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Monday, September 29, 2003

This reminds me of Europe today. With the only difference that it is still stuck back then!


The Lost Boys
By BOB HERBERT


enny Grant is a middle-aged real estate appraiser in New York City whose family hit the state lottery some years back. But that's not important to this story.

"There was a drug that came around, had to be early 1970-71 — it was called pink mescaline," he said. "We would do it day after day after day."

They'd drop this acid and then somebody might suggest they play stickball. So Mr. Grant and his buddies, high on mescaline, would make their way to a gathering spot that had been sacred to them since childhood, a nondescript playground called 2nd Street Park in the Brighton Beach section of Brooklyn.

This was the era of the Grateful Dead and antiwar protests and confusion of every kind for the immediate post-World War II generation, which had been handed every advantage and was supposed to save the world.

As many of us know from experience, and as others will see with extreme clarity in a documentary film called "The Boys of 2nd Street Park," an awful lot of kids from that generation were barely able — in some cases, unable — to save even themselves.

Mr. Grant gestures, on camera, toward the park. "That was home plate. We were in the outfield, and playing stickball on this psychedelic pink mescaline. Pitching, catching and hitting in ecstatic bliss."

"The Boys of 2nd Street Park" is an intensely personal and very moving film directed by New York public relations man Dan Klores (who was one of the boys but is not profiled in the film) and co-produced by Mr. Klores and Ron Berger.

A presentation of the Showtime cable network, it tells the story of a group of kids from working-class backgrounds in a mostly Jewish neighborhood who centered their lives on a playground, and who pursued the sport of basketball, at least for a while, as if it were the one true religion.

The film's achievement, I think, is that it manages to turn that tiny patch of New York City asphalt into a mirror that reflects much of the reality of an entire generation. When the Boys of 2nd Street Park graduated from basketball to drugs in the 1960's — when they started dropping acid and smoking weed and surrendering to a bliss they'd never previously known — they were following an imperative that swept, often with tragic results, through young people from every group and every region in America.

They were also discovering a different kind of bliss, the new sexual freedom of the 1960's, which carried its own risks for those who were unprepared. Steve Satin, who married his high school sweetheart and took off on a serendipitous cross-continental honeymoon with several pals in tow, says in the film that one of his friends "took it upon himself to solve our problems — by sleeping with my wife."

And, of course, there was Vietnam, which meant that for some of the boys there was a draft to dodge. Bobby Feld was already seeing a psychiatrist when he got his draft notice. The doctor gave him a letter to give the draft board. "It basically termed me a paranoid-schizophrenic with — dare I say — with homicidal tendencies," said Mr. Feld.

He was exempted from the draft, he said, "and I was told that in a case of national emergency they'd draft women and children before they would draft me."

Some of the boys went on to lead decent lives as adults, raising families and achieving professional success. Some have endured excruciating tragedies, including the loss of children. One was murdered. Some dropped out and stayed out. Mr. Satin lost two decades to the walking death of drug addiction.

I asked Mr. Klores why he thought so many of the dreams of the first wave of baby boomers got derailed. He saw drugs as the main culprit. But his movie goes deeper, showing how youthful ignorance, misguided peer pressure and the absence of a sense of purpose and meaning in one's life can lead to all kinds of self-destructive behavior, including drug use.

The Boys of 2nd Street Park are graying and balding now, but apparently as affectionate and loving with one another as ever. They're in their 50's and long lines of sadness and regret are strung through some of their stories. They're bright guys and they know how much of their promise remained unrealized.

It was supposed to have been different for the generation that romped in cowboy suits in the 50's and ushered in the era of rock 'n' roll. It was supposed to have been better.



The Mask of Warka
By WILLIAM SAFIRE


WASHINGTON — A tip from an Iraqi led to a frightened boy, then to a smuggler, finally to a farm where — wrapped in rags under six inches of dirt — Iraqi police and U.S. troops recently found the priceless Mask of Warka, "the Mona Lisa of Mesopotamia," the face sculpted 5,500 years ago and stolen during the liberation of Baghdad.

Acting on another tip, searchers were directed to a garden near Tikrit, where they found a buried cache of weapons, including 23 missiles capable of shooting down aircraft.

Intelligence is the tool we need to find out where to dig. Those now so gleefully certain we will find no weapons of mass destruction may be surprised if — someday — an Iraqi technician, no longer terrified of reprisal or eager for reward, directs us to an easily hidden sack of deadly germs.

Such a find would be treated with suspicion by the legion with a stake in failure. Planted by the C.I.A., they'd say; or, old viruses left over from a previous era. Nothing that helps justify our overthrow of this generation's bloodiest tyrant — not human rights, not even a major victory in the war on terror — will they find acceptable.

Evidence of that deep-seated denial is the reaction to the most significant and extensive poll conducted this year by the Gallup organization.

The startling finding: despite all the hardships — the early looting, the explosions and killings afterward, the publicized lack of power and worry about water, fear of the bands of criminals that Saddam released and of terrorists that Syria and Iran exported — despite it all, two out of three residents of Baghdad believe that they are better off today under occupation than they were in the "orderly" times when Saddam was butchering his opposition.

That is the opposite of the impression created by pictures of explosions and angry shouters. The Gallup results that get the news lead are those showing a slip in President Bush's approval rating. But when the newsworthy measurement of Iraqi pro-overthrow opinion is even reported, a secondary finding is emphasized: the popularity of Jacques Chirac.

How should Bush and Tony Blair react to such failuremongering in the face of strategic success? They acted on the best information and logical evaluation, took no chances in stopping a proven sociopath and — as Bush coolly reminded grumpy U.N. politicians who had vacillated for a decade — "the world is safer today."

Realistically we should expect political campaigning, not gratitude, from the temporary leadership we appointed. As night follows day, members of the Iraqi Governing Council will outdo one another in demanding more authority quickly — thereby currying favor with potential voters and future European customers — while secretly hoping our coalition sticks around to make the country governable.

We should take full advantage of the Franco-German-Russian shortsighted unwillingness to take part in Iraq's reconstruction. For example, that means the $10 billion claim on Iraq's empty treasury to pay for Saddam's arms should be paid by New Iraq on the day Vladimir Putin redeems the czarist debt, including interest, and not a day sooner.

We should also take the $21 billion portion of the $87 billion budget that Bush earmarked for rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure and make that an obligation of an Iraq Reconstruction Finance Corporation. It is right for America to pay the military costs of regime change because it was clearly in our (and the free-riding world's) anti-terror interest. But New Iraq's huge oil reserves should be collateral for our low-interest loans to pay for the rebuilding of that nation's economy.

The Iraq we ultimately leave behind will be happy to be rid of all occupiers. It will belong to the Arab League and OPEC. But it will not sponsor terror nor threaten its Kurds and Shiites with genocide. New Iraq has a good chance of showing its oppressed, downtrodden neighbors what freedom and enterprise can do for Arab peoples.

The happily recovered mask of Warka, with its mysterious oval face and darkened eyes — relic of the Sumerian civilization that invented writing — is a suitable symbol of the reborn nation. She may look a little like Hillary Clinton wearing sunglasses, but I think I can detect a smile.


2 Servings of Reality, Please
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN


The American public got a real tutorial in diplomacy last week, one that I suspect it could have done without. It was introduced to two concepts: the free rider and the war of choice. How the U.S. public digests these two concepts is going to have a huge impact on our next presidential election.

The free rider lesson was administered by all of America's friends, allies and rivals at the United Nations. President Bush went up there last week, hat in hand, looking for financial and military support for the war he chose to launch in Iraq. I would summarize the collective response of the U.N. to Mr. Bush as follows:

"You talkin' to us? This is your war, pal. We told you before about Iraq: You break it alone, you own it alone. Well, you broke it, now you own it. We've got you over a barrel, because you and your taxpayers have no choice but to see this through, so why should we pay? If you make Iraq a success, we'll all enjoy the security benefits. We'll all get a free ride. And if you make a mess in Iraq, all the wrath will be directed at you and you alone will foot the bill. There is a fine line between being Churchill and being a chump, and we'll let history decide who you are. In the meantime, don't expect us to pay to watch. We were all born at night — but not last night."

Oh, I suspect if the U.S. manages to secure some new U.N. resolution giving more cover to the U.S. reconstruction of Iraq, we will scrounge up a few Indian or Turkish soldiers and maybe a few dollars, but nothing that will make a real dent in the $87 billion price tag the Bush team has presented to the American people.

Sorry folks, we broke it, we own it, and the worst thing we could do now is start shortchanging ourselves. There is a move in Congress to fully finance that part of the $87 billion for U.S. troops in Iraq, but to slash the $20 billion for Iraqi schools and reconstruction. That would be a big mistake. It is that $20 billion that is the key to getting out and leaving behind a reasonably stable, self-governing Iraq.

As if this weren't enough for one week, the U.S. public also got a lesson in wars of choice. It was administered by David Kay, the former U.N. weapons inspector who has been leading the U.S. team searching for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Last week Mr. Kay gave an interim report indicating that in four months of searching in Iraq he has found none of the W.M.D. that President Bush cited as his principal reason for going to war.

What this means for the American people is this: The war to oust Saddam Hussein was always a war of choice (a good choice, I believe). But democracies don't like to fight wars of choice, and, if they do, they want them to be quick sprints, like Bosnia, Kosovo or Grenada — not marathons. Knowing this, the Bush team tried to turn Iraq into a war of necessity by hyping the threat Saddam may have posed with W.M.D.

With Mr. Kay's interim report, it is now becoming clear that this was not a war of necessity at all, it was a war of choice, and, on top of it all, it was a war of choice that is going to be a marathon, not a sprint. And, because the Bush team chose to start this marathon largely alone, the free-riding world is going to let us finish it, and pay for it, largely alone.

This is the cold, hard reality and U.S. politics will now be about how we manage it. So far, notes Jeff Garten, dean of the Yale School of Management, "the politics of the day, whether by Republicans or Democrats, has not been up to the magnitude of the task. There is disparity between the words people use to describe the challenge and any honest appraisal of what it's going to take to succeed."

President Bush is deeply morally unserious when he tells Americans that we can succeed in this marathon and still have radical tax cuts for the rich and a soaring deficit, and the only people who will have to sacrifice are reservists and soldiers. And the Democrats had better decide: What is their party going to be about? Wallowing in the mess, endlessly criticizing how we got into Iraq, or articulating a broader, more realistic vision for successful nation-building there?

The lessons learned this week, and their implications, are gigantic. They will shape America's role in the world, its perception of itself and its ability to grapple with both foreign and domestic problems for years to come. I think the American people will see this through, but they want a pragmatic, strategically optimistic, morally serious plan to get behind. The leader who presents that will be the next president — I hope.


Not Ready for Prime Time: A National Dichotomy

Political Elite Is Schizophrenic
WASHINGTON, Sep. 25, 2003


If there has ever been a crowd that is never satisfied, it’s Washington’s political pros. In his latest Against the Grain commentary, CBSNews.com's Dick Meyer chatters about the contradictions of the chattering class.


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We want a fresh face. And then when one comes along, we morph "fresh" into "inexperienced and untested."

We crave candidates who are even mildly unscripted, who dare to toss the odd sprinkle of spontaneity into the processed pablum of politics. And then when one comes along, we jump on the inevitable gaffes and tongue-slips with arsenic-laced keyboards and soundbites. They’re damned if they do, damned if they don’t.

The "we" here is not "We the people" but we the political elite (and I use the term very loosely): the political press, the punditocracy, the talking heads, the consultants.

The political elites devour the young we lure into campaigns like whiny, glutinous cannibals. And today’s specials are Wesley Clark and Howard Dean.

"Not Ready for Prime Time" proclaims the headline of a recent column by The Washington Post’s Richard Cohen, and it captures the ethos of much punditry about the Democrats’ two freshest faces. "This game of politics is complicated," writes Cohen, and Clark and Dean just don’t get it. Never mind that Clark is leading in two national polls in the first week of his campaign. Disregard the fact that Dean is leading the money race and has an inspired grassroots network. They are amateurs and outsiders and the law of electoral gravity will bring them down.

(A thought: if politics is so complicated, how did Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush get to be president? I think politics is pretty simple. If people like a candidate, they have a tendency to vote for him, or her.)

If John Edwards’ campaign were hot right new, he would be the too-fresh-boy. There would be even more citations of the political elite’s pseudo-favorite cautionary tale, "The Candidate," where the newly-elected Robert Redford pathetically asks, "What do we do now?"

And if Lieberman, Gephardt or Kerry was on fire, we’d be wondering when this tired, programmed old pro would go down the Gore-drain.

I freely admit and openly declare that I am a sucker for two of these vocational character flaws.

I like outsiders and non-politicians in campaigns. I like them for their entertainment value, because they spruce up a stale story and because they sometimes speak English or, in the case of H. Ross Perot, a funny dialect. So I vow never to complain about Clark and Dean’s lack of political plasticity.

I also like politicians who go "off message." Candidates like John McCain, Bob Dole and Howard Dean are gaffe-prone because they are willing to engage in unrehearsed, human-like conversation. They have senses of humor, wit, irreverence, and sometimes they get mad and cranky. They misuse buzzwords and then get buzz-sawed by the rhetoric police. So I vow never to be a gaffe predator.

Other politicians like Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush are gaffe-prone even though they are highly scripted because they are less articulate and have trouble with words and syntax. These bloopers delight intellectuals and opponents, but rarely become news stories.

Voters, in my experience, are sympathetic to both sorts of gaffes. The political elite isn’t.

Clark’s first week was allegedly marred by a gaffe on what one reporter called his "signature issue" – his opposition, as a former four-star general, to the war in Iraq. Soon after he tossed his helmet into the ring, Clark, asked about the congressional resolution that authorized use of force in Iraq, said, "At the time, I probably would have voted for it, but I think that's too simple a question." GAFFE: flip-flop flap to follow.

I am underwhelmed by that flap. What Clark was saying was that at the time of the vote, the U.S. was trying to pressure Saddam into major concessions on weapons inspections and congressional backing for the president’s threat may have been expedient, though Clark was and remained against the unilateral war. That’s not a sound bite, it’s a tad complicated, and it’s not very close to what actually came out of his mouth. But a flap? I don’t see it. President Bush’s routinely utters more mangled policy locutions that are translated charitably.

But for Clark, the political elite immediately pounced with the "not ready for prime time" theory. Clark had the last laugh in the form of terrific poll numbers.

Ironically, one of the pouncers was fellow outsider and gaffe-meister, Howard Dean. "I was shocked," Dean said. Yeah right, shocked my... asterisk.

Just two weeks earlier, Dean was fighting his own gaffe-flap. Talking to a few reporters about the Middle East at a coffeehouse in Santa Fe, Dean said "it’s not our place to take sides" in the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians. GAFFE: flap to follow.

Again, I am underwhelmed by the flap. If Dean had been more precise and said, "The U.S. is an unwavering ally of Israel and opponent of Palestinian terror and extremism, but will continue to try to facilitate reconciliation between these historic enemies" there would have been no flap.

Joe Lieberman flayed Dean over this in the next debate. And Dean, in turn said Lieberman was trying to "demagogue" this issue. Just as Dean, who reminds us that he’s a truth-telling shoot-from-the-hip kind of a guy, is now trying to "demagogue" Clark’s remark.

So voters shopping in the Clark and Dean aisles beware. Since LBJ and Tricky Dick, voters have preferred presidents who run far outside the Beltway – outsiders, but only superficially and geographically. The finicky aesthetic of the political elite has also prevailed; none of so-called outsiders were mavericks and they weren’t new to political campaigning.

Wes Clark better still have his flak jacket. And Howard Dean too, though he won’t be getting one of Clark’s extras now.

Dick Meyer, the Editorial Director of CBSNews.com, is based in Washington. For many years, he was a political and investigative producer for The CBS News Evening News With Dan Rather.

E-mail questions, comments, complaints and ideas to
Against the Grain




Beyond 'Nation-Building'


By Donald H. Rumsfeld
Thursday, September 25, 2003; Page A33


Two weeks into Operation Iraqi Freedom, a number of newspapers and many airwaves were filled with prognosticators declaring the war plan a failure. The United States, they said, did not do enough to build international support, did not properly anticipate the level of resistance by Iraqis, and failed to send enough forces to do the job.

Then coalition forces took Baghdad in 21 days. Today Gen. Tom Franks's innovative and flexible war plan, which so many dismissed as a failure, is being studied by military historians and taught in war colleges.

Today in Iraq, an innovative plan is also being implemented in our effort to win the peace. And it should come as no surprise that we are again hearing suggestions as to why the postwar effort is on the brink of failure.

It will take longer than 21 days, but I believe that the plan to win the peace in Iraq will succeed -- just as the plan to win the war succeeded.

Why did some predict failure in the first weeks of the war? One reason, I suspect, is that Gen. Franks's plan was different and unfamiliar -- in short, not what was expected. And because it didn't fit into the template of general expectations, many assumed at the first setback that the underlying strategy had to be flawed. It wasn't. Setbacks were expected, and the plan was designed to be flexible so our forces could deal with surprise. The coalition forces did so exceedingly well.

I believe the same will be true of the effort in Iraq today. Once again, what the coalition is doing is unfamiliar and different from many past "nation-building" efforts. So, when the coalition faces the inevitable surprises and setbacks, the assumption is that the underlying strategy is failing. I do not believe that is the case. To the contrary, despite real dangers, I believe that the new approach being taken by Gen. John Abizaid and Ambassador L. Paul Bremer will succeed and that success will have an important impact, not just on the future of Iraq but also on future international efforts to help struggling nations recover from war and regain self-reliance.

Today in Iraq we are operating on the same guiding principle that has brought success to our effort in Afghanistan: Iraq and Afghanistan belong to the Iraqi and Afghan peoples -- the United States does not aspire to own or run those countries.

During the war in Afghanistan, this philosophy helped shape the military campaign. Instead of sending a massive invasion force, we kept the coalition footprint modest and adopted a strategy of teaming with local Afghan forces that opposed the Taliban. The use of precision-guided weapons and the immediate delivery of humanitarian relief sent the message that we were coming as a force of liberation. And after the major fighting ended, we did not flood Afghanistan with Americans but rather worked with Afghans to establish an interim government and an Afghan national army. In Iraq the military challenge was notably different. No force of Iraqi fighters could have toppled the Saddam Hussein regime without significant numbers of coalition forces -- though in the north, Special Operations forces and Kurdish pesh merga fighters did tie down Hussein's northern units and liberate Mosul. Even so, we did not flood the country with a half-million U.S. troops. We kept our footprint modest, liberating Iraq with a little more than 100,000 U.S. troops on the ground. The use of precision weapons allowed us to save innocent lives and make clear that this was a war against a regime, not a people. And when major combat operations ended, we began working immediately to enlist Iraqis to take responsibility for governance and security.

We have made solid progress: Within two months, all major Iraqi cities and most towns had municipal councils -- something that took eight months in postwar Germany. Within four months the Iraqi Governing Council had appointed a cabinet -- something that took 14 months in Germany. An independent Iraqi Central Bank was established and a new currency announced in just two months -- accomplishments that took three years in postwar Germany. Within two months a new Iraqi police force was conducting joint patrols with coalition forces. Within three months, we had begun training a new Iraqi army -- and today some 56,000 are participating in the defense of their country. By contrast, it took 14 months to establish a police force in Germany and 10 years to begin training a new German army.

Why is enlisting Iraqis in security and governance so important?

Because it is their country. We are not in Iraq to engage in nation-building -- our mission is to help Iraqis so that they can build their own nation. That is an important distinction.

A foreign presence in any country is unnatural. It is much like a broken bone. If it's not set properly at the outset, the muscles and tendons will grow around the break, and eventually the body will adjust to the abnormal condition. This is what has happened in some past nation-building exercises. Well-intentioned foreigners arrive on the scene, look at the problems, and say, "Let's go fix it for them." Despite the good intentions and efforts of the international workers, there can be unintended adverse side effects. Because when foreigners come in with solutions to local problems, it can create dependency. Economies can remain unreformed, distorted and dependent. In some instances, educated young people make more money as drivers for international workers than as doctors or civil servants.

For example, East Timor is one of the poorest countries in Asia, yet the capital is now one of the most expensive cities in Asia. Local restaurants are out of reach for most Timorese and cater to international workers, who are paid 200 times the average local wage. At the city's main supermarket, prices are reportedly on par with those in London and New York.

Or take Kosovo. A driver shuttling international workers around the capital earns 10 times the salary of a university professor, and the U.N. administration pays its local staff between four and 10 times the salary of doctors and nurses. Four years after the war, the United Nations still runs Kosovo by executive fiat, issuing postage stamps, passports and driver's licenses. Decisions made by the local elected parliament are invalid without the signature of the U.N. administrator. And still, to this day, Kosovar ministers have U.N. overseers with the power to approve or disapprove their decisions.

Our objective is not to create dependency but to encourage Iraqi independence, by giving Iraqis increasing responsibility, over time, for the security and governance of their country. Because long-term stability comes not from the presence of foreign forces but from the development of functioning local institutions. The sooner Iraqis can take responsibility for their own affairs the sooner U.S. forces can come home.

That is why the coalition has been recruiting Iraqis to help defend Iraq, why municipal councils have been formed in 90 percent of the country and why the Iraqi Governing Council is taking charge of developing the 2004 budget and creating a process for the drafting of a new constitution, written by Iraqis, so that the Iraqi people can eventually choose their leaders in free elections -- and we can achieve an orderly transfer of full sovereignty.

Coalition efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan are bearing fruit.

Afghanistan is on the path to stability and self-government -- transformed from a safe haven for terrorism to an important U.S. ally, not just in the war against terror but also in the larger struggle for freedom and moderation in the Muslim world.

In Iraq the regime is gone, and Iraqis are stepping forward to take responsibility for their country. They are serving local, regional and national governing institutions, signing up to serve as police, border guards, soldiers and civil defense forces, starting businesses, creating jobs and building a new nation from the rubble of Saddam Hussein's tyranny.

This is not to underestimate the challenges in Iraq today. Terrorists and regime remnants want to roll back our successes and stop the Iraqi people's transition to democracy and self-government. We can expect they will continue to attack our successes, and the brave Iraqis who work with us, for some time. But coalition forces are dealing with the threat. And the security situation is improving.

Indeed, we may find that the biggest threat in Iraq comes not from terrorists and regime remnants but from the physical and psychological effects of three decades of Stalinist oppression. But Iraq also has a number of advantages -- oil wealth, water and an elaborate system of irrigation canals, vast wheat and barley fields, biblical sites and the potential for tourism, and an educated, urban population.

But to help Iraqis succeed, we must proceed with some humility. American forces can do many remarkable things, but they cannot provide permanent stability or create an Iraqi democracy. That will be up to the Iraqi people.

The work in Iraq is difficult, costly and dangerous. But it is worth the risks and the costs, because if the coalition succeeds, Iraqis will take hold of their country, develop the institutions of self-government and reclaim their nation's place as a responsible member of the international community. If we succeed, we will deal terrorism a powerful blow, because a democratic Iraq in the heart of the Middle East would be a defeat for the ideology of terror that is seeking to take control of that area of the world.

It will take patience, but if we are steadfast, Iraq can become a model for a successful transition from tyranny to democracy and self-reliance, and a friend and ally of the United States and the world's free and peace-loving nations. A few months ago, that statement would have seemed fanciful to many. Today, it is a goal within reach. But only if we help Iraqis build their nation, instead of trying to do it for them -- and have the wisdom to know the difference.

The writer is U.S. secretary of defense.


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