqis, and despite their fears, have decided to go on no matter what. Yes, we’ll give sacrifices and we’ll go through sad days but I’m totally convinced that nothing can stop the process. We’ll pay precious blood but it’s worth the sacrifice. The accomplishment will be a great victory and a turning point in history that will influence the region and the world.
Once again I address those who think that the war on terror was a mistake; take a look at the Iraqi field and you can see how the terrorists have gone crazy proving by themselves that the war is on them. Still they can kill some of us but they can't kill our dreams and they can't kill Iraq. No more martial laws and we're ready to give more sacrifices to achieve our ultimate freedom and build democracy.
-By Mohammed.
Thursday, June 24, 2004
Army unit claims victory over sheik
By Rowan Scarborough
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
The Army's powerful 1st Armored Division is proclaiming victory over Sheik Muqtada al-Sadr's marauding militia that just a month ago seemed on the verge of conquering southern Iraq.
The Germany-based division defeated the militia with a mix of American firepower and money paid to informants. Officers today say "Operation Iron Saber" will go down in military history books as one of the most important battles in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.
"I've got to think this was a watershed operation in terms of how to do things as part of a counterinsurgency," said Brig. Gen. Mark Hertling, a West Point graduate and one of two 1st Armored assistant division commanders, in an interview last week as he moved around southern Iraq. "We happened to design a campaign that did very well against this militia."
When the division got word April 8 that Sheik al-Sadr's uprising meant most 1st Armored soldiers would stay and fight, rather than going home as scheduled, it touched off a series of remarkable military maneuvers.
Soldiers, tanks and helicopters at a port in Kuwait reversed course, rushing back inside Iraq to battle the Shi'ite cleric's 10,000-strong army. Within days, a four-tank squadron was rumbling toward the eastern city of Kut. And within hours of arriving, Lt. Col. Mark Calvert and his squadron had cleared the town's government buildings of the sheik's so-called Mahdi's Army.
Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, 1st Armored commander, huddled with Gen. Hertling and other senior aides to map an overall war strategy. The division would shift from urban combat in Baghdad's streets to precision strikes amid shrines of great religious significance.
Hunting the enemy in tight city streets broadened to patrolling a region the size of Vermont.
Gen. Dempsey first needed the locations of Sheik al-Sadr's rifle-toting henchmen. Average Iraqis, fed up with the militia's kidnappings and thievery, quickly became spies, as did a few moderate clerics who publicly stayed neutral.
Once he had targets, Gen. Dempsey could then map a battle plan for entering four key cities — Karbala, Najaf, Kufa and Diwaniyah. This would be a counterinsurgency fought with 70-ton M-1 Abrams tanks and aerial gunships overhead. It would not be the lightning movements of clandestine commandos, but rather all the brute force the Army could muster, directed at narrowly defined targets.
Last week, Sheik al-Sadr surrendered. He called on what was left of his men to cease operations and said he may one day seek public office in a democratic Iraq.
Gen. Hertling said Mahdi's Army is defeated, according the Army's doctrinal definition of defeat. A few stragglers might be able to fire a rocket-propelled grenade, he said, but noted: "Do they have the capability of launching any kind of offensive operation? Absolutely not."
The division estimates it killed at least several thousand militia members.
Gen. Dempsey designed "Iron Saber" based on four pillars: massive combat power; information operations to discredit Sheik al-Sadr; rebuilding the Iraqi security forces that fled; and beginning civil affairs operations as quickly as possible, including paying Iraqis to repair damaged public buildings.
"As soon as we finished military operations, we immediately began civil-military operations," said Gen. Hertling. "We crossed over from bullets to money."
The strike into Kut was followed by an incursion into Diwaniyah. Then an 18-tank battalion entered Karbala, a holy city where precision operations were needed to spare religious shrines. Then soldiers moved into Najaf and Kufa, where Sheik al-Sadr was hiding out and where about 3,000 of his fighters occupied government buildings, mosques, amusement parks and schools.
"We were going from outside in to get this guy," Gen. Hertling said. "We had to go after them one city at a time."
By Rowan Scarborough
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
The Army's powerful 1st Armored Division is proclaiming victory over Sheik Muqtada al-Sadr's marauding militia that just a month ago seemed on the verge of conquering southern Iraq.
The Germany-based division defeated the militia with a mix of American firepower and money paid to informants. Officers today say "Operation Iron Saber" will go down in military history books as one of the most important battles in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.
"I've got to think this was a watershed operation in terms of how to do things as part of a counterinsurgency," said Brig. Gen. Mark Hertling, a West Point graduate and one of two 1st Armored assistant division commanders, in an interview last week as he moved around southern Iraq. "We happened to design a campaign that did very well against this militia."
When the division got word April 8 that Sheik al-Sadr's uprising meant most 1st Armored soldiers would stay and fight, rather than going home as scheduled, it touched off a series of remarkable military maneuvers.
Soldiers, tanks and helicopters at a port in Kuwait reversed course, rushing back inside Iraq to battle the Shi'ite cleric's 10,000-strong army. Within days, a four-tank squadron was rumbling toward the eastern city of Kut. And within hours of arriving, Lt. Col. Mark Calvert and his squadron had cleared the town's government buildings of the sheik's so-called Mahdi's Army.
Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, 1st Armored commander, huddled with Gen. Hertling and other senior aides to map an overall war strategy. The division would shift from urban combat in Baghdad's streets to precision strikes amid shrines of great religious significance.
Hunting the enemy in tight city streets broadened to patrolling a region the size of Vermont.
Gen. Dempsey first needed the locations of Sheik al-Sadr's rifle-toting henchmen. Average Iraqis, fed up with the militia's kidnappings and thievery, quickly became spies, as did a few moderate clerics who publicly stayed neutral.
Once he had targets, Gen. Dempsey could then map a battle plan for entering four key cities — Karbala, Najaf, Kufa and Diwaniyah. This would be a counterinsurgency fought with 70-ton M-1 Abrams tanks and aerial gunships overhead. It would not be the lightning movements of clandestine commandos, but rather all the brute force the Army could muster, directed at narrowly defined targets.
Last week, Sheik al-Sadr surrendered. He called on what was left of his men to cease operations and said he may one day seek public office in a democratic Iraq.
Gen. Hertling said Mahdi's Army is defeated, according the Army's doctrinal definition of defeat. A few stragglers might be able to fire a rocket-propelled grenade, he said, but noted: "Do they have the capability of launching any kind of offensive operation? Absolutely not."
The division estimates it killed at least several thousand militia members.
Gen. Dempsey designed "Iron Saber" based on four pillars: massive combat power; information operations to discredit Sheik al-Sadr; rebuilding the Iraqi security forces that fled; and beginning civil affairs operations as quickly as possible, including paying Iraqis to repair damaged public buildings.
"As soon as we finished military operations, we immediately began civil-military operations," said Gen. Hertling. "We crossed over from bullets to money."
The strike into Kut was followed by an incursion into Diwaniyah. Then an 18-tank battalion entered Karbala, a holy city where precision operations were needed to spare religious shrines. Then soldiers moved into Najaf and Kufa, where Sheik al-Sadr was hiding out and where about 3,000 of his fighters occupied government buildings, mosques, amusement parks and schools.
"We were going from outside in to get this guy," Gen. Hertling said. "We had to go after them one city at a time."
Monday, June 21, 2004
A quote from president Bush's speach at Fort Lewis on June 18th 2004:
"At the same time that we're helping the Iraqis bring the terrorists to justice, we're helping the Iraqi people to rebuild the basic infrastructure of their country. This is tough work. It's hard work. It's hard work to go from a society terrorized by a tyrant to a free society. But we have done this kind of work before. I want you to listen to how The New York Times described conditions in Germany in November, 1946. This was 18 months after the fall of Berlin. "Germany is a land in an acute stage of economic, political and moral crisis. The basic elements of recovery and peace are lacking. European capitals are frightened by the prospect of a German collapse. In every military headquarters, one meets alarmed officials doing their best to deal with the consequences of the occupation policy they admit has failed."
"At the same time that we're helping the Iraqis bring the terrorists to justice, we're helping the Iraqi people to rebuild the basic infrastructure of their country. This is tough work. It's hard work. It's hard work to go from a society terrorized by a tyrant to a free society. But we have done this kind of work before. I want you to listen to how The New York Times described conditions in Germany in November, 1946. This was 18 months after the fall of Berlin. "Germany is a land in an acute stage of economic, political and moral crisis. The basic elements of recovery and peace are lacking. European capitals are frightened by the prospect of a German collapse. In every military headquarters, one meets alarmed officials doing their best to deal with the consequences of the occupation policy they admit has failed."
Democracy in Arabia?
Liberal scoffers underestimate its prospects.
by Amir Taheri
AT THE CLOSE of the recent G-8 summit in Sea Island, Georgia, sighs of relief could be heard in palaces across the Middle East where unelected leaders wield near-absolute power.
The summit had been expected to produce a clarion call for reform in the only part of the world still largely unaffected by changes that have reshaped global politics since the end of the Cold War. Instead, it settled for a string of bland admonitions.
Anxious to avoid fresh charges of unilateralism, and responding to demands from French president Jacques Chirac and German chancellor Gerhard Schröder, President Bush toned down his call for a democratic revolution in the greater Middle East.
But though the message from Sea Island has disappointed many moderates in the region, the process of change triggered by the liberation of Afghanistan and Iraq shows no sign of coming to a close. In liberal circles in Europe and North America, the idea that George W. Bush could inspire any democratic revolution may provoke derision, but in the Middle East, U.S. action in Afghanistan and Iraq is seen as marking the end of an era--the era in which the region's politics was dominated by pan-Arabism and Islamism.
The Taliban was the epitome of Islamism: No one could claim to be more Islamist than Mullah Muhammad Omar. The Iraqi Baath represented the most radical version of Arab nationalism, inspired by Nazism and communism. If anybody could have created the pan-Arab Utopia, it was Saddam Hussein. The defeat of those two "models" has given democrats in the Muslim world a chance to get their message through to the masses previously captivated by Islamism and pan-Arabism.
"The genie will not return to the bottle," says Iraqi scholar Faleh Abdul-Jabbar. "There is a growing feeling in the region that the days of despotic regimes are numbered."
"The thing is, this is open debate that wasn't there three or four months ago," Jordan's King Abdullah told the Washington Post last week. "Once you open that door, it is very hard to shut it. So countries that are resistant to it are now having to look at the issues of reform."
One reason for this optimism is the belief that the Bush administration is determined to shift the United States from being a supporter of the status quo in the Middle East to being a champion of democratic change.
"The United States understands that its security is contingent on change in the Middle East," says Saudi novelist Turki al-Hamad. "The Americans have learned that as long as our societies are not reformed, they cannot be safe."
During the past few months the Muslim world has witnessed a series of conferences devoted to reform, change, and democratization.
Last month's Arab League Summit in Tunis, though it avoided the word democratization, approved a set of changes designed to broaden the base of political decision-making. A couple of weeks before that, the issue had topped the agenda of a major regional conference in Jordan. Similar conferences have been held in Kuala-Lumpur, the Malaysian capital, the Yemeni capital of Sanaa, the Lebanese capital Beirut, Turkey's cultural capital Istanbul, and Alexandria in Egypt. All these conferences endorsed the clear message that for Muslim nations democratic reform is the only way out of "a historic quagmire."
To be sure, the debate on whether Islam is compatible with democracy is not over. But many in the region believe that the issue now is the necessity of democracy for Muslims rather than its compatibility with Islam.
The fact that almost no one in mainstream Islam regrets the demise of the Taliban and the Iraqi Baath shows that, contrary to claims by some "Islamologists," the overwhelming majority of Muslims do not love despots and are not prepared to fight for them.
Some countries in the region--among them Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Yemen, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman--are already moving towards the open-society model, albeit at widely different paces. All have held elections that, though not free and fair by Western standards, could be regarded as acceptable by the standards of the so-called developing world.
Other countries--notably Saudi Arabia and Egypt--have accepted the need for reform but are trying to limit the power that the ruling elites would have to relinquish to make change meaningful.
The Saudi dynasty has launched a series of "national dialogue" sessions to assess public opinion on reform. The latest, held in Jeddah last week, focused on women's rights and produced 19 demands which, if implemented, could make Saudi women full citizens for the first time. Egypt and Iran are toying with the idea of emulating the so-called Chinese model, combining political repression with economic liberalization. A version of that model is already in place in Tunisia. Still frozen in their despotic ways are Libya, Sudan, and Syria.
Despite a public relations drive to improve his image abroad, Libya's dictator, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, continues to preside over one of the region's most repressive regimes. In Syria, however, pressure for change is on the rise. Last week a coalition of eight parties called on President Bashar Assad to end the monopoly of its Baath party on political power and accept pluralism "as a principle of national politics."
Most regimes in the region are committed to holding elections in one form or another, abandoning the claim that only informal consultation is acceptable in Islam.
Perhaps more important, words and phrases that denote democratization are being heard in conversations and read in newspapers: opening, dialogue, participation, consent, pluralism, separation of powers, rule of law, due process, free enterprise, civil society, good governance, human rights, gender equality, accountability, and transparency.
Cynics might suggest that all this is nothing but the tribute that vice pays to virtue. The despots may talk of democracy as a tactic to weather the storm created by the liberation of Afghanistan and Iraq, but they will revert to their traditional methods of rule by violence and bribery. And there is, of course, no guarantee that any elections they hold will not be "fixed" to confirm the power of the rulers. Whether the cynics are right depends largely on what happens in Afghanistan and Iraq in the coming months.
The Afghans are scheduled to hold their first-ever free elections in September, followed by the Iraqis, who will go to the polls in January 2005. To be held under international supervision, the Afghan and Iraqi elections could produce the first accurate picture of opinion in two key Muslim countries. As things stand, there is every chance that both elections will be won by moderate conservatives who recognize the importance of power sharing and popular participation in decision-making.
Success in the Afghan and Iraqi elections could help bring Muslim politics out of the palaces, army barracks, mosques, and streets, and direct it into new channels such as political parties, parliaments, and law courts. The tepid message from Sea Island, then, is not the end of the story.
Transforming the greater Middle East from an area of despotism and darkness into one of democracy and development requires the same vision and determination that led the Free World to victory over the Soviet "Evil Empire" less than a generation ago.
The same people who laughed at Ronald Reagan for believing that communism could be defeated now dismiss Bush's call for democratization in the Middle East as another sign of American naiveté. Professional anti-Americans shudder at the thought that "someone like George W. Bush" might actually not only win the war on terror but also help the Muslim nations join the mainstream of global human development. President Bush should trust his instinct and remain committed to helping the Middle East take the path of democratic change.
Amir Taheri is the author of ten books on the Middle East and Islam.
Liberal scoffers underestimate its prospects.
by Amir Taheri
AT THE CLOSE of the recent G-8 summit in Sea Island, Georgia, sighs of relief could be heard in palaces across the Middle East where unelected leaders wield near-absolute power.
The summit had been expected to produce a clarion call for reform in the only part of the world still largely unaffected by changes that have reshaped global politics since the end of the Cold War. Instead, it settled for a string of bland admonitions.
Anxious to avoid fresh charges of unilateralism, and responding to demands from French president Jacques Chirac and German chancellor Gerhard Schröder, President Bush toned down his call for a democratic revolution in the greater Middle East.
But though the message from Sea Island has disappointed many moderates in the region, the process of change triggered by the liberation of Afghanistan and Iraq shows no sign of coming to a close. In liberal circles in Europe and North America, the idea that George W. Bush could inspire any democratic revolution may provoke derision, but in the Middle East, U.S. action in Afghanistan and Iraq is seen as marking the end of an era--the era in which the region's politics was dominated by pan-Arabism and Islamism.
The Taliban was the epitome of Islamism: No one could claim to be more Islamist than Mullah Muhammad Omar. The Iraqi Baath represented the most radical version of Arab nationalism, inspired by Nazism and communism. If anybody could have created the pan-Arab Utopia, it was Saddam Hussein. The defeat of those two "models" has given democrats in the Muslim world a chance to get their message through to the masses previously captivated by Islamism and pan-Arabism.
"The genie will not return to the bottle," says Iraqi scholar Faleh Abdul-Jabbar. "There is a growing feeling in the region that the days of despotic regimes are numbered."
"The thing is, this is open debate that wasn't there three or four months ago," Jordan's King Abdullah told the Washington Post last week. "Once you open that door, it is very hard to shut it. So countries that are resistant to it are now having to look at the issues of reform."
One reason for this optimism is the belief that the Bush administration is determined to shift the United States from being a supporter of the status quo in the Middle East to being a champion of democratic change.
"The United States understands that its security is contingent on change in the Middle East," says Saudi novelist Turki al-Hamad. "The Americans have learned that as long as our societies are not reformed, they cannot be safe."
During the past few months the Muslim world has witnessed a series of conferences devoted to reform, change, and democratization.
Last month's Arab League Summit in Tunis, though it avoided the word democratization, approved a set of changes designed to broaden the base of political decision-making. A couple of weeks before that, the issue had topped the agenda of a major regional conference in Jordan. Similar conferences have been held in Kuala-Lumpur, the Malaysian capital, the Yemeni capital of Sanaa, the Lebanese capital Beirut, Turkey's cultural capital Istanbul, and Alexandria in Egypt. All these conferences endorsed the clear message that for Muslim nations democratic reform is the only way out of "a historic quagmire."
To be sure, the debate on whether Islam is compatible with democracy is not over. But many in the region believe that the issue now is the necessity of democracy for Muslims rather than its compatibility with Islam.
The fact that almost no one in mainstream Islam regrets the demise of the Taliban and the Iraqi Baath shows that, contrary to claims by some "Islamologists," the overwhelming majority of Muslims do not love despots and are not prepared to fight for them.
Some countries in the region--among them Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Yemen, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman--are already moving towards the open-society model, albeit at widely different paces. All have held elections that, though not free and fair by Western standards, could be regarded as acceptable by the standards of the so-called developing world.
Other countries--notably Saudi Arabia and Egypt--have accepted the need for reform but are trying to limit the power that the ruling elites would have to relinquish to make change meaningful.
The Saudi dynasty has launched a series of "national dialogue" sessions to assess public opinion on reform. The latest, held in Jeddah last week, focused on women's rights and produced 19 demands which, if implemented, could make Saudi women full citizens for the first time. Egypt and Iran are toying with the idea of emulating the so-called Chinese model, combining political repression with economic liberalization. A version of that model is already in place in Tunisia. Still frozen in their despotic ways are Libya, Sudan, and Syria.
Despite a public relations drive to improve his image abroad, Libya's dictator, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, continues to preside over one of the region's most repressive regimes. In Syria, however, pressure for change is on the rise. Last week a coalition of eight parties called on President Bashar Assad to end the monopoly of its Baath party on political power and accept pluralism "as a principle of national politics."
Most regimes in the region are committed to holding elections in one form or another, abandoning the claim that only informal consultation is acceptable in Islam.
Perhaps more important, words and phrases that denote democratization are being heard in conversations and read in newspapers: opening, dialogue, participation, consent, pluralism, separation of powers, rule of law, due process, free enterprise, civil society, good governance, human rights, gender equality, accountability, and transparency.
Cynics might suggest that all this is nothing but the tribute that vice pays to virtue. The despots may talk of democracy as a tactic to weather the storm created by the liberation of Afghanistan and Iraq, but they will revert to their traditional methods of rule by violence and bribery. And there is, of course, no guarantee that any elections they hold will not be "fixed" to confirm the power of the rulers. Whether the cynics are right depends largely on what happens in Afghanistan and Iraq in the coming months.
The Afghans are scheduled to hold their first-ever free elections in September, followed by the Iraqis, who will go to the polls in January 2005. To be held under international supervision, the Afghan and Iraqi elections could produce the first accurate picture of opinion in two key Muslim countries. As things stand, there is every chance that both elections will be won by moderate conservatives who recognize the importance of power sharing and popular participation in decision-making.
Success in the Afghan and Iraqi elections could help bring Muslim politics out of the palaces, army barracks, mosques, and streets, and direct it into new channels such as political parties, parliaments, and law courts. The tepid message from Sea Island, then, is not the end of the story.
Transforming the greater Middle East from an area of despotism and darkness into one of democracy and development requires the same vision and determination that led the Free World to victory over the Soviet "Evil Empire" less than a generation ago.
The same people who laughed at Ronald Reagan for believing that communism could be defeated now dismiss Bush's call for democratization in the Middle East as another sign of American naiveté. Professional anti-Americans shudder at the thought that "someone like George W. Bush" might actually not only win the war on terror but also help the Muslim nations join the mainstream of global human development. President Bush should trust his instinct and remain committed to helping the Middle East take the path of democratic change.
Amir Taheri is the author of ten books on the Middle East and Islam.
Kerry's Cruel Realism
By DAVID BROOKS
ometimes in the unscripted moments of a campaign, when the handlers are away, a candidate shows his true nature. Earlier this month, Andres Oppenheimer of The Miami Herald asked John Kerry what he thought of something called the Varela Project. Kerry said it was "counterproductive." It's necessary to try other approaches, he added.
The Varela Project happens to be one of the most inspiring democracy movements in the world today. It is being led by a Cuban dissident named Oswaldo Payá, who has spent his life trying to topple Castro's regime. Payá realized early on that the dictatorship would never be overthrown by a direct Bay of Pigs-style military assault, but it could be undermined by a peaceful grass-roots movement of Christian democrats, modeling themselves on Martin Luther King Jr.
As a young man, Payá founded a magazine called People of God, but it was shut down. He criticized the Soviet Union and was thrown into a work camp. He was given a chance to escape Cuba, but refused.
Then in the mid-1990's, he and other dissidents exploited a loophole in the Cuban Constitution that allows ordinary citizens to propose legislation if they can gather 10,000 signatures on a petition. They began a petition drive to call for a national plebiscite on five basic human rights: free speech, free elections, freedom to worship, freedom to start businesses, and the freeing of political prisoners.
This drive, the Varela Project, quickly amassed the 10,000 signatures, and more. Jimmy Carter lauded the project on Cuban television. The European Union gave Payá its Sakharov Prize for human rights.
Then came Castro's crackdown. Though it didn't dare touch Payá, the regime arrested 75 other dissidents and sentenced each of them to up to 28 years in jail. This week Payá issued a desperate call for international attention and solidarity because the hunt for dissidents continues.
John Kerry's view? As he told Oppenheimer, the Varela Project "has gotten a lot of people in trouble . . . and it brought down the hammer in a way that I think wound up being counterproductive."
Imagine if you are a Cuban political prisoner rotting in a jail, and you learn that the leader of the oldest democratic party in the world thinks you're being counterproductive. Kerry's comment is a harpoon directed at the morale of Cuba's dissidents.
Imagine sitting in Castro's secret police headquarters and reading that statement. The lesson you draw is that crackdowns work. Throw some dissidents in jail, and the man who might be president of the United States will blame the democrats for being provocative.
Imagine if in the 1980's Ronald Reagan had called Andrei Sakharov or Natan Sharansky or Lech Walesa or Vaclav Havel "counterproductive" because, after all, what they did spawned crackdowns, too.
If there's anything we've learned over the past 20 years it is the power of moral suasion to buck up dissidents and undermine tyrannical regimes. And yet Kerry seems to have decided that other priorities come first.
Over the past several months, Kerry and his advisers have signaled that they would like to take American foreign policy in a more "realist" direction. That means, as Kerry told the editors of The Washington Post, playing down the idea of promoting democracy and focusing narrowly instead on national security. That means, as Kerry advisers told Joshua Micah Marshall in The Atlantic, pursuing a foreign policy that looks more like the one Brent Scowcroft designed for the first Bush administration.
You can see why Kerry thinks that's a clever shift, after the arduous efforts to promote democracy in Iraq. With realism, you avoid humanitarian interventions.
But if we are going to turn realist, let's be clear about what that means in practice. It means worrying less about the nature of regimes and dealing with whoever happens to be in power. It means alienating people who dream of living in freedom while we luxuriate in ours. It means doing little to confront crimes against humanity; realism gives a president a thousand excuses for inaction. It means betraying people like Oswaldo Payá — again and again and again.
There's a reason Carter, Reagan and George W. Bush all turned, in different ways, against this approach. They understood that democracy advances security, kowtowing to dictators does not. Most of all, they didn't want to conduct a foreign policy that would make them feel ashamed.
By DAVID BROOKS
ometimes in the unscripted moments of a campaign, when the handlers are away, a candidate shows his true nature. Earlier this month, Andres Oppenheimer of The Miami Herald asked John Kerry what he thought of something called the Varela Project. Kerry said it was "counterproductive." It's necessary to try other approaches, he added.
The Varela Project happens to be one of the most inspiring democracy movements in the world today. It is being led by a Cuban dissident named Oswaldo Payá, who has spent his life trying to topple Castro's regime. Payá realized early on that the dictatorship would never be overthrown by a direct Bay of Pigs-style military assault, but it could be undermined by a peaceful grass-roots movement of Christian democrats, modeling themselves on Martin Luther King Jr.
As a young man, Payá founded a magazine called People of God, but it was shut down. He criticized the Soviet Union and was thrown into a work camp. He was given a chance to escape Cuba, but refused.
Then in the mid-1990's, he and other dissidents exploited a loophole in the Cuban Constitution that allows ordinary citizens to propose legislation if they can gather 10,000 signatures on a petition. They began a petition drive to call for a national plebiscite on five basic human rights: free speech, free elections, freedom to worship, freedom to start businesses, and the freeing of political prisoners.
This drive, the Varela Project, quickly amassed the 10,000 signatures, and more. Jimmy Carter lauded the project on Cuban television. The European Union gave Payá its Sakharov Prize for human rights.
Then came Castro's crackdown. Though it didn't dare touch Payá, the regime arrested 75 other dissidents and sentenced each of them to up to 28 years in jail. This week Payá issued a desperate call for international attention and solidarity because the hunt for dissidents continues.
John Kerry's view? As he told Oppenheimer, the Varela Project "has gotten a lot of people in trouble . . . and it brought down the hammer in a way that I think wound up being counterproductive."
Imagine if you are a Cuban political prisoner rotting in a jail, and you learn that the leader of the oldest democratic party in the world thinks you're being counterproductive. Kerry's comment is a harpoon directed at the morale of Cuba's dissidents.
Imagine sitting in Castro's secret police headquarters and reading that statement. The lesson you draw is that crackdowns work. Throw some dissidents in jail, and the man who might be president of the United States will blame the democrats for being provocative.
Imagine if in the 1980's Ronald Reagan had called Andrei Sakharov or Natan Sharansky or Lech Walesa or Vaclav Havel "counterproductive" because, after all, what they did spawned crackdowns, too.
If there's anything we've learned over the past 20 years it is the power of moral suasion to buck up dissidents and undermine tyrannical regimes. And yet Kerry seems to have decided that other priorities come first.
Over the past several months, Kerry and his advisers have signaled that they would like to take American foreign policy in a more "realist" direction. That means, as Kerry told the editors of The Washington Post, playing down the idea of promoting democracy and focusing narrowly instead on national security. That means, as Kerry advisers told Joshua Micah Marshall in The Atlantic, pursuing a foreign policy that looks more like the one Brent Scowcroft designed for the first Bush administration.
You can see why Kerry thinks that's a clever shift, after the arduous efforts to promote democracy in Iraq. With realism, you avoid humanitarian interventions.
But if we are going to turn realist, let's be clear about what that means in practice. It means worrying less about the nature of regimes and dealing with whoever happens to be in power. It means alienating people who dream of living in freedom while we luxuriate in ours. It means doing little to confront crimes against humanity; realism gives a president a thousand excuses for inaction. It means betraying people like Oswaldo Payá — again and again and again.
There's a reason Carter, Reagan and George W. Bush all turned, in different ways, against this approach. They understood that democracy advances security, kowtowing to dictators does not. Most of all, they didn't want to conduct a foreign policy that would make them feel ashamed.
Love Our Technology, Love Us
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
BEIJING
If anti-Americanism is on the rise around the world, no one told the kids in the student visa line at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. The quest among Chinese students for visas to study in America, say U.S. Embassy officials, has become so intense that it has spawned Internet chat rooms, where Chinese students swap stories about which arguments work best with which U.S. consular officials and even give them names like "Amazon Goddess," "Too Tall Baldy" and "Handsome Guy."
Just how closely Chinese students strategize over the Internet on how to get visas to America — at a time when fewer are being given for security reasons — was revealed to the embassy recently when on one day one consular officer had scores of students come through with the same line, which some chat room had suggested would work: "I want to go to America to become a famous professor." After hearing this all day, he was surprised to get one student who came before him and pronounced, "My mom has an artificial limb and I want to build a better artificial leg for my mom and that is why I want to study in the U.S." The consular officer was so relieved to hear a new line that he told the young man: "You know, this is the best story I've heard this morning. I really salute you. I'm going to give you a visa."
You guessed it. The next day every other student who showed up at the embassy said he or she wanted to go to America to learn how to build "a better artificial limb for my mother." Said one U.S. official: "We have to be so careful what we say, because it gets into the chat rooms right away."
Hearing stories like this, you have to wonder: are Bush officials right when they dismiss all of this talk that President Bush has made America more unpopular in the world now than at any other time in postwar history? Do people really hate us? Don't those visa lines say otherwise? This is worth a closer look.
To begin with, there a few "technical" reasons why anti-Americanism generally does not have the same edge in Asia as in Europe and the Middle East. Asia's leaders, as a group, have much more legitimacy than leaders in the Arab world, either because they have come to power through free elections or because they have delivered on their core promise to their people of economic growth. Because of that, they don't need to demonize America regularly to deflect their people's anger from them. Also, Asia generally is focused like a laser on economic development — and countries like China see investment and technology transfer from America as critical to their growth. "People in Asia do not hate the United States," Singapore's elder statesman, Lee Kuan Yew, said to me. "Big countries like China and India are focused right now on their economic development and they see in America an enormous well to draw technology and economic growth from."
But here's the problem: Young people want American education and technology more than ever, but fewer and fewer want to wear our T-shirts anymore — want to be identified as "pro-American." As one former U.S. diplomat in Beijing put it to me: "They want to cherry-pick us, not line up with us. We've lost prestige."
The idea of America as the embodiment of the promise of freedom and democracy — not just of technology and high living standards — is integral to how we think of ourselves, but it is no longer how a lot of others think of us. They are now compartmentalizing. The unilateral war in Iraq, the postwar mess there, the walk-away from Kyoto and other treaties, the Abu Ghraib scandal have taken a toll. The idea of America as embodying the charisma of democracy has been damaged. As the political theorist Yaron Ezrahi put it, "America as the do-gooder has been hurt, but America as the goods-doer is still there."
Fortunately, this situation is not irreparable. The longing for an America that exports hope, not fear, and that is an example of the best global practices and values, runs really deep in the world. In fact, it is one reason that some people abroad are so angry with President Bush — because they blame him for taking that America away from them. I'm convinced a different approach or different administration would elicit a big response from the world. But for now, we will pay a price, because when people want to line up for our visas but not for our policies, it means Americans alone will have to bear the burden and the price of those policies.
That is not good for us. When you lose your status as a power with values, you weaken your ability to fight those powers without values.
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
BEIJING
If anti-Americanism is on the rise around the world, no one told the kids in the student visa line at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. The quest among Chinese students for visas to study in America, say U.S. Embassy officials, has become so intense that it has spawned Internet chat rooms, where Chinese students swap stories about which arguments work best with which U.S. consular officials and even give them names like "Amazon Goddess," "Too Tall Baldy" and "Handsome Guy."
Just how closely Chinese students strategize over the Internet on how to get visas to America — at a time when fewer are being given for security reasons — was revealed to the embassy recently when on one day one consular officer had scores of students come through with the same line, which some chat room had suggested would work: "I want to go to America to become a famous professor." After hearing this all day, he was surprised to get one student who came before him and pronounced, "My mom has an artificial limb and I want to build a better artificial leg for my mom and that is why I want to study in the U.S." The consular officer was so relieved to hear a new line that he told the young man: "You know, this is the best story I've heard this morning. I really salute you. I'm going to give you a visa."
You guessed it. The next day every other student who showed up at the embassy said he or she wanted to go to America to learn how to build "a better artificial limb for my mother." Said one U.S. official: "We have to be so careful what we say, because it gets into the chat rooms right away."
Hearing stories like this, you have to wonder: are Bush officials right when they dismiss all of this talk that President Bush has made America more unpopular in the world now than at any other time in postwar history? Do people really hate us? Don't those visa lines say otherwise? This is worth a closer look.
To begin with, there a few "technical" reasons why anti-Americanism generally does not have the same edge in Asia as in Europe and the Middle East. Asia's leaders, as a group, have much more legitimacy than leaders in the Arab world, either because they have come to power through free elections or because they have delivered on their core promise to their people of economic growth. Because of that, they don't need to demonize America regularly to deflect their people's anger from them. Also, Asia generally is focused like a laser on economic development — and countries like China see investment and technology transfer from America as critical to their growth. "People in Asia do not hate the United States," Singapore's elder statesman, Lee Kuan Yew, said to me. "Big countries like China and India are focused right now on their economic development and they see in America an enormous well to draw technology and economic growth from."
But here's the problem: Young people want American education and technology more than ever, but fewer and fewer want to wear our T-shirts anymore — want to be identified as "pro-American." As one former U.S. diplomat in Beijing put it to me: "They want to cherry-pick us, not line up with us. We've lost prestige."
The idea of America as the embodiment of the promise of freedom and democracy — not just of technology and high living standards — is integral to how we think of ourselves, but it is no longer how a lot of others think of us. They are now compartmentalizing. The unilateral war in Iraq, the postwar mess there, the walk-away from Kyoto and other treaties, the Abu Ghraib scandal have taken a toll. The idea of America as embodying the charisma of democracy has been damaged. As the political theorist Yaron Ezrahi put it, "America as the do-gooder has been hurt, but America as the goods-doer is still there."
Fortunately, this situation is not irreparable. The longing for an America that exports hope, not fear, and that is an example of the best global practices and values, runs really deep in the world. In fact, it is one reason that some people abroad are so angry with President Bush — because they blame him for taking that America away from them. I'm convinced a different approach or different administration would elicit a big response from the world. But for now, we will pay a price, because when people want to line up for our visas but not for our policies, it means Americans alone will have to bear the burden and the price of those policies.
That is not good for us. When you lose your status as a power with values, you weaken your ability to fight those powers without values.
