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Terrorists Betray Our Values
When Americans and Arabs unite, the enemies of peace will be defeated.
By King Abdullah II
Abdullah II is king of Jordan.

September 14, 2003



AMMAN, Jordan — This year, Jordanians, like Americans, have been killed and injured in devastating terror bombings in Saudi Arabia and Baghdad. The dead include a 5-year-old boy, Yazan Abassi, and his 10-year-old sister, Zeina. The faces of these victims and their grieving families are in my mind whenever I read terrorists' claims to speak for the Arab and Muslim people. In fact, my people have been among the first to suffer from those who preach the culture of terror and seek power through violence. And their claim that Islam justifies their actions is, pure and simple, a lie.

The evil that occurred Sept. 11 two years ago left scars on the whole world, but none as great as the false idea that Islam encourages violence. Yet according to a recent poll by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, this is what a growing number of Americans think. That's a misunderstanding that threatens to divide the friends of peace, Arab and American, just when we most need to stand together.

The truth is that from its very earliest days, Islam has called on its believers to lead lives of peace and tolerance. The very name of Islam is rooted in the word for peace, al salaam. Far from sanctioning the killing of innocents, our faith prohibits it. Jihad, so often translated as "holy war," actually means struggle. And the Prophet Muhammad, Peace Be Upon Him, taught that the greater holy war is the war inside ourselves, against our own weaknesses and failings.

When extremists commit atrocities, they are also doing violence to Islamic teachings. Long before the 20th century's Geneva Conventions on war, Muslim soldiers were given strict rules of conduct to protect civilians. Even today, schoolchildren learn a famous speech by the Prophet's first successor, Abu Bakr. He commands integrity, forbids the killing of innocents of any faith and bans wanton destruction: "Do not betray, do not deceive, do not bludgeon and maim, do not kill a child, nor a woman, nor an old man," he instructed. "Do not burn; do not cut down a fruit tree If you come across communities who have consecrated themselves to the [Christian church], leave them."

It is also untrue that Islam forbids its believers from engaging constructively in the modern world. The Koran and Hadith — the sayings and deeds of the Prophet, Peace Be Upon Him — support a dynamic faith of discourse and interpretation. From the earliest times, believers were called on to discuss, reason and apply the principles of their faith to the real world around them.

The resulting golden age of Islam, beginning in the 9th century, was driven by the work of enlightened Muslim thinkers. They pioneered a rationalist, liberal tradition and a thriving, multiethnic civilization. Islamic scholars set milestones in medicine, astronomy, science and social justice, ideas that paved the way for the European Renaissance. Great Arab cities provided refuge and new ideas to travelers from around the world. Muslim, Christian and Jewish scholars, like the great Jewish philosopher Maimonides, worked together in the royal courts.

In the 14th century, a new kind of orthodoxy came to power, which closed the door on debate and discovery. Yet the age-old, positive traditions of Islam provide another path, a path that respects diversity, pioneers new ideas and empowers people throughout society. As an Islamic nation for the 21st century, Jordan is inspired by these values as we shape an open, democratic and free civil society.

In 2003 there are more than 1 billion Muslims worldwide, and the vast majority are people of peace. Since September 2001, this moderate, silent majority of Muslims has begun to speak up about the true Islam. Jordan is leading the way. For us, this is a historic responsibility. Our soil, the Levant, is after all the ancient home of all three great monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Here at the home of faith, we are determined to spread Islam's promise of tolerance, justice and progress — both within our own country and as a model for peacemaking and democratic reform in our region.

It is also important for the true Islam to be understood in the West. Ours is a critical moment in history, a time of genuine possibilities for progress — in the war on terror, in the peace process in the Middle East, in the reconstruction of Iraq. The enemies of peace would like nothing better than to discourage and divide us. We must not let it happen.

This week I will be in Washington, D.C., to talk with President Bush and Congress about our shared goals for peace, and how to achieve them. Jordan and the United States have a significant strategic alliance that is contributing to the success of the global war on terror. In the Middle East, we have worked closely together to bring peace to the homeland of faith — to end the conflict and occupation that have caused so much suffering to Palestinians and Israelis alike. The "road map" to peace has been sanctioned by the international community. It offers Israelis collective security guaranteed by all Arabs; a peace treaty and normal relations with Arab states; and an end to the conflict. It offers Palestinians an end to the occupation; a viable, independent state by 2005; and the promise to live as a free and prospering people.

The road map can take us to a lasting peace, peace that is an essential requirement for development and reform throughout the Middle East, peace that will end the festering despair that terrorism and hatred have fed on. But success will require our full commitment, our resources and, most important, our unity.

The only people who win when Americans feel divided from their Arab and Muslim friends are the extremists and haters. Let's not allow these enemies of peace to do any more violence than they already have. Now, more than ever, we need to stand together, as allies, partners and friends.

From the Secretary of State upon returning from Iraq

'As Long as It Takes'
Iraqis are on the road to democratic self-government.

BY COLIN POWELLFriday, September 19, 2003 12:01 a.m.

I have just returned from Iraq. What I saw there convinced me, more than ever, that our liberation of Iraq was in the best interests of the Iraqi people, the American people and the world.
The Iraq I saw was a society on the move, a vibrant land with a hardy people experiencing the first heady taste of freedom. Iraq has come a long way since the dawn of this year, when Saddam Hussein was holding his people in poverty, ignorance and fear while filling mass graves with his opponents. The Iraqi regime was still squandering Iraq's treasure on deadly weapons programs, in defiance of 12 years of United Nations Security Council resolutions. While children died, Saddam was lavishing money on palaces and perks, for himself and his cronies.





Thanks to the courage of our brave men and women in uniform, and those of our coalition partners, all that has changed. Saddam is gone. Thanks to the hard work of Ambassador L. Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq is being transformed. The evidence was everywhere to be seen. Streets are lined with shops selling newspapers and books with opinions of every stripe. Schools and universities are open, teaching young Iraqis the skills to live in freedom and compete in our globalizing world. Parents are forming PTAs to support these schools, and to make sure that they have a voice in their children's future. The hospitals are operating, and 95% of the health clinics are open to provide critical medical services to Iraqis of all ages.
Most important of all, Iraqis are on the road to democratic self-government. All the major cities and over 85% of the towns have councils. In Baghdad, I attended a city council meeting that was remarkable for its normalcy. I saw its members spend their time talking about what most city councils are concerned with--jobs, education and the environment. At the national level I met with an Iraqi Governing Council that has appointed ministers and is taking responsibility for national policy. In fact, while I was there, the new minister of justice announced the legal framework for a truly independent judiciary.

The Governing Council has appointed a central bank governor who will be in charge of introducing Iraq's new, unified currency next month. It also recently endorsed new tariffs and is now discussing world-class reforms to open the country to productive foreign investment. Now, the Governing Council is turning its attention to the process for drawing up a democratic constitution for a democratic Iraq.

I was truly moved when I met with my counterpart, Hoshyar Zebari, free Iraq's first foreign minister. He will soon be off to New York as part of the Iraqi delegation to the opening of the United Nations General Assembly.

Iraq has come very far, but serious problems remain, starting with security. American commanders and troops told me of the many threats they face--from leftover loyalists who want to return Iraq to the dark days of Saddam, from criminals who were set loose on Iraqi society when Saddam emptied the jails and, increasingly, from outside terrorists who have come to Iraq to open a new front in their campaign against the civilized world. But our commanders also briefed me on their plan for meeting these security threats, and it is a good one.

We also need to complete the renewal of Iraq's electrical grid, its water treatment facilities and its other infrastructure, which were run down and destroyed during the years of Saddam's misrule. Here, too, we are making progress. Electric generation now averages 75% of prewar levels, and that figure is rising. Telephone service is being restored to hundreds of thousands of customers. Dilapidated water and sewage treatment facilities are being modernized. But it will take time and money to finish the job.

Indeed, that's Iraq in a nutshell. With our support, the Iraqis have made great progress. But it will take time and money to finish the job. President Bush has asked Congress for $20 billion to help rebuild Iraq's infrastructure. Next month, the international community will meet in Madrid to pledge additional assistance for Iraqi reconstruction. With these funds, and our continued help, I know the Iraqis will take great strides in rebuilding their battered country.





How long will we stay in Iraq? We will stay as long as it takes to turn full responsibility for governing Iraq over to a capable and democratically elected Iraqi administration. Only a government elected under a democratic constitution can take full responsibility and enjoy full legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi people and the world.
Anyone who doubts the wisdom of President Bush's course in Iraq should stand, as I did, by the side of the mass grave in Halabja, in Iraq's north. That terrible site holds the remains of 5,000 innocent men, women and children who were gassed to death by Saddam Hussein's criminal regime.

The Iraqi people must be empowered to prevent such mass murder from happening ever again. They must be given the tools and the support to build a peaceful and prosperous democracy. They deserve no less. The American people deserve no less.

Mr. Powell is secretary of state.

THE CASE FOR BUSH HATRED.
Mad About You
by Jonathan Chait


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Post date 09.18.03 | Issue date 09.29.03 E-mail this article

hate President George W. Bush. There, I said it. I think his policies rank him among the worst presidents in U.S. history. And, while I'm tempted to leave it at that, the truth is that I hate him for less substantive reasons, too. I hate the inequitable way he has come to his economic and political achievements and his utter lack of humility (disguised behind transparently false modesty) at having done so. His favorite answer to the question of nepotism--"I inherited half my father's friends and all his enemies"--conveys the laughable implication that his birth bestowed more disadvantage than advantage. He reminds me of a certain type I knew in high school--the kid who was given a fancy sports car for his sixteenth birthday and believed that he had somehow earned it. I hate the way he walks--shoulders flexed, elbows splayed out from his sides like a teenage boy feigning machismo. I hate the way he talks--blustery self-assurance masked by a pseudo-populist twang. I even hate the things that everybody seems to like about him. I hate his lame nickname-bestowing-- a way to establish one's social superiority beneath a veneer of chumminess (does anybody give their boss a nickname without his consent?). And, while most people who meet Bush claim to like him, I suspect that, if I got to know him personally, I would hate him even more.

There seem to be quite a few of us Bush haters. I have friends who have a viscerally hostile reaction to the sound of his voice or describe his existence as a constant oppressive force in their daily psyche. Nor is this phenomenon limited to my personal experience: Pollster Geoff Garin, speaking to The New York Times, called Bush hatred "as strong as anything I've experienced in 25 years now of polling." Columnist Robert Novak described it as a "hatred ... that I have never seen in 44 years of campaign watching."

Yet, for all its pervasiveness, Bush hatred is described almost exclusively as a sort of incomprehensible mental affliction. James Traub, writing last June in The New York Times Magazine, dismissed the "hysteria" of Bush haters. Conservatives have taken a special interest in the subject. "Democrats are seized with a loathing for President Bush--a contempt and disdain giving way to a hatred that is near pathological--unlike any since they had Richard Nixon to kick around," writes Charles Krauthammer in Time magazine. "The puzzle is where this depth of feeling comes from." Even writers like David Brooks and Christopher Caldwell of The Weekly Standard--the sorts of conservatives who have plenty of liberal friends--seem to regard it from the standpoint of total incomprehension. "Democrats have been driven into a frenzy of illogic by their dislike of George W. Bush," explains Caldwell. "It's mystifying," writes Brooks, noting that Democrats have grown "so caught up in their own victimization that they behave in ways that are patently not in their self-interest, and that are almost guaranteed to perpetuate their suffering."

Have Bush haters lost their minds? Certainly some have. Antipathy to Bush has, for example, led many liberals not only to believe the costs of the Iraq war outweigh the benefits but to refuse to acknowledge any benefits at all, even freeing the Iraqis from Saddam Hussein's reign of terror. And it has caused them to look for the presidential nominee who can best stoke their own anger, not the one who can win over a majority of voters--who, they forget, still like Bush. But, although Bush hatred can result in irrationality, it's not the product of irrationality. Indeed, for those not ideologically or personally committed to Bush's success, hatred for Bush is a logical response to the events of the last few years. It is not the slightest bit mystifying that liberals despise Bush. It would be mystifying if we did not.

One reason Bush hatred is seen as inherently irrational is that its immediate precursor, hatred of Bill Clinton, really did have a paranoid tinge. Conservatives, in retrospect, now concede that some of the Clinton haters were a little bit nutty. But they usually do so only in the context of declaring that Bush hatred is as bad or worse. "Back then, [there were] disapproving articles--not to mention armchair psychoanalysis--about Clinton-hating," complains Byron York in a National Review story this month. "Today, there appears to be less concern." Adds Brooks, "Now it is true that you can find conservatives and Republicans who went berserk during the Clinton years, accusing the Clintons of multiple murders and obsessing how Vince Foster's body may or may not have been moved. ... But the Democratic mood is more pervasive, and potentially more self-destructive."

It's certainly true that there is a left-wing fringe of Bush haters whose lurid conspiracy-mongering neatly parallels that of the Clinton haters. York cites various left-wing websites that compare Bush to Hitler and accuse him of murder. The trouble with this parallel is, first, that this sort of Bush-hating is entirely confined to the political fringe. The most mainstream anti-Bush conspiracy theorist cited in York's piece is Alexander Cockburn, the ultra-left, rabidly anti-Clinton newsletter editor. Mainstream Democrats have avoided delving into Bush's economic ties with the bin Laden family or suggesting that Bush invaded Iraq primarily to benefit Halliburton. The Clinton haters, on the other hand, drew from the highest ranks of the Republican Party and the conservative intelligentsia. Bush's solicitor general, Theodore Olson, was involved with The American Spectator's "Arkansas Project," which used every conceivable method--including paying sources--to dig up dirt from Clinton's past. Mainstream conservative pundits, such as William Safire and Rush Limbaugh, asserted that Vince Foster had been murdered, and GOP Government Reform Committee Chairman Dan Burton attempted to demonstrate this theory forensically by firing a shot into a dummy head in his backyard.

A second, more crucial difference is that Bush is a far more radical president than Clinton was. From a purely ideological standpoint, then, liberal hatred of Bush makes more sense than conservatives' Clinton fixation. Clinton offended liberals time and again, embracing welfare reform, tax cuts, and free trade, and nominating judicial moderates. When budget surpluses first appeared, he stunned the left by reducing the national debt rather than pushing for more spending. Bush, on the other hand, has developed into a truly radical president. Like Ronald Reagan, Bush crusaded for an enormous supply-side tax cut that was anathema to liberals. But, where Reagan followed his cuts with subsequent measures to reduce revenue loss and restore some progressivity to the tax code, Bush proceeded to execute two additional regressive tax cuts. Combined with his stated desire to eliminate virtually all taxes on capital income and to privatize Medicare and Social Security, it's not much of an exaggeration to say that Bush would like to roll back the federal government to something resembling its pre-New Deal state.

And, while there has been no shortage of liberal hysteria over Bush's foreign policy, it's not hard to see why it scares so many people. I was (and remain) a supporter of the war in Iraq. But the way Bush sold it--by playing upon the public's erroneous belief that Saddam had some role in the September 11 attacks--harkened back to the deceit that preceded the Spanish-American War. Bush's doctrine of preemption, which reserved the right to invade just about any nation we desired, was far broader than anything he needed to validate invading a country that had flouted its truce agreements for more than a decade. While liberals may be overreacting to Bush's foreign policy decisions-- remember their fear of an imminent invasion of Syria?--the president's shifting and dishonest rationales and tendency to paint anyone who disagrees with him as unpatriotic offer plenty of grounds for suspicion.



t was not always this way. During the 2000 election, liberals evinced far less disdain for Bush than conservatives did for Al Gore. As The New York Times reported on the eve of the election, "The gap in intensity between Democrats and Republicans has been apparent all year." This "passion gap" manifested itself in the willingness of many liberals and leftists to vote for Ralph Nader, even in swing states. It became even more obvious during the Florida recount, when a December 2000 ABC News/Washington Post poll showed Gore voters more willing to accept a Bush victory than vice-versa, by a 47 to 28 percent margin. "There is no great ideological chasm dividing the candidates," retiring Democratic Senator Pat Moynihan told the Times. "Each one has his prescription-drugs plan, each one has his tax-cut program, and the country obviously thinks one would do about as well as the other."

Most Democrats took Bush's victory with a measure of equanimity because he had spent his campaign presenting himself as a "compassionate conservative"--a phrase intended to contrast him with the GOP ideologues in Congress--who would reduce partisan strife in Washington. His loss of the popular vote, and the disputed Florida recount, followed by his soothing promises to be "president of all Americans," all fed the widespread assumption that Bush would hew a centrist course. "Given the circumstances, there is only one possible governing strategy: a quiet, patient, and persistent bipartisanship," intoned a New Yorker editorial written by Joe Klein.

Instead, Bush has governed as the most partisan president in modern U.S. history. The pillars of his compassionate-conservative agenda--the faith-based initiative, charitable tax credits, additional spending on education--have been abandoned or absurdly underfunded. Instead, Bush's legislative strategy has revolved around wringing out narrow, party-line votes for conservative priorities by applying relentless pressure to GOP moderates--in one case, to the point of driving Vermont's James Jeffords out of the party. Indeed, when bipartisanship shows even the slightest sign of life, Bush usually responds by ruthlessly tamping it down. In 2001, he convinced GOP Representative Charlie Norwood to abandon his long-cherished patients' bill of rights, which enjoyed widespread Democratic support. According to a Washington Post account, Bush and other White House officials "met with Norwood for hours and issued endless appeals to party loyalty." Such behavior is now so routine that it barely rates notice. Earlier this year, a column by Novak noted almost in passing that "senior lawmakers are admonished by junior White House aides to refrain from being too chummy with Democrats."

When the September 11 attacks gave Bush an opportunity to unite the country, he simply took it as another chance for partisan gain. He opposed a plan to bolster airport security for fear that it would lead to a few more union jobs. When Democrats proposed creating a Department of Homeland Security, he resisted it as well. But later, facing controversy over disclosures of pre-September 11 intelligence failures, he adopted the idea as his own and immediately began using it as a cudgel with which to bludgeon Democrats. The episode was telling: Having spent the better part of a year denying the need for any Homeland Security Department at all, Bush aides secretly wrote up a plan with civil service provisions they knew Democrats would oppose and then used it to impugn the patriotism of any Democrats who did--most notably Georgia Senator Max Cleland, a triple-amputee veteran running for reelection who, despite his support for the war with Iraq and general hawkishness, lost his Senate race thanks to an ugly GOP ad linking him to Osama bin Laden.

All this helps answer the oft-posed question of why liberals detest Bush more than Reagan. It's not just that Bush has been more ideologically radical; it's that Bush's success represents a breakdown of the political process. Reagan didn't pretend to be anything other than what he was; his election came at the crest of a twelve-year-long popular rebellion against liberalism. Bush, on the other hand, assumed office at a time when most Americans approved of Clinton's policies. He triumphed largely because a number of democratic safeguards failed. The media overwhelmingly bought into Bush's compassionate-conservative facade and downplayed his radical economic conservatism. On top of that, it took the monomania of a third-party spoiler candidate, plus an electoral college that gives disproportionate weight to GOP voters--the voting population of Gore's blue-state voters exceeded that of Bush's red-state voters--even to bring Bush close enough that faulty ballots in Florida could put him in office.

But Bush is never called to task for the radical disconnect between how he got into office and what he has done since arriving. Reporters don't ask if he has succeeded in "changing the tone." Even the fact that Bush lost the popular vote is hardly ever mentioned. Liberals hate Bush not because he has succeeded but because his success is deeply unfair and could even be described as cheating.



t doesn't help that this also happens to be a pretty compelling explanation of how Bush achieved his station in life. He got into college as a legacy; his parents' friends and political cronies propped him up through a series of failed business ventures (the founder of Harken Energy summed up his economic appeal thusly: "His name was George Bush"); he obtained the primary source of his wealth by selling all his Harken stock before it plunged on bad news, triggering an inconclusive Securities Exchange Commission insider-trading investigation; the GOP establishment cleared a path for him through the primaries by showering him with a political war chest of previously unthinkable size; and conservative justices (one appointed by his father) flouted their own legal principles--adopting an absurdly expansive federal role to enforce voting rights they had never even conceived of before--to halt a recount that threatened to put his more popular opponent in the White House.

Conservatives believe liberals resent Bush in part because he is a rough-hewn Texan. In fact, they hate him because they believe he is not a rough-hewn Texan but rather a pampered frat boy masquerading as one, with his pickup truck and blue jeans serving as the perfect props to disguise his plutocratic nature. The liberal view of Bush was captured by Washington Post (and former tnr) cartoonist Tom Toles, who once depicted Bush being informed by an adviser that he "didn't hit a triple. You were born on third base." A puzzled Bush replies, "I thought I was born at my beloved hardscrabble Crawford ranch," at which point his subordinate reminds him, "You bought that place a couple years ago for your presidential campaign."

During the 1990s, it was occasionally noted that conservatives despised Clinton because he flouted their basic values. From the beginning, they saw him as a product of the 1960s, a moral relativist who gave his wife too much power. But what really set them off was that he cheated on his wife, lied, and got away with it. "We must teach our children that crime does not pay," insisted former California Representative and uber-Clinton hater Bob Dornan. "What kind of example does this set to teach kids that lying like this is OK?" complained Andrea Sheldon Lafferty, executive director of the Traditional Values Coalition.

In a way, Bush's personal life is just as deep an affront to the values of the liberal meritocracy. How can they teach their children that they must get straight A's if the president slid through with C's--and brags about it!--and then, rather than truly earning his living, amasses a fortune through crony capitalism? The beliefs of the striving, educated elite were expressed, fittingly enough, by Clinton at a meeting of the Aspen Institute last month. Clinton, according to New York magazine reporter Michael Wolff, said of the Harken deal that Bush had "sold the stock to buy the baseball team which got him the governorship which got him the presidency." Every aspect of Bush's personal history points to the ways in which American life continues to fall short of the meritocratic ideal.



ut perhaps most infuriating of all is the fact that liberals do not see their view of Bush given public expression. It's not that Bush has been spared from any criticism--far from it. It's that certain kinds of criticism have been largely banished from mainstream discourse. After Bush assumed office, the political media pretty much decided that the health of U.S. democracy, having edged uncomfortably close to chaos in December 2000, required a cooling of overheated passions. Criticism of Bush's policies--after a requisite honeymoon--was fine. But the media defined any attempt to question Bush's legitimacy as out-of-bounds. When, in early February, Democratic National Committee Chairman Terry McAuliffe invoked the Florida debacle, The Washington Post reported it thusly: "Although some Democratic leaders have concluded that the public wants to move past the ill will over the post-election maneuvering that settled the close Florida contest, McAuliffe plainly believes that with some audiences--namely, the Democratic base of activists he was addressing yesterday--a backward-looking appeal to resentment is for now the best way to motivate and unite an often-fractious party." (This was in a news story!) "It sounds like you're still fighting the election," growled NBC's Tim Russert on "Meet the Press." "So much for bipartisanship!" huffed ABC's Sam Donaldson on "This Week."

Just as mainstream Democrats and liberals ceased to question Bush's right to hold office, so too did they cease to question his intelligence. If you search a journalistic database for articles discussing Bush's brainpower, you will find something curious. The idea of Bush as a dullard comes up frequently--but nearly always in the context of knocking it down. While it's described as a widely held view, one can find very few people who will admit to holding it. Conservatives use the theme as a taunt--if Bush is so dumb, how come he keeps winning? Liberals, spooked, have concluded that calling Bush dumb is a strategic mistake. "You're not going to get votes by assuming that, as a party, you're a lot smarter than the voters," argued Democratic Leadership Council President Bruce Reed last November. "Casting Bush as a dummy also plays into his strategy of casting himself as a Texas common man," wrote Washington Post columnist E.J. Dionne in March 2001.

Maybe Bush's limited brainpower hasn't hampered his political success. And maybe pointing out that he's not the brightest bulb is politically counterproductive. Nonetheless, however immaterial or inconvenient the fact may be, it remains true that Bush is just not a terribly bright man. (Or, more precisely, his intellectual incuriosity is such that the effect is the same.) On the rare occasions Bush takes an extemporaneous question for which he hasn't prepared, he usually stumbles embarrassingly. When asked in July whether, given that Israel was releasing Palestinian prisoners, he would consider releasing famed Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard, Bush's answer showed he didn't even know who Pollard is. "Well, I said very clearly at the press conference with Prime Minister [Mahmoud] Abbas, I don't expect anybody to release somebody from prison who'll go kill somebody," he rambled. Bush's unscripted replies have caused him to accidentally change U.S. policy on Taiwan. And, while Bush's inner circle remains committed to the pretense of a president in total command of his staff, his advisers occasionally blurt out the truth. In the July issue of Vanity Fair, Richard Perle admitted that, when he first met Bush, "he didn't know very much."

While liberals have pretty much quit questioning Bush's competence, conservatives have given free rein to their most sycophantic impulses. Some of this is Bush's own doing--most notably, his staged aircraft-carrier landing, a naked attempt to transfer the public's admiration for the military onto himself (a man, it must be noted, who took a coveted slot in the National Guard during Vietnam and who then apparently declined to show up for a year of duty). Bush's supporters have spawned an entire industry of hagiographic kitsch. You can buy a twelve-inch doll of Bush clad in his "Mission Accomplished" flight suit or, if you have a couple thousand dollars to spend, a bronze bust depicting a steely-eyed "Commander-in-Chief" Bush. National Review is enticing its readers to fork over $24.95 for a book-length collection of Bush's post-September 11, 2001, speeches--any and all of which could be downloaded from the White House website for free. The collection recasts Bush as Winston Churchill, with even his most mundane pronouncements ("Excerpted Remarks by the President from Speech at the Lighting of the National Christmas Tree," "Excerpted Remarks by the President from Speech to the Missouri Farmers Association") deemed worthy of cherishing in bound form. Meanwhile, the recent Showtime pseudo-documentary "DC 9/11" renders the president as a Clint Eastwood figure, lording over a cringing Dick Cheney and barking out such implausible lines as "If some tinhorn terrorist wants me, tell him to come on over and get me. I'll be here!"

Certainly Clinton had his defenders and admirers, but no similar cult of personality. Liberal Hollywood fantasies--"The West Wing," The American President--all depict imaginary presidents who pointedly lack Clinton's personal flaws or penchant for compromise. The political point was more to highlight Clinton's deficiencies than to defend them.

The persistence of an absurdly heroic view of Bush is what makes his dullness so maddening. To be a liberal today is to feel as though you've been transported into some alternative universe in which a transparently mediocre man is revered as a moral and strategic giant. You ask yourself why Bush is considered a great, or even a likeable, man. You wonder what it is you have been missing. Being a liberal, you probably subject yourself to frequent periods of self-doubt. But then you conclude that you're actually not missing anything at all. You decide Bush is a dullard lacking any moral constraints in his pursuit of partisan gain, loyal to no principle save the comfort of the very rich, unburdened by any thoughtful consideration of the national interest, and a man who, on those occasions when he actually does make a correct decision, does so almost by accident.

There. That feels better.

September 19, 2003
Germany Will Share the Burden in Iraq
By GERHARD SCHRÖDER

ERLIN — Terrorism continues to be a very serious risk to security and stability in the world. With the fight against terrorism far from over, Germans and Americans stand united in the battle. Together, we will prevail.

For many months now, German soldiers have been fighting side by side with American troops in Afghanistan, once a haven and a logistical base for international terrorism. I am firmly convinced that we have no choice but to continue on in this common struggle, given the threat that global terrorism and Al Qaeda pose to the international community.

I put my own political future on the line in 2001 when I asked the German Bundestag for a vote of confidence for sending troops to Afghanistan, a military commitment unprecedented for Germany.

Until very recently, German troops played a leading role in the International Security Assistance Force, which has brought a measure of stability and order to Kabul and the surrounding areas. Though the force is now commanded by NATO, a German NATO general is in charge. Freeing Afghanistan from the bondage of the Taliban and Al Qaeda was an exceptional accomplishment.

Now, however, we must focus our efforts on helping a troubled country introduce democracy and rebuild itself under extremely difficult circumstances. Germany is therefore prepared to participate in extending the reconstruction program beyond Kabul and to assign military personnel to protect civilian aid workers and organizations.

It would be tragic, both for the Afghan people and the international community, if this country were to relapse into tyranny or once more become a breeding ground for terrorists. We have a joint responsibility to prevent this, for it is in our common interest and in keeping with our common values.

German-American cooperation is solid in other areas as well. Our troops are working with American forces in the Balkans to ensure stability there. Our navy is helping to patrol the Horn of Africa, protecting international sea routes. And more than 8,000 German troops are participating in peacekeeping missions around the world.

In the fight against terrorism, German intelligence services and law enforcement are working closely with American and other international partners. And on the diplomatic front, Germany and its European partners are doing their utmost with Washington to bring forward the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. Our commitment to peace in the Middle East, based on the security of Israel and the right of the Palestinian people to form a state of their own, is a pillar of our foreign policy.

It is true that Germany and the United States disagreed on how best to deal with Saddam Hussein's regime. There is no point in continuing this debate. We should now look toward the future. We must work together to win the peace. The United Nations must play a central role. The international community has a key interest in ensuring that stability and democracy are established as quickly as possible in Iraq. The international mission needs greater legitimacy in order to accelerate the process leading to a government acting on its own authority in Iraq.

In addition to its current military involvement in Afghanistan, the Balkans and elsewhere, Germany is willing to provide humanitarian aid, to assist in the civilian and economic reconstruction of Iraq and to train Iraqi security forces.

When we gather in New York next week for the United Nations General Assembly, we will underline that Germany and the United States are linked by a profound friendship based on common experiences and values. For Germans, the 2003 general assembly is very special. It was exactly 30 years ago that Germany was admitted to the United Nations, a milestone in our postwar history. Back then, Germans were still forced to live in two states, divided by a wall and a dangerous border. Today, Germany is united.

We Germans will not forget how the United States helped and supported us in rebuilding and reuniting our country. That Germany is living today in a peaceful, prosperous and secure Europe is thanks in no small measure to America's friendship, farsightedness and political determination.

Beginning with President Harry S. Truman, all American presidents have supported and encouraged European integration. This remains a wise policy, for a strong and united Europe is also in the interest of the United States. With the adoption of a European constitution and the enlargement of the European Union, Europe is opening an important new chapter in unity. Germany, as a civilian power in the heart of Europe, knows from its own history that cooperation and integration are conditions for security and prosperity.

Not until after the fall of the wall and unification did Germany fully regain its sovereignty. Today we are a full member in the international community — with all the rights and obligations this entails. Germany's role in the world has changed and so has our foreign policy. My country is willing to shoulder more responsibility. This may entail using military force as a last resort in resolving conflicts.

However, we must not forget that security in today's world cannot be guaranteed by one country going it alone; it can be achieved only through international cooperation. Nor can security be limited to the activities of the police and the military. If we want to make our world freer and safer, we must fight the roots of insecurity, oppression, fanaticism and poverty — and we must do it together.


Gerhard Schröder is the chancellor of Germany. This was translated by the German Embassy from the German.

A very interesting thought:

The Axis of Democracy (Revisited)
Parag Khanna
Ariel Sharon’s current visit to India has been widely reported and in some corners scorned as a “Hindu-Zionist” conspiracy, but deeper analysis suggests that the visit actually represents the completion of a triangle of American-led partnerships between nations with similar histories, facing similar threats and with a common commitment to democracy.

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, America has forged anti-terrorism alliances of convenience with several unexpected bedfellows, including Uzbekistan and Pakistan. But in light of the same threats, the US has also accelerated strategic coordination with India and Israel, a more reliable set of militarily robust and democratic allies, to confront not only Islamic fundamentalism, but also longer-term threats to American preponderance (such as the rise of China). The non-democratic nature of Uzbekistan and Pakistan makes them less durable allies for the United States than the stable, if struggling, democracies of Israel and India.

Like the United States, Israel and India have a strong sense of national identity rooted in a secular ideology despite ethnic and religious diversity. Moreover, they are all located in turbulent neighborhoods, making them important bridgeheads for American engagement. With robust militaries, these states are capable of decisively affecting the outcomes of potential conflicts in the Middle East and in Central and South Asia. Unlike the states comprising the "Axis of Evil," not only do strong ties already exist within the emerging "Axis of Democracy," but these relations are deepening in light of geostrategic imperatives. Consider for example the most visible and controversial item on the Sharon-Vajpayee agenda: the $1 billion sale of Phalcon radar systems.

With half of the world’s nuclear powers now located in Asia, there is more than a rhetorical need to build strong democratic alliances in Asia beyond Japan and South Korea. After an estrangement spanning the Cold War and hitting rock bottom after India’s May 1998 nuclear tests, the Indo-U.S. relationship has rapidly blossomed since the Kargil crisis of 1999. The mutual concern over the security of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal after the Musharraf coup in October 1999, as well as reciprocal visits by President Clinton and Prime Minister Vajpayee in 2000, cemented the strategic reconciliation between what current External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha calls the "Twin Towers of Democracy". Sinha has summed up the emerging realism between the two states more subtly in claiming that they have become "sensitive to each other’s strategic compulsions". The Bush administration’s desire to continue to deepen engagement with India after September 11, 2001, led to a loosening of export controls on dual-use technology, effectively ending the sanctions imposed after the nuclear tests. Bilateral agreements, promoting the transfer of civilian nuclear technology, have now been signed; naval cooperation including joint patrols of Indian Ocean sea lanes—critical for the transport of oil—has proceeded swiftly; and additional funding is foreseen for the U.S.-India Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism. The U.S. has also intensified its own role behind the scenes in promoting high-level dialogue between India and Pakistan, a move long resisted but now implicitly accepted by India. Reciprocally, India was also quick to support America’s position on missile defense and has taken to imitating U.S. policies on preemption. For its part, the U.S. has begun to heed Indian Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani’s warning that, even in the absence of a Kashmir dispute, Pakistan has become the "epicenter of global terrorism" and that India "will not wait for any other country to declare Pakistan a terrorist state". For the first time, U.S. support of Pakistan—as it relates to curbing Islamic extremism within its borders—is welcomed rather than resented by India, which fears a collapsed, radicalized state on its border.

Like the U.S.-Israel alliance, India and America are learning to develop a stable partnership in which they will, at worst, agree to disagree; this becomes most visible when Indian rhetoric vis-à-vis Pakistan takes on a character reminiscent of Israel’s denunciations of the Palestinian Authority. Closer to home, the role of Indians in American society is rapidly beginning to resemble that of the Jewish community: 1.8 million Indians reside in the U.S., many of them wealthy dot.com executives and doctors, making Indians the richest per capita ethnic minority in America with a concomitant, visible rise in social recognition. The enormous lobbying potential of an emerging collective consciousness in the Indian diaspora is clear; there are now more than 130 members in the India Caucus of the House of Representatives.

The India-Israel alliance is more subtle in emergence but increasingly profound. Prior to the current Sharon visit, Major General Uzi Dayan, head of Israel’s National Security Council, visited his Indian counterpart Brajesh Mishra last September for a "joint security strategic dialogue", which was followed by a visit from Foreign Minister Shimon Peres in which he praised India as Israel’s "best friend" in the region. Both face a common nemesis in Islamic radicalism, and India has sought Israeli guidance in counter-terrorism and border patrol through a joint anti-terror commission established in 2000. The Phalcon radar which India now purchases is the same system the U.S. prohibited Israel from selling to China two years ago. In total, over $2 billion in arms contracts have been signed between Israel Aircraft Industries and the Indian Defense Ministry, with Israel selling surface-to-surface Barak missiles, pilotless planes, radar systems, and renovating hundreds of Mig-21 and Mig-29 planes and Russian-made T-72 tanks. With the Sharon visit, the purchase by India of Israel’s Arrow Theater Missile Defense system, the only fielded and operational system of its kind, also appears likely. Though the U.S. must still approve this sale, it would represent a victory for India in countering Pakistan's rapidly growing missile program and in strengthening Indo-U.S. strategic relations, while at the same time serving the Pentagon’s goal of advancing an international missile defense architecture.

There is one final candidate for the “Axis of Democracy”: Turkey. As a NATO member state, Turkey played a pivotal role in monitoring Soviet actions in the Middle East and Black Sea region during the Cold War. Despite the Defense Department’s failure to gain access to Turkish bases for the Iraq invasion, Turkey remains a major transport corridor as oil flows from Iraq are renewed. On the domestic front, its ruling party of Justice and Development (AKP), which took power after the November parliamentary elections, has voiced its commitment to proving that a Muslim country can be democratic and transparent. Strong U.S. pressure to accelerate Turkey’s entry into the European Union resulted in a compromise to begin accession talks in December 2004, and Ankara demonstrated its goodwill by acquiescing to an opening of the “Green Line” in an effort to spur resolution of the 40-year old Cyprus dispute. Turkey remains a critical partner for the United States in promoting stability in a dangerous region of the world.

Furthremore, despite pressure from Arab states, Foreign Minister Ismael Cem has reiterated Turkey’s commitment to relations with Israel. For the past five years, the Israeli Air Force has used Turkish air space for training and the two nations’ pilots have exercised together. Turkey, Israel and India form a triangle proximate to or enveloping the world’s major energy basins—the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea—and depend heavily on their resources. In the coming decades, America’s alliance with these states could be crucial to securing stable flows of oil from the region.

The Bush Administration understands that both the immediate focus on terrorism and the long-term threat of militancy in the Islamic world require stable, enduring cooperation for America to remain unchallenged globally. The group of states comprising this Axis of Democracy will function as a network, coordinating strategies and policies. The U.S.-India Defense Policy Group, established under President George H.W. Bush, was the final link in this set of relationships, complementing U.S.-Turkish cooperation through NATO and the longstanding alliance with Israel. All four states share a realist worldview, allowing them to support common positions in strategic affairs, yet they share a strong commitment to democratization.

Alliances may be ephemeral and of convenience, or durable and rooted in culture and history, but they are always based on strategic necessity and joint opposition. Naturally, there are areas of tension within this Axis of Democracy, not dissimilar to antagonisms within NATO. For example, the United States exerts much pressure to contain Israel’s nuclear status and strongly urges restraint on India’s nuclear program. Furthermore, on human rights, America has been critical of all three states at various times. Yet this new grouping could become America’s key geostrategic vehicle for promoting its global interests. Europe, having nearly achieved its ultimate goal of becoming a postmodern "zone of peace", has also become regionally self-obsessed and remains culturally and politically reluctant to share the burden of providing for global stability with America. The Axis of Democracy could prove to be an enduring coalition of the willing against both the threat of international terrorism and future threats to global peace.

How True, How Sad:

September 18, 2003
Our War With France
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

It's time we Americans came to terms with something: France is not just our annoying ally. It is not just our jealous rival. France is becoming our enemy.

If you add up how France behaved in the run-up to the Iraq war (making it impossible for the Security Council to put a real ultimatum to Saddam Hussein that might have avoided a war), and if you look at how France behaved during the war (when its foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin, refused to answer the question of whether he wanted Saddam or America to win in Iraq), and if you watch how France is behaving today (demanding some kind of loopy symbolic transfer of Iraqi sovereignty to some kind of hastily thrown together Iraqi provisional government, with the rest of Iraq's transition to democracy to be overseen more by a divided U.N. than by America), then there is only one conclusion one can draw: France wants America to fail in Iraq.

France wants America to sink in a quagmire there in the crazy hope that a weakened U.S. will pave the way for France to assume its "rightful" place as America's equal, if not superior, in shaping world affairs.

Yes, the Bush team's arrogance has sharpened French hostility. Had President Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld not been so full of themselves right after America's military victory in Iraq — and instead used that moment, when the French were feeling that maybe they should have taken part, to magnanimously reach out to Paris to join in reconstruction — it might have softened French attitudes. But even that I have doubts about.

What I have no doubts about, though, is that there is no coherent, legitimate Iraqi authority able to assume power in the near term, and trying to force one now would lead to a dangerous internal struggle and delay the building of the democratic institutions Iraq so badly needs. Iraqis know this. France knows this, which is why its original proposal (which it now seems to be backtracking on a bit) could only be malicious.

What is so amazing to me about the French campaign — "Operation America Must Fail" — is that France seems to have given no thought as to how this would affect France. Let me spell it out in simple English: if America is defeated in Iraq by a coalition of Saddamists and Islamists, radical Muslim groups — from Baghdad to the Muslim slums of Paris — will all be energized, and the forces of modernism and tolerance within these Muslim communities will be on the run. To think that France, with its large Muslim minority, where radicals are already gaining strength, would not see its own social fabric affected by this is fanciful.

If France were serious, it would be using its influence within the European Union to assemble an army of 25,000 Eurotroops, and a $5 billion reconstruction package, and then saying to the Bush team: Here, we're sincere about helping to rebuild Iraq, but now we want a real seat at the management table. Instead, the French have put out an ill-conceived proposal, just to show that they can be different, without any promise that even if America said yes Paris would make a meaningful contribution.

But then France has never been interested in promoting democracy in the modern Arab world, which is why its pose as the new protector of Iraqi representative government — after being so content with Saddam's one-man rule — is so patently cynical.

Clearly, not all E.U. countries are comfortable with this French mischief, yet many are going along for the ride. It's stunning to me that the E.U., misled by France, could let itself be written out of the most important political development project in modern Middle East history. The whole tone and direction of the Arab-Muslim world, which is right on Europe's doorstep, will be affected by the outcome in Iraq. It would be as if America said it did not care what happened in Mexico because it was mad at Spain.

Says John Chipman, director of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies: "What the Europeans are saying about Iraq is that this is our backyard, we're not going to let you meddle in it, but we're not going to tend it ourselves."

But what's most sad is that France is right — America will not be as effective or legitimate in its efforts to rebuild Iraq without French help. Having France working with us in Iraq, rather than against us in the world, would be so beneficial for both nations and for the Arabs' future. Too bad this French government has other priorities.

Gathering Storm II:

Another French Twist
Is Paris playing Colin Powell for a fool again?
Tuesday, September 16, 2003 12:01 a.m.

Secretary of State Colin Powell was mighty peeved when the French opposed a U.N. resolution to support war in Iraq after he'd told President Bush they would not. Now that President Bush is seeking a new U.N. resolution for post-Saddam Iraq, we're soon going to see if the French have fooled Mr. Powell again.
The Secretary has assured Mr. Bush that this time he can get the U.N. resolution, and it is true that many nations now seem cooperative. That includes the Chinese and notably the Russians, as well as the U.N. Secretary General himself, Kofi Annan. The August truck-bombing of the U.N. mission in Baghdad seems to have jolted Mr. Annan into recognition that terrorism isn't merely an American problem.

An August 28 internal Pentagon memo to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld noted that "State has proposed" U.N. Security Council resolution "language that would 'authorize' a stability force in Iraq--under our command--and call on member states to join it. We think this is good language and we seek your approval."

The memo, written by Assistant Secretary Peter Rodman, added that "State thinks the language will work in New York. It echoes the UNSCR which the French obtained to endorse their intervention in the Ivory Coast in February!" Mr. Rumsfeld initialed his approval.

Far from approving the State Department language at the U.N., however, the French have so far rejected Mr. Powell's draft. First they insisted that the Coalition Provisional Authority be turned over to the U.N., an idea the U.S. rejected. Then, during this weekend's talks, the French turned to insisting that decision-making power in Iraq be turned over within weeks to the Iraqi Governing Council.





This sudden French insistence on Iraqi self-rule is touching given their opposition to toppling Saddam Hussein's dictatorship. And surely the French know that no one wants to turn authority over to Iraqis more than the U.S. does, as soon as they are ready. The ploy is so transparently cynical that it suggests the French goal is to find some excuse, any excuse, to draw out negotiations as long as possible, or to gain as many commercial concessions as possible for French companies.
Mr. Powell put his best spin on the failed weekend talks, but the more important question is how long he will let the French play this game. How much time does anyone really need to work out these details? The U.S. will continue to bear the vast majority of the burden--human and financial--for rebuilding Iraq no matter what the U.N. does.

If the goal here is really to confer some U.N. imprimatur on the postwar rebuilding of Iraq, then let's get on with it. The French don't have the troops to help much anyway, and we doubt they'll be contributing much cash. Mr. Bush wants the U.N. endorsement so the Turks, the Indians and perhaps other countries can use it as a fig leaf to justify their own troop contributions. We shouldn't have to indulge French mischief to get that permission.

Mr. Powell--and the U.S.--ought simply to give the French a deadline to declare their support or opposition. Then present a resolution to the U.N. Security Council and dare the French to veto it. If they won't accept language for Iraq similar to what they received for their little incursion in Ivory Coast earlier this year, then the world will see French anti-Americanism for what it clearly is.


Copyright © 2003 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

And more on the fight going on in DC from the Washington Post:

Iraq Takes A Toll on Rumsfeld

By Thomas E. Ricks and Vernon Loeb

Since he returned to the Pentagon three years ago, Donald H. Rumsfeld has been one of the most activist secretaries of defense in a generation, challenging the uniformed brass to modernize the nation's military into a 21st century fighting force and leading the armed services through two major wars in 18 months.

Along the way, Rumsfeld has rankled many in the military with his aggressive style and far-reaching agenda for "transforming" the military, even as he has won acclaim for his leadership of the Pentagon through the trauma of the Sept. 11, 2001, attack on the building and ensuing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the war on terrorism. Now, less than five months after he helped formulate and execute a bold plan in which a U.S. invasion force drove to Baghdad and toppled the Iraqi government in 21 days, Rumsfeld is facing his greatest challenge yet.

Having demanded full authority for overseeing the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq, elbowing the State Department aside, Rumsfeld is being blamed by many in Congress and the military establishment for the problems facing the United States, which include mounting U.S. casualties and costs exceeding $1 billion a week.

Whatever else Rumsfeld achieves at the Pentagon, the outcome of the Iraq occupation will go a long way toward determining his legacy in this, his second stint as secretary of defense. It also will affect the political fortunes of President Bush, whose reelection bid could hinge on events in Iraq.

Rumsfeld's ability to weather his largest crisis will depend to a degree on his standing with three key constituencies: the White House, Congress and the military's officer corps. How he does with them will be shaped largely by whether security improves in Iraq, according to officials in the administration, Congress and the Pentagon.

At the moment, at least, Rumsfeld's standing among all three is mixed. White House officials said that Rumsfeld retains the full confidence of the president. But after a long winning streak, the Pentagon chief has begun to lose some policy battles, most notably when Bush decided to seek a new United Nations resolution on Iraq -- a course about which Rumsfeld has expressed reservations.

Rumsfeld's relations with the military have been strained since he returned to office. This is particularly true within the Army, which felt threatened by his modernization plans before the Sept. 11 attacks and where concern runs deep about the damage the Iraq occupation could do the service in the long run.

Rumsfeld appears to be losing ground most dramatically on Capitol Hill, where even some conservative Republicans are expressing concern about his handling of Iraq. "Winning the peace is a lot different than winning the war," said Sen. Lindsey O. Graham (R-S.C.), who counts himself as a strong Rumsfeld supporter but notes that not all his colleagues feel the same. "His bluntness comes across as arrogance, and he's made some enemies on Capitol Hill, probably because of style differences," said Graham, an Air Force veteran who serves on the Armed Services Committee.

Sen. John W. Warner (R-Va.), the panel's chairman, struck a decidedly cool note when asked how Rumsfeld is doing. "Understandably we have some differences," he said Friday in a written response. "However, I consistently work with Secretary Rumsfeld to support the president and the men and women of the armed forces, and have a high regard for his integrity and forcefulness."
'Rummy Is a Survivor'
On Capitol Hill and elsewhere, Rumsfeld's assertive self-confidence and brash style -- seared into the public's memory during televised news conferences during the Afghanistan war -- for many months seemed to fuel the secretary's popularity. Now, those same qualities strike many inside and outside of government as a vulnerability that leads them to question whether Rumsfeld has the flexibility to make the changes and compromises they see as necessary to fixing the situation in Iraq.

"Robert McNamara for four years of Vietnam going down the toilet was absolutely convinced with a religious zeal that what he was doing was the right thing," said Thomas E. White, a retired Army general who was fired as Army secretary this year by Rumsfeld. "It wasn't until 30 years later that it dawned on him that he was dead wrong. And I think you have the same thing with Don Rumsfeld."

McNamara served as secretary of defense in the 1960s under Democratic presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson.

Most analysts said they believe it is far too early to count Rumsfeld out, and many supporters said they are convinced he will rise and prove his critics wrong once again. His backers note that the secretary continues to have a close relationship with Vice President Cheney, who worked under Rumsfeld in the Gerald Ford White House.

As a longtime aide to Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Rumsfeld's principal rival in the national security arena, F. William Smullen might be expected to revel in Rumsfeld's difficulties. To the contrary, Smullen argues that it is grossly unfair to hang the problems of postwar Iraq on the defense secretary. "I think there is plenty of blame to go around, far and wide, to include Congress and the mass media, and people are going to be hard-pressed to dump it all on Rumsfeld," said Smullen, who was Powell's chief of staff until last fall, when he became director of national security studies at Syracuse University.

"Every time Rumsfeld goes through one of these episodes, people think it's the end for him," said Loren B. Thompson, a defense analyst and consultant at the Lexington Institute with ties to the Pentagon and defense contractors. "But he always ends up looking vindicated. What we're really facing in Iraq is a mop-up operation, and as the mop-up continues and as we gradually sharpen our intelligence and train Iraqi security forces, Rumsfeld is going to look better and better. In the end, it will look like he understood the occupation of Iraq better than most of his critics did."

As one Army general put it: "Rummy is a survivor."

Rumsfeld declined to be interviewed for this article, and his spokesman declined to provide any comment.

Speaking for Bush, White House communications director Dan Bartlett said Friday, "The president ignores the Washington pastime of armchair quarterbacking with perfect hindsight. The president has all the faith and confidence in Secretary Rumsfeld that he did on the day he announced him for the position."

National security adviser Condoleezza Rice said the difficulties of postwar Iraq have not led to a reduction in the role played by Rumsfeld and the Defense Department. "Don Rumsfeld and the Pentagon had the lead and have the lead in postwar reconstruction because . . . we wanted a way to unify the command of the forces and the civilian reconstruction effort," Rice said in an interview Friday. "It's a very, very tough job, but he's managed it well, the president believes he's done it well, and when problems have come up, he's moved to fix them."

Nor, she said, has the White House been taken aback by the cost and difficulty of the Iraq occupation. "Yes, this is really challenging, it's really challenging for all of us, and Don has got a heavy part of the burden," she said. "But everybody knows what it is we're trying to do, and everybody knows how important this is, and everybody knows this is a chance to change history."

Yet, the difficulties in Iraq have diminished Rumsfeld's standing within the administration, according to people familiar with its inner workings, with a reduction in Rumsfeld's operating latitude. Unhappiness with Rumsfeld's freewheeling style -- he has been known to interject himself in issues usually considered beyond the purview of a secretary of defense -- had been building within parts of the administration, officials said.

But it was the Pentagon's handling of postwar Iraq that really hurt Rumsfeld's position, according to some administration officials. Asked about this, a senior White House official said it was "patently false" that Rumsfeld had somehow been ordered by the White House to better coordinate his policy initiatives with other parts of the administration.
'He's Very Defensive'
Unhappiness with Rumsfeld flared on Capitol Hill months before the invasion of Iraq, when Warner stood up at a meeting of Republican senators with White House Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card Jr. and complained that Rumsfeld was neither cooperating nor consulting with the Senate. Warner told Card that he had never seen anything like it in 25 years in the Senate.

Now, with casualties in Iraq mounting and lawmakers growing agitated about the costs of occupation and reconstruction, the strains have become more pronounced, even as the administration continues to hold strong Republican support on Capitol Hill for its overall policy goals in Iraq.

Even Rumsfeld's GOP backers chafe at the way he interacts with Congress. "I think his legislative affairs shop is awful," said one Republican senator, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. "It serves him so poorly. Don Rumsfeld can't be personally blamed for all of that. But the combination of his personality, which some people find condescending and prickly and a little offensive -- Rumsfeld himself doesn't have any time for criticism -- and the fact that the groundwork hasn't been laid by a good legislative affairs staff, has created some problems."

Graham, the South Carolina Republican, said that among his colleagues, "there's some belief that he's reluctant to admit that things are off-track when they seem to be off-track. He's very defensive."

Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.), a West Point graduate and former officer in the 82nd Airborne Division, said Rumsfeld was "critically important to a spectacular conventional military victory in Iraq." But Reed said the real question now is whether Rumsfeld is committed to reaching out to other countries "in a way that encourages allies to join us" in managing the occupation.

While the administration says it wants a U.N. resolution aimed at winning more foreign troops and money, Reed said, "The rhetoric is not matched by the body language and all the things that have to go into getting people to cooperate with you."

Others on Capitol Hill are not as pessimistic. Rep. Heather A. Wilson (R-N.M.), an Air Force veteran who later served on the staff of the National Security Council in George H.W. Bush's administration, said that "over the last 10 days, I've seen the administration make the changes and commitments they need to make in order to be successful in the long term."

Wilson adds that her old comrades in the Air Force tend to like Rumsfeld's direct style, a sentiment that others in Congress second. Graham said, "I find him refreshing in a stiff-collared town. . . . He's the right guy at the right time."

Likewise, said Sen. Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.), "I have immense regard for Don Rumsfeld and his staff."
'A Bloodletting'
Iraq has raised new doubts about Rumsfeld among some officers from the Army and Marines, the two services still operating there.

Retired Marine Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, a former head of the U.S. Central Command who also served the Bush administration as Middle East envoy, sharply criticized the Pentagon's handling of postwar Iraq in a speech before the U.S. Naval Institute and the Marine Corps Association 10 days ago. He received an enthusiastic response from hundreds of military officers present.

In the Army, there are deep worries that the Iraq occupation could do long-term damage to the service. Of the 10 active-duty Army divisions, nine will have all or parts deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan this year or next.

"The Army is strained and stressed," Gen. John Keane, the service's number two officer, said Thursday.

The major worry, according to some in the Army, is that repeated deployments to Iraq will persuade the backbone of the service -- seasoned sergeants and younger officers -- to leave in mid-career instead of serving a full 20 years. There already is talk that some of those now serving in Iraq will come home, only to be sent back in 2005.

"The last time we had people doing combat tours every other year was Vietnam," one defense expert said. "The impact on soldiers and families was great. A lot of good junior officers and mid-grade NCOs [noncommissioned officers] walked. This decimated the rising leadership and broke the force."

The state of the Army reserves is a special worry, and the reserves are adept at conveying that concern to Congress.

"Unless there's adaptation in the reserves, there's going to be a bloodletting," with thousands of reservists declining to reenlist, said Graham, who serves as an officer in the Air Force Reserve. He said he is introducing legislation -- along with Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-N.Y.) -- to radically improve the health benefits for reservists, and to reduce the costs to civilian employers of reservists deployed overseas.

Rumsfeld's critics acknowledge that if conditions in Iraq improve in six months -- with a constitution signed, an election plan underway, U.S. casualties drastically reduced, and thousands of troops returning home -- Rumsfeld's legacy is probably secure. But they say that he has a track record of sticking too long with incorrect assumptions about the speed of recovery and brushing aside problems such as looting. Rumsfeld has resisted adding troops to the forces in Iraq on grounds they are not needed and that more responsibility must be turned over to the Iraqis.

So if parts of Iraq are still combat zones next spring, with the Army apparently mired in a seemingly never-ending fight, then Rumsfeld may wind up remembered as a principal architect of a foreign policy disaster, according to some military experts and lawmakers.

"He is absolutely convinced that he is right, that his view is correct, so all the rest of this stuff that is floating around is kind of noise, a lot of which he just dismisses out of hand, or he rationalizes somehow as consistent with this plan of his," White said.

Robert S. Gelbard, a former U.S. diplomat with experience in several peacekeeping operations, said he is puzzled by Rumsfeld's insistence that no additional troops are needed to improve security in Iraq. "What's hard to figure out is the continued adamant statements that there's no need for additional troops," he said. "That is utterly perplexing, given the security situation there."

The view among many in the administration, Congress and military interviewed for this article was that Iraq likely would simmer down in the coming months and that security conditions would improve, in part, they said, because of the extraordinary efforts by the 122,000 troops deployed there.

"I suspect he will be saved by the strong backs and the creativity of the Army soldiers in Iraq," one White House aide said. "And that's an incredible irony."

The debate of the day back in the US: Neocons Vs. Supply-siders!

EURONEWS! A note from Sweden to be taken very seriously by all:

News Analysis: Behind vote, a mistrust of Germany and France John Vinocur/IHT IHT
Monday, September 15, 2003



Sweden's rejection of the European Union's common currency was a coldly rational statement of mistrust in the euro. It distanced itself from the stagnant economic performance of the euro zone, and flatly refused to place its monetary future under the sway of big countries like France and Germany, who have bent the euro's rules to suit themselves.

Coming at a moment when emotions after the murder of Foreign Minister Anna Lindh might well have pointed the electorate in the direction of the "yes" vote she favored, the "no" in the referendum Sunday proposing adoption of the euro wasn't just a slap, but a hard right, to the jaw of European monetary union.

As a country that believes in rules and reasonableness, that treasures moderation, and bases its economic life on exports and solid international relations, Sweden said, in effect, that it could do better on its own.

Despite its shock and grief over the death of its pro-euro foreign minister, Sweden restrained its emotions and said it was not joining a currency that had provided more signs of self-interested maneuvering among its strongest members than a willingness to play by the regulations they conceived themselves.

For the euro's participants, and for those outside Europe, it was an embarrassing rejection. It made euro-Europe look like no place to go for an enlightened electorate - after the Danes' and Swedes' refusals, only Britain has a referendum on its schedule - and euroland like mostly a split-level club for the noncomplying founder countries and the needy new members from the continent's east and south.

In the weeks before the vote, Prime Minister Goran Persson, a euro supporter, had said that a substantial source of opposition to joining the currency resulted from France's and Germany's unwillingness to meet the euro zone's annual deficit criteria - a reference, in France's case, to its prime minister's statement that its European obligations would always be subordinate to France's self-interest.

After Lindh's death, Finance Minister Bosse Ringholm returned to the issue and, as if stating a deep grievance, said, "We have a problem here, in particular with France." Its violation of the rules of the euro zone's national performance criteria, he said, "has been disturbing the election campaign and it has been negative for the 'yes' vote."

Obviously, Swedes often complain that their own country is obsessed and burdened with inflexible regulations and codes. But Sweden is also proud of its sense of civic duty and its acceptance of the necessity for compliance.

It was in this context that many Swedes were likely to have seen joining the euro as buying into a situation where Sweden would obey the Stability and Growth Pact rules, however economically ascetic, while countries like France or Germany were demonstrating the rules were only meant for the little folk.

The "no" forces, who stirred a strong anti-establishment wave in the country, had only to post editorial commentary from France or Germany to make their point. The current L'Express newsmagazine accuses France of anti-European demagoguery. Le Monde, pointing out that no French government had balanced a budget since 1975, said over the weekend that France had not only crashed into its own economic wall, "but as the shame of Europe to boot."

Against this, Sweden's economic circumstances outside the euro, after years of budget trimming, looked very favorable. Sweden now runs a budget surplus. Its unemployment rate is better than the euro zone average. And its projected growth rate of 1.5 percent for the year is more than double that of the EU, which the European Commission lowered to 0.5 percent from 0.7 percent a few days before the referendum.

This euro stagnancy, and the accusations by Wim Duisenberg, the outgoing president of the European Central Bank, that there is a lack of sufficient political courage in the euro zone to enforce the reforms needed to bring about a genuine surge of growth, had a particular resonance in a country that actually has its finances in order.

After all, what did the euro offer Sweden? One of the promises of the "yes" campaign was a more stable currency than what the krona offered over the last years. Yet it is no secret that a part of Sweden's economic success for years has been due to competitive devaluations of the krona against the dollar.

Without the euro, the "no" forces argued, the krona would hardly become more of a target for a speculative run. But the government and central bank would lose their capacity to adjust the currency's value in relation to trends in trade, or the dollar, or the euro.

The burden now falls back on the EU and the 12 of its members that make up its common currency. With their meager growth perspectives, and the United States' massive lead in productivity and innovation, the euro states' capacity to regain their attractiveness lies in finding the political will to bring about dramatic structural change in the group's leading economies.

This is now so obvious that Duisenberg's remarks about a failure in courage among political leaders, or similar comments by his successor, Jean-ClaudeTrichet, were met with silence.

The Swedish vote, in the eyes of the Swedish euro proponents at least, is in a real sense partly the fault of France and Germany. To assume that these two governments would take the steps needed to turn their economies into the motors of Europe, and remove the growing pall over Europe's role in the world, required a measure of trust that Sweden's cold-eyed electorate saw no good reason to grant.

International Herald Tribune

Copyright © 2003 The International Herald Tribune