Euroblogger

Take a Deep Breath
By DAVID BROOKS

Come on people, let's get a grip.

This week, Chicken Littles like Ted Kennedy and Robert Byrd were ranting that Iraq is another Vietnam. Pundits and sages were spinning a whole series of mutually exclusive disaster scenarios: Civil war! A nationwide rebellion!

Maybe we should calm down a bit. I've spent the last few days talking with people who've spent much of their careers studying and working in this region. We're at a perilous moment in Iraqi history, but the situation is not collapsing. We're in the middle of a battle. It's a battle against people who vehemently oppose a democratic Iraq. The task is to crush those enemies without making life impossible for those who fundamentally want what we want.

The Shiite violence is being fomented by Moktada al-Sadr, a lowlife hoodlum from an august family. The ruthless and hyperpoliticized Sadr has spent the past year trying to marginalize established religious figures, like Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who come from a more quietist tradition and who believe in the separation of government and clergy. Sadr and his fellow putschists have been spectacularly unsuccessful in winning popular support. The vast majority of Iraqis do not want an Iranian-style dictatorship. Most see Sadr as a young, hotheaded murderer who terrorizes people wherever he goes.

He and his band have taken this opportunity to make a desperate bid for power, before democratic elections reveal the meagerness of their following.

He has cleverly picked his moment, and he has several advantages. He is exploiting wounded national pride. He is capitalizing on the Iraqis' frustration with the American occupation (they continually overestimate our competence, then invent conspiracy theories to explain why we haven't transformed Iraq).

Most important, Sadr has the advantages that always accrue to fascist thugs. He is vicious, while his opponents are civilized. Sadr and his band terrify people, and ride on a current of blood. They get financial and logistical support from Iran. They profit from the mayhem caused by assorted terrorists, like Imad Mugniyah, who are sowing chaos in Iraq. They need to spark a conflagration to seize power.

Sadr's domestic opponents are ill-equipped to deal with him. The police have revealed their weakness. Normal Iraqis are doing what they learned to do under Saddam; they are keeping their heads down. Clerics like Sistani, who operate by consensus, do not want to be seen siding with outsiders against a fellow Muslim.

Nonetheless, Sadr faces long odds. Iraqis may be frustrated with the Americans, but they don't want to jump from Baath fascism to theocratic fascism. In a February poll, only 10 percent of Iraqis said it was acceptable to attack Americans. In Kut yesterday, CNN reported, local tribesmen, disgusted by Sadr's violence, rose up against his troops. If you'd listened to the recent hysteria, you never would have expected that to happen.

Furthermore, many of the most influential Shiite groups in Iraq, such as the Dawa and Sciri parties, are invested in the process of building the new Iraq. Their policies don't jibe with ours, but they have a stake in a democratic future and would love to see Sadr eliminated. There are even signs that the Iranians themselves regard Sadr as hopelessly volatile.

Most important, leadership in the U.S. is for once cool and resolved. This week I spoke with leading Democrats and Republicans and found a virtual consensus. We're going to keep the June 30 handover deadline. We're going to raise troop levels if necessary. We're going to wait for the holy period to end and crush Sadr. As Joe Lieberman put it, a military offensive will alienate Iraqis, but "the greater risk is [Sadr] will grow into something malevolent." As Charles Hill, the legendary foreign service officer who now teaches at Yale, observed, "I've been pleasantly surprised by the boldness and resolve."

Nonetheless, yesterday's defections from the Iraqi Governing Council show that populist pressure on the good guys is getting intense. Maybe it is time to pause, to let passions cool, to let the democrats marshal their forces. If people like Sistani are forced to declare war on the U.S., the gates of hell will open up.

Over the long run, though, the task is unavoidable. Sadr is an enemy of civilization. The terrorists are enemies of civilization. They must be defeated.

The first candle.-

It’s the day that brought me back to life. It’s the 9th of April and I’m free, and they will not steel my joy again and they will not silence me. A year ago at the same date, the thieves and criminals prevented me from celebrating my freedom in the open air, and today thieves, criminals and fanatics are doing the same, but they will not steal my happiness that is making my soul fly and dance with joy and they can’t stop this.

A year ago, words failed me as I met the 1st American soldier, and I still remember his name, “corporal, Adam” and all I could utter was “thank you!” how could I ever put my whole life in few words? How could I have thanked that soldier enough? How could I have told him what it meant to me to see him and his comrades-who brought me back to life- at last? Thank you Adam, Lieutenant Antonio, Captain Brian Curtis and all the coalition soldiers who I can’t remember their names, and those I never met.

It’s the 9th of April and I feel safe! And I don’t care what those ‘political experts’ on the newspapers and TV channels, say about the ‘occupation’, deteriorated security and ‘unemployment’. You can’t understand this, because you never experienced real fear this long. Let me tell you about it, as I’m one of those who passed Saddam’s filthy test of life.
The statue fell and with it, horror fell. You don’t know what it means to be scared to death most of your life, brothers and sisters. I knew that and I faced it during the reign of evil and darkness. I was afraid to talk, I wasn't allowed to think and I wasn't allowed to feel…I wasn't allowed to love.

How dare anyone imply to me how should I feel? And who they think they are, those who try to put words in my mouth? I’m alive and I’m free, and I have the right to say whatever I feel and chose the words I like. No one will tell me again what to say and what to feel.
Yes, it’s the 9th of April. I lit the 1st candle today to celebrate my 1st year, as a free man and no one will prevent me from celebrating. I, who the earth is no longer enough to contain my feelings, I who have wings now, and I don’t have to carry an ID…I’m Iraqi. I have the right to wander through my country southwards and northwards, without being stopped by someone to ask me who I am and where I’m going. I’m the son of the 9th of April.

Years ago, when I was a fugitive, a Ba’athist who’s a friend of my father and a relative said to me mockingly “how long are you going to live like this!? Get out of this ‘hole’ and turn yourself in to the authorities and do your military service.” I looked at him and I couldn’t say anything, but my soul screamed inside me, “The day when your tyrant becomes a defeated fugitive will come. He will search for a hole to hide in, and I will own Iraq then”. And here comes the dream true!

I’m the son of the 9th of April, tyrant’s clowns, and you have to fear me, you who betrayed me every minute and every day, and you want to chain me again???
You know why it’s impossible now? I was a slave and I never knew who I am…. and now I’m free! Thanks to all who dared to tell the truth and didn’t fear the consequences. And as for you, who saved me and my people, I can’t thank you enough. My voice goes feeble and my eyes swell with tears as I think of the Iraqis, Americans and all the coalition soldiers who gave their lives to free Iraq and make this world a better place. God bless their souls and all those who decided to fight to the end and never been discouraged, even in the toughest moments. I hope you can call me brother, because I’ll never fail you, as you never failed me.
This time, the 9th of April has come again and in what way! The powers of darkness and evil are trying to stifle my candle with their foul breaths but this time I'm alive and free and I will face them, and I will lit it again and again …and again.

By Mohammed.

- posted by Omar @ 20:28
Comments (115)

Days I do not want to forget.
The day, Wednesday, the 9th of April 2003.

“The American troops enter Saddam’s city peacefully”, this was the headline I saw when I woke up this morning. Ok, they’re on this side of the city. I didn’t give much attention to this news in the beginning; Baghdad is a big city with many big neighborhoods. Later my friend, Ahmed, asked me to go with him to buy some stuff they need for his grandfather’s funeral. As soon as we got to the street we saw something weird; there wasn’t even a single policeman or security personnel in the street, even traffic policemen disappeared. As a matter of fact we were heading just opposite to the direction from which the coalition troops are advancing and as we reached our destination we found some of the Ba’ath militia taking position in a narrow corner in the market and they looked scared. However, we shopped and drove back home and in the way I told my friend “it must be over, I feel this” he said “let’s try that guy standing over there” he was an ordinary man. I asked “what’s going on?” he said “I don’t know but the army and the Ba’ath party members have evaporated”. A little bit later we were surprised to see a police car driven by a bearded man in civilian clothes, we looked at each other’s face (what is this??) the man was driving around the square again and again with the siren turned on! Just a few seconds later we saw a governmental bus but the passengers were just an ordinary family and they were all sitting near the driver and they were all laughing! It seems that everything is over. I cried: HE’S GONE.

We drove home fast and as I entered the house I found that everyone was watching the news; they were showing an area that’s just a few kilometers from our place and there was a man slapping Saddam’s portrait with his slipper and another one shouting “we’re Americans, no, we’re USA! The time has come when America teaches Saddam a lesson". We were stunned, Saddam has fallen. The neighbors and friends gathered in the street, some faces were laughing and others, you could see fear and denial in their eyes.

I couldn’t hold myself and the joy that overwhelmed me anymore. This is not the time to stay at home, I drove with my friend to celebrate with the people and when we reached the first main street, the scene was different than what it looked an hour ago; their was a clash among the looters at one of the military facilities, we tried to ignore them and go on, but we were surprised by a spray of fire above our heads; the car in front of us took a very fast turn and stopped in front of us the driver shouted at us “go back, they’re stealing cars also”. There was a bunch of armed people standing few hundred meters away with their faces directed towards us. I didn’t see any American troops, they’re not here yet. We hurried back to our homes; the streets are too dangerous.

The rest of my friends and neighbors were waiting to hear from us, I screamed "Saddam has fallen" Everybody was shocked. Some of them couldn’t say a word, one of them asked me to repeat what I said and I replied "F*** Saddam". None of us dared before to swear at the ‘leader’ in public. My father put the radio aside and I saw tears in my father friend’s eyes, who hugged my father and congratulated him. We started to hug each other with tears of joy but I was somewhat depressed. I want to go out to the streets and scream as loud as I can to celebrate my freedom, but I couldn’t.

We gathered around the TV with our neighbors and friends watching the fast events and the funny thing is that many Arab channels (who were covering the war 24 hours a day) have totally ignored the issue in the beginning. They were showing songs, shows or scientific reports!!

We saw the people gathering around the statue and the American and Iraqi flags were held high by Iraqis and American soldiers…. And the statue fell, and fear fell, and here goes Baghdad free of her tyrant. A great feeling of relief.

One of my friends took his AK-47 and fired some shots in the air (for the first time in his life) we don’t know what to do and how to feel but the important thing is…It’s over.

-By Mohammed.

From Tyranny to Freedom
Democracy in Iraq has precedent.


Recent acts of barbarism against Coalition forces in Iraq have revived an old and enormously important debate: Are these terrorists the products of fanatic tyrannies, or are the tyrannies the logical expression of the true nature of the peoples of the region?



This is not an academic exercise, for many argue that our foreign policy depends on the answer. If we believe that the barbarism is the result of the likes of Saddam Hussein and the Iranian mullahs, then the war against terrorism should concentrate on regime change. Once the tyrants are removed, the terrorists will be deprived of their sustenance, and greater freedom and democracy can be expected. But, it is said, if fanaticism and barbarism are intrinsically part and parcel of the region's culture, mere regime change cannot possibly eliminate this sort of terrorism. Some way would have to be found to change the culture, and only then could terrorism be truly defeated and a political transformation succeed.

It is an ancient and highly instructive debate. It is featured in the book of Exodus in a lively confrontation between Moses and the Almighty. In one of the many uprisings against Moses, the Jews demand new leaders who will lead them back to Egypt. God reacts with disgust, tells Moses that these people are unworthy of the Divine mission, and announces his intention to kill all but a small remnant, the few people deserving of freedom and the Holy Land. Moses insists that they can be taught, and achieves a compromise: They will be spared, but will have to remain in the wilderness for 40 years. Thereafter a new generation will create Israel. Were the rebellious Jews created by Egyptian tyranny, or were they the sort of people who preferred tyranny to freedom?

The newly freed Egyptian slaves were not quickly transformed into freedom-loving democrats, despite their exceptional leaders. But in time they and their children learned the habits of mind of free people.

The greatest modern political thinker, Nicolò Machiavelli, observed that it is as difficult to bring freedom to a people accustomed to tyranny as it is to crush freedom in a free society. Yet Machiavelli knew that both had been accomplished, even though he took a very dim view of human nature ("man is more inclined to do evil than to do good").

At the end of the Second World War, the leaders of the Great Generation pondered the disposition of Germany and Japan. Many believed it was impossible to bring freedom to people who had embraced fascism and its attendant culture of death (from Japanese suicide bombers in their kamikaze aircraft to SS fighters on the ground celebrating heroic death). The celebrated George F. Kennan, then the chief of the State Department's policy-planning staff, was convinced that there were no potential democratic leaders in Germany, and that we should retain the Nazi bureaucracy. At least they knew how to manage a modern state. And in Japan, many of our wisest men insisted that the only hope for Japanese democracy was the total extirpation of the Imperial culture; the Emperor had to go.

But there were democrats in Germany who proved excellent leaders of a free country, and the emperor still sits on his throne in democratic Japan.

To those who say that democracy cannot be introduced in the Muslim Middle East, where it has never existed, there is an easy answer: If that were true, then there would be no democracy at all, since tyranny is older than democracy, and oppression has been far more common than freedom for most of human history. We all lived under tyranny before we became free; freedom has had to be wrested from the hands of kings, caliphs and nobles, and imams and priests — and it has invariably been a tough battle. But that is quite different from saying it cannot be done at all.

The history of the Muslim world abounds with example of successful self-government, from the high degree of autonomy granted to some of the lands of the Ottoman Empire to the remarkably modern Iranian Constitution of 1906, and the contemporary Middle East is currently bubbling with calls for greater freedom, often from surprising sources (such as the son of Libyan tyrant Muammar Khaddafi). It is hard to believe that the peoples of the Middle East are bound and determined to remain oppressed, when millions of Iranians have demonstrated for freedom, and, just within the past few months, pro-democracy demonstrations have erupted in Saudi Arabia and Syria.

Yet those in Iraq who are killing us and our allies, along with Arab civilians — and even themselves and their own children — are also part of the culture of the Middle East, and they draw upon it to justify their actions and inspire others to do likewise. Do we not have to change at least those elements of the region's culture? Can we expect to defeat terrorism without also discrediting the ideas and passions that underlie it? And does that not automatically mean a long process, in which political and military weapons are largely irrelevant?

I do not think so. Nothing so discredits an idea as its defeat in the real world. Had we not defeated the fascists in World War II, the heirs of Tojo, Hitler, and Mussolini would most likely still rule Japan, Germany, and Italy, and some version of fascism would most likely remain a potent force in many other societies, just as it was in the Twenties, Thirties and early Forties. But our victory in war defeated both the enemy regimes and their evil doctrines, and fascism is no longer an inspiration. If we defeat the terrorists and remove the regimes that support them, we are likely to find the appeal of bloody jihad dramatically reduced. There is undoubtedly a connection between the pro-democracy demonstrations (and Libya's surrender) and the liberation of Afghanistan and Iraq.

The barbarians in Fallujah are part of a culture that is both bloody and peaceful, just like the Western culture that produced fascism and communism. The central issue in this war is which elements in that culture will prevail. You do not have to be a Hegelian to believe that ideas rise and fall with the people that embrace them, or that culture is linked to the success and failure of its advocates. We may not know the answer to the academic question: whether the culture favored tyrants or if the tyrants imposed a culture favorable to their domination. But we do know the answer to the policy question: tyranny and terror, along with the culture that favors them, can be defeated, to the benefit of freedom and even democracy.

Crunch Time in Baghdad
Bush must prove he's determined to win.
Tuesday, April 6, 2004 12:01 a.m.

The next few days in Iraq may be the most critical since President Bush ordered the invasion a year ago. Millions of Iraqis, and millions of Americans, are waiting to see if the U.S. is still fighting in Iraq to win.
Marines were digging in around Fallujah yesterday, in anticipation of a military response to last week's mutilation of four U.S. civilians in that part of the Sunni Triangle. Meanwhile, the coalition announced that an Iraqi judge had issued a murder arrest warrant for the Shiite Muslim cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, who ordered the riots on Sunday that resulted in the deaths of eight Americans and a Salvadoran. If Mr. Bush fails to show that there is a price to pay for killing Americans, he might as well bring everyone home today.

Americans will support their President in war--far more than liberal elites appreciate. But they won't support a President who isn't fighting with enough force and the right strategy to prevail. Unlike Mr. Bush's determination to topple Saddam Hussein, the transition back to Iraqi rule has been marked in recent months by drift and indecision. Especially in the runup to the transfer of power on June 30, the worst Iraqis are rushing in to exploit this uncertainty.





What's needed now is a reassertion of U.S. resolve, notably on security but also on the transition to Iraqi sovereignty, and even if it means no drawdown of American forces any time soon. The coalition had hoped to turn over more of this task to Iraqis, and this remains both desirable and inevitable. But they clearly aren't yet up to that task in the face of well-armed insurgents or private militias.
Partly this is America's fault for not arming Iraqis on our side with enough firepower soon enough. The State Department (rather than the Pentagon) is responsible for disbursing the small arms that are now available, while Congress's desire to micromanage Defense procurement has delayed contracts from being let for more and better equipment. If Senate soundbite kibbitzers Richard Lugar and Joe Biden want to be constructive, this is a problem they could work on. In the meantime, U.S. forces will have to re-enter such cities and towns as Fallujah and work with Iraqis friendly to the coalition to restore order and kill or arrest those who target Americans.

This has to include Mr. Sadr. The young cleric has been stirring trouble for months, but with Sunday's riots he has crossed a line that makes him an urgent threat to the coalition and any new Iraqi government. Yesterday's judicial warrant implicates him in the mob slaying of another Shiite leader, the moderate Abdel-Majid al-Khoei, shortly after he had returned to Najaf from exile in London in April 2003.

Unlike Grand Ayatollah Sistani, Mr. Sadr never mentions the word "democracy" in his fatwas and talks openly of creating an Iranian-style Islamic Republic in Iraq. Mr. Sadr has visited Tehran since the fall of Saddam, and his Mahdi militia is almost certainly financed and trained by Iranians. Revolutionary Guards may be instigating some of the current unrest. As recently as last Friday, Mr. Sadr declared that "I am the beating arm for Hezbollah and Hamas here in Iraq." Hezbollah has been financed by Iran for years.

Having let Mr. Sadr's militia grow, the coalition now has no choice but to break it up. It should also warn the Dawa Islamic political party that its dealings with Iran won't be tolerated. As for Tehran, we would hope the Sadr uprising puts to rest the illusion that the mullahs can be appeased. As Bernard Lewis teaches, Middle Eastern leaders interpret American restraint as weakness. Iran's mullahs fear a Muslim democracy in Iraq because it is a direct threat to their own rule. If warnings to Tehran from Washington don't impress them, perhaps some cruise missiles aimed at the Bushehr nuclear site will concentrate their minds.

Proof of U.S. resolve is especially important as the transfer of sovereignty on June 30 nears. Millions of Iraqis are grateful for their liberation from Saddam and are willing to help us finish the job. But too many Iraqis already suspect that June 30 has more to do with our elections than with theirs. If they now see the U.S. failing to respond forcefully to the past week's unrest, they will conclude that the Americans are preparing to leave. Then the mayhem and jockeying for power will only get worse.





Yesterday, Mr. Bush reiterated his support for the June 30 transfer. But the timing is less important than the fact that the U.S. still has no plan for what will happen on that date. The current non-plan is for U.S. regent L. Paul Bremer to toss the ball to U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi and hope he can figure it out.
With elections put off for some months anyway, the default transfer plan will probably involve retaining the Iraqi Governing Council in some form. The coalition is better off doing this on its own and leaving the U.N. out of it. It isn't as if Kofi Annan is offering any troops, and Mr. Brahimi--a Sunni Arab nationalist close to nations that coddled Saddam--makes Shiites nervous. This latest Bush Administration dance with the U.N. is just one more signal to many Iraqis that the U.S. is eager to get out.

While we're at it, Mr. Bush can send an important signal with his choice of who should succeed Mr. Bremer as U.S. ambassador to Iraq. The worst choice would be a career diplomat. We'd recommend Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy Defense secretary, who has his own reputational stake in Iraq's success and would be seen by Iraqis as someone committed for the long haul. He also wouldn't need on-the-job training. Rudy Giuliani would also be a serious choice.

We trust that Mr. Bush knows that his reaction to Fallujah and Mr. Sadr matters far more to his re-election prospects than does Richard Clarke's book tour. Americans realize that the current 20-20 Beltway hindsight over 9/11 is mostly political. But they also know that Iraq was Mr. Bush's undertaking, and they will hold him responsible for any failure of will.

Neoconservatives and the American Mainstream

By Zachary Selden
Zachary Selden is the director of the Defence and Security Committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect those of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. The author would like to thank Jason Biros for his research assistance in preparing this article and Paul Cook, John Lis, Andrea Cellino, and Roberta Calorio for comments and suggestions.

Americans working and living in Europe are often struck by the preoccupation in defense and security circles with the pernicious influence of “neoconservatives” on U.S. foreign policy. There is a pervasive sense that American foreign policy is being driven down a radically new path by a small band of ideologues who have virtually hijacked the policymaking process. European defense and foreign policy elites are not the only ones who seem to believe that current U.S. foreign policy is something of an aberration; this view is found more broadly in European public opinion as well. In a 2003 Pew poll, approximately 75 percent of those surveyed in France and Germany said the current “problem with the U.S.” was mainly President George W. Bush, while only 21 percent said it had more to do with the United States in general. The end result is a dominant opinion in much of Europe that little will be repaired in the transatlantic relationship until there is a new presidential administration in the United States, or at least a marked reduction in the influence of the small group of neoconservative extremists who surround President Bush.

Although there are notable exceptions, many European commentators and much of the public are resorting to conspiratorial theories to explain the direction of U.S. foreign policy and somehow overlook the fact that American public opinion runs in favor of the president’s handling of foreign affairs. Perhaps more important, however, they overlook the deep historical roots of the current direction of American foreign policy. It is not driven by a “neocon cabal.” Rather, it is that certain individuals associated with the neoconservative label have been particularly articulate in expressing a set of policies that flow from two ideas that resonate deeply in American public opinion. The first is a belief that the United States has a responsibility to spread its vision of individual liberty. The second is that the primary and perhaps exclusive task of the federal government is to protect its citizens from external threats. Whatever the actual causes of U.S. action in any particular instance, those principles loom large in the public debate and shape how and when the United States becomes involved in other countries’ affairs.

The first principle is often credited to Woodrow Wilson, but in some ways its roots stretch back into the eighteenth century. It is founded on the moral assertions that have been part of American political thought since the early days of the republic. Chief among them is the idea that individual liberty is a moral absolute and that a system of governance that enshrines individual liberty is morally and practically superior to all others. This is a very fundamental belief, deeply embedded in American political thought and public opinion. It is a principle, however, that does not necessarily have the same level of importance in modern European political systems, whose constitutions tend to place a greater emphasis on social harmony than on individual liberty.

The second principle conflicts somewhat with the first and serves to moderate the impulse to intervention. Since the republic’s founding, there has been a vigorous debate as to the proper role of the federal government, a debate that is still at the heart of most cases brought before the U.S. Supreme Court. But there has always been a strong trend toward the idea of a limited federal government whose sole exclusive area of responsibility is in foreign affairs and the protection of the nation from external enemies. In fact, the first five numbers of the Federalist focus almost exclusively on foreign affairs and the need for a federal government to protect the nation from foreign influence. The end result of this idea is a broad consensus across the political spectrum that cautions against foreign interventions unless they are required for national security reasons.

We see these contradictory principles at work today. Since the 1970s, there have been those who argue for American military intervention in the Middle East, optimistically promoting what essentially boils down to a set of “American” values for the region. But most Americans have looked askance at such ideas without a national security justification for direct intervention. September 11, 2001, was the turning point. An increasingly large proportion of public opinion became more certain that the only way to ensure the nation’s security against transnational enemies operating from the Middle East was to transform the region. What was previously seen as too risky became acceptable in the aftermath of 9-11.

In essence, public opinion shifted in favor of policies that have been articulated by neoconservatives for at least a decade, and neocons have been very adept at articulating a policy that resonates with longstanding ideas in American public life. Therefore, what many label “neoconservative” is a product of ideas that are neither “neo” nor “conservative,” but a worldview that has broad appeal to American citizens in ways that are difficult for many Europeans to fully fathom within the context of their own political systems.

In short, if Europe is waiting for a new administration or a new set of policy professionals to rise to positions of influence, the continent may be in for a very long wait. The style in which affairs are conducted may change, and the blunt take-it-or-leave-it pronouncements of the current administration might be softened, but the substance of American foreign policy will remain roughly the same. The current direction of U.S. foreign policy — reshaping the Middle East, preemptive confrontations with potentially threatening adversaries, and an ambivalent attitude toward international organizations that constrain the use of American power to achieve those ends — is unlikely to change substantially with any new administration that could conceivably come to the White House in the near future. It is not the case that the president and a small band of advisors are steering America on a radically new path; rather, they are following a pattern in U.S. foreign policy with deep historical roots. If there is to be reconciliation within the transatlantic partnership, it must start with this recognition.



The core ideas

There is no shortage of studies on the roots of American foreign policy or the labels that can be associated with the enduring ideas that continue to guide it. Diplomatic historian Robert W. Tucker views it as a balance between those content to make the United States an exemplar of democratic virtues and those who want to launch crusades to impart those values throughout the world. Arthur Schlesinger sees it as a contest between realism and messianism. Henry Kissinger calls it a balance between isolationism and globalism. Walter McDougall identifies eight guiding principles, and Thomas Bailey finds five.1 Walter Russell Mead, in his Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World (Knopf, 2001), notes four tendencies that he labels Wilsonian, Jeffersonian, Jacksonian, and Hamiltonian. My purpose here is not to engage in a historical debate, but to highlight the core ideas that historians generally find at the roots of U.S. foreign policy.

Clearly, one set of core ideas is associated with American exceptionalism and, flowing from that idea, a revolutionary or messianic ethos that rises periodically to push the United States into global intervention in the name of individual liberty and freedom. Behind this tendency lies an assumption so prevalent and historically accepted in American political thought that it is rarely questioned: that American liberal values and institutions constitute a generalizable model that promotes human rights and prosperity. Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points are a classic example of this messianic belief, but so is the construction of the liberal international order forged out of the detritus of the Second World War.

Many around the world find the idea positively risible. America’s interventions in Latin America, its support for dictatorships, its interventions for pure realpolitik and commercial reasons are all said to expose this belief as a sham. There is no doubt that the United States is guilty of talking idealism and walking realism, but, as McDougall has written, U.S. foreign policy has always been a mix of “the good, the bad, and the ugly.” Regardless, the idea endures and repeatedly captures the public imagination. America as liberator is a powerful popular image that motivates a fair amount of U.S. foreign policy, even if the bad and the ugly often raise their heads as well.

Critics also raise the question of selective intervention. Sub-Saharan Africa is rife with repressive regimes guilty of horrific human rights abuses, yet the United States is not about to become embroiled in that continent. If spreading individual liberty is truly one of the core beliefs of American foreign policy, then why, ask the critics, does the U.S. virtually ignore Africa?

The answer lies in that second core belief shaping U.S. foreign policy: The federal government should be limited in its authority. How does this principle of domestic governance affect foreign policy? In a very basic sense, it shapes a prevalent conviction in American political thought that the primary — and, some would say, only — task of the federal government is to protect its citizens from foreign enemies. To a large extent, the whole framework of the federal government is based on the idea that is necessary to ward off enemies that could otherwise threaten individual states. This was an impetus behind abandoning the original Articles of Confederation and drafting the Constitution in 1787. Of course, investing power in the federal government diminished the power of the individual states, and in many ways this was seen at the time as a necessary evil. Thomas Jefferson spoke (and probably still speaks) for many Americans when he said, “We should be made one nation in every case concerning foreign affairs and separate ones in what is merely domestic.”

This idea is also at the root of John Adams’s famous assertion that America should not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. It is a two-centuries-old statement that probably still reflects a large swath of American public opinion, and it restricts the predilection toward intervention. Foreign adventures would only increase the power of the federal government, diminishing the authority of state and local governments. Becoming too embroiled in world events would mean raising a large standing military and increasing taxes along with other demands on the people and the individual states. For a republic founded on the idea of individual liberty above all else, resting on a Constitution that specifically limits the power of the federal government, this is a dangerous prospect.

In large part, many of these fears have been realized. The power of the federal government has increased dramatically over the past century as the U.S. has become gradually more active and finally dominant in world affairs. But this only makes the principle of limiting the power of the federal government all the more relevant in American politics. Therefore, any American president who seeks to convince the public to back an intervention for purposes that are not explicitly in the interest of national security will face an uphill battle. American public opinion was divided over interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti for precisely this reason. Even in the abstract, Americans are far less likely to favor committing troops to such operations than Europeans. In the Worldviews 2002 survey, fewer than half of Americans (48 percent) favored using the military to “bring peace in a region where there is civil war” while 72 percent of Europeans favored the same. At the root of American ambivalence lies a fundamental conviction that the federal government should remain within limited powers — not launch crusades that detract from its core purpose.

It takes a significant event to move American public opinion away from supporting a constrained foreign policy to supporting a grand reshaping of the international environment, but such shifts in public opinion can be massive and rapid once the nation is threatened. Woodrow Wilson could not muster popular support for the U.S. entrance into World War i until German U-boat activity convinced the public that Germany constituted a threat to American national security. Franklin Roosevelt failed to stir public opinion to enter World War ii before Pearl Harbor. Here was a clear case of blatant aggression and fascist brutalization of millions of people around the world, but the American impulse toward intervention was checked by a more fundamental question: Does such an intervention fit within the primary task of the federal government? Roosevelt tried for over a year to bring the U.S. into the war, but until Pearl Harbor the American public remained very divided.

President Bush himself evinces these contradictory impulses. As a candidate, Bush pledged a “humble” approach to global affairs — to refrain from using American forces for the sort of unclear peacekeeping and nation-building exercises that characterized the deployment of the U.S. armed forces in the 1990s. Once the nation was threatened, however, he shifted his rhetoric and policy decisions to support what is probably the largest nation-building exercise since World War ii.



America and Europe: Vive la différence?

In robert kagan’s now-famous assessment, “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.”2 Kagan traces the differences in attitudes on the use of power in the international environment to the fact that the United States has the ability to project power and Europe does not. In fact, it is precisely America’s capability to project power that allowed the great experiment of a united Europe to flourish along with what Kagan, following the scholar-diplomat Robert Cooper, calls the “postmodern” ideas that clash with America’s “Hobbesian” view of the world. But as Kagan also notes, there are differences between the transatlantic partners that have more to do with the distribution of ideas than the current distribution of power.

At a very basic level, much of Europe fails to appreciate the seriousness of the core principles animating American foreign policy and how deeply they affect popular opinion. Where Europe sees imperialism, America sees the use of power for moral purposes. Where Europe asks by what right America imposes its values, America sees those values as universal and moral absolutes. Where Europe sees hypocrisy, America sees a balance between competing principles.

Those principles are very real and are reflected in the founding documents of the republic and the writings of early observers such as Tocqueville. The messianic aspects of American exceptionalism are found throughout many of the basic texts of American history, although they tend to focus on America as the exemplar of liberty (John Winthrop’s “city upon a hill”) rather than as a crusading state bringing the benefits of individual liberty to the oppressed. However, the two visions rapidly became conflated in early American history. By his second term as president, Thomas Jefferson began to speak less of America as the “exemplar of liberty” and more of America as the “empire of liberty.”3

At the same time, the more cautionary and limiting principles regarding how the nation should be governed are readily apparent in the Constitution. Despite the fact that the document explicitly gives all powers not specifically designated as federal responsibilities to the individual states and the people in general, the states demanded additional restrictions on the federal government as found in the first 10 amendments to the Constitution.

Cynics may be correct that many U.S. citizens are unaware of the actual content of the Constitution, but they are very aware of its basic purpose: to restrict the power of the government in the name of individual liberty. The U.S. Constitution is essentially a product of eighteenth-century Enlightenment thought that elevates the protection of individual liberty as a core purpose of government. As a result, many of the rights set down in it are protections against the intrusion of the state (e.g., “Congress shall make no law . . .”). Regardless of the number of individuals who can cite chapter and verse from the Constitution, most understand that it is a document designed to protect the citizen from an overreaching government.

This is a very different social contract from what is found in European constitutions. Those documents were generally drafted later and reflect social democratic ideas arising in the nineteenth century. As a result, they often establish expanded conceptions of what the state will provide its citizens, including social security, housing, and even environmental protection. Often those same constitutions also spell out what the citizen is expected to give the state in return, such as obligatory military service.

The difference is quite fundamental. The U.S. Constitution puts a premium on individual liberty and freedom from governmental interference in the citizens’ daily affairs. Most European constitutions place a premium on social harmony, reserving the right of the state to more directly affect the lives of its citizens for the provision of specific public goods. One can argue that those documents are a reflection of the values found in their societies or, conversely, that the values found in society are imposed by the system of governance flowing from the founding document. Either way, the end result is that Europe and the United States hold up different ideas about the role of government and the ideals that undergird the political system.

We should be skeptical of making vast generalizations based on such a cursory look at a few documents — clearly there are exceptions — but the assessment presented here is a condensation of longstanding comparative analyses. What is important to note, however, is that it is precisely those principles that distinguish the United States from Europe that neoconservatives have invoked to argue for the current direction of American foreign policy.



Right place at the right time

It is difficult to define neoconservative foreign policy or to spell out what distinguishes it from other strains of political thought. Originally the label was applied to former leftists who became anti-communist after World War ii and to Democrats who found themselves more in the Republican camp in the post-Vietnam era. But many of the individuals identified as neocons today are too young to have been part of the original group or were never associated with the Democratic Party.

Some turn to a more arcane definition of “the neoconservatives” as the students of the University of Chicago political philosophy professor Leo Strauss. Others note the Jewish surnames of many of the president’s foreign affairs and defense advisors and hint darkly that the U.S. government is being manipulated for the benefit of Israel. Once again, these definitions fail to satisfy. Strauss may have been an influence on some, but it is difficult to believe that a relatively obscure philosophy professor dead for 30 years could now suddenly wield such influence over the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. By the same token, many of President Bush’s advisors may indeed have Jewish roots, but many do not; it is, moreover, truly bizarre to believe that individuals can work their way to the top of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus by advocating the interests of another state to the detriment of the United States.

More often than not, the label is now employed as a pejorative to mean “hawkish on foreign policy.” But this description applies to much of the American public since September 11. What has happened is that some commentators and defense intellectuals associated with the neocon label have been successful after 9-11 in articulating ideas that resonate with the general public and deep-seated beliefs that have historically guided the conduct of American foreign policy.

As much as some may have wanted to push the U.S. toward intervention in Iraq and take a firmer line with state supporters of terrorism, it simply was not politically possible until the clear and present danger presented itself. The arguments of Paul Wolfowitz and others were originally made in the early 1990s. They pressed for a more interventionist policy based on the threat to U.S. national security posed by inaction in the Greater Middle East, particularly in Iraq. One does not have to look any further than the Defense Planning Guidance of 1992 (co-authored by Wolfowitz), which in part advises removing the Saddam Hussein regime, to see the pattern. Others have long been advocating increased U.S. pressure on other regimes in the region, such as Iran and Syria. But it was not until September 11 that such a policy could have resonance in American public opinion.

There is also a strong misperception in Europe that the ideas ascribed to the neocons represent a small, extreme faction of the Republican Party. Although the so-called neocons may in general be Republicans, their ideas have a fair degree of approval within the ranks of the Democratic Party as well. In my own recollection, the first two individuals to promote the idea of military action to remove Saddam Hussein from power were both Democratic Party figures — one a retired congressman and the other a former Clinton administration official. It also bears repeating that 81 Democrats in the House of Representatives voted in favor of authorizing the president to use military force in Iraq. Clearly there is more involved here than a handful of Rasputin-like ideologues whispering in the president’s ear.

In truth, much of what has been identified as the neoconservative agenda has little to do with Republican versus Democrat; it is more a contest between realists and idealists — with the neocons firmly in the idealist camp. Realists are generally conservative in the true sense of the word. They do not seek to take risks to extend liberal democratic ideals. On the contrary, they seek to maintain American primacy and would not risk diluting finite resources to take on an enormous and protracted mission such as remaking the Middle East.

The realist school of thought contrasts sharply with the neoconservative camp, whose agenda would not be unfamiliar to Woodrow Wilson. He too sought to remake the international system from a position of relative strength, to spread democracy and the rule of law. It is true that today’s crusaders are not about to place their trust in international institutions to do the job, but the basic ideals are similar in that they seek to use American power to reshape the global environment in the name of a set of liberal democratic ideals. It is their belief that this will make the United States more secure by reducing the seemingly intractable problems of the Middle East, thus getting at some of the root causes of terrorism. In taking up this banner, the neocons play into a very deep and old aspect of American political thought. This is why President Bush could speak for a large majority of the country when he set forth such an ambitious agenda based on their proposals.



Substance and style

Grand conspiracy theories are not needed to explain the direction of American foreign policy. What is needed is an appreciation of the core ideas that have guided it over the years and how those ideas differ from what is found in European political thought. If the transatlantic relationship is to recover from the current rift, it is important to understand the roots of the differences.

Of course, some may argue that the political ideas held by the American public are simply a product of the messages that the national leadership broadcasts. Therefore, the entire idea of looking at core ideas and principles is suspect. There is no doubt that leaders shape and mold public opinion, but it seems extremely unlikely in an age of instant access to information from a variety of sources that the American public could be so held in sway by its leaders if the message those leaders delivered was not in line with their basic sentiments and opinions.

The argument presented here may be a cause for further pessimism about the transatlantic alliance. If the two sides are truly on divergent paths and operating from very different root beliefs, many could say it is time to finalize the divorce and move on. But a few factors counsel against this level of resignation. First, the divergent root beliefs have always been there. The current direction of American foreign policy is not at all out of character with past actions and grows from deep-seated principles. Second, the U.S. may choose to deal with its allies in a somewhat different manner depending on the administration or the particular officials within the current administration.

The current administration’s emphasis on pragmatism and frank speaking has a certain cultural appeal to many Americans, but given the hegemonic position of the U.S. in the global environment, frank speaking often sounds dictatorial. Consider some of the international agreements that the U.S. refuses to sign that many in Europe cite as evidence of American intransigence: the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention Protocol, the International Criminal Court, and the Kyoto Protocol. Many Americans see those agreements as deeply flawed in their current state, and it is safe to say that none would stand a chance of being ratified by the U.S. Senate. Indeed, the Senate voted unanimously to reject the Kyoto Protocol in its current form in a sense of the Senate resolution. Given the far more independent role of the Congress in foreign policy compared to most European legislatures, an American president faces a very difficult task in moving any international agreement forward without a large degree of congressional support. The Bush administration chose to be blunt in its approach to all four and remove the U.S. from the negotiations. At one level, there is a pragmatic appeal to this approach: Why continue to spend countless hours negotiating agreements that the Senate is unlikely to support? On another level, however, there is certainly room in American foreign policy to maintain the process in the hope that something worthwhile and acceptable will eventually emerge. One can only wonder whether the current state of the transatlantic relationship would be better at this point had the U.S. chosen that path.

In other words, style may change even if substance remains largely the same. This may help alleviate the current rift in transatlantic relations, but it will not erase the basic differences in how and why the United States acts in the international environment. Those causes are deeply rooted in basic principles that have guided American foreign policy for a very long time, and they are unlikely to change anytime soon.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes

1 Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776 (Houghton Mifflin, 1997). Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969).

2 Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” Policy Review 113 (June-July 2002).

3 See Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson (Oxford University Press, 1990).