Friday, April 01, 2005
The Democrats: A party without a base
Bill Bradley
The New York Times Thursday, March 31, 2005
NEW YORK Five months after the presidential election, Democrats are still pointing fingers at one another and trying to figure out why Republicans won. Was the problem the party's position on social issues or taxes or defense or what? Were there tactical errors made in the conduct of the campaign? Were the right advisers heard? Was the candidate flawed?Before deciding what Democrats should do now, it's important to see what Republicans have done right over many years. When the Goldwater Republicans lost in 1964, they didn't try to become Democrats. They tried to figure out how to make their own ideas more appealing to the voters.As part of this effort, they turned to Lewis Powell, then a corporate lawyer and soon to become a member of the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1971 he wrote a landmark memo for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in which he advocated a sweeping, coordinated and long-term effort to spread conservative ideas on college campuses, in academic journals and in the news media.To further the party's ideological and political goals, Republicans in the 1970s and 1980s built a comprehensive structure based on Powell's blueprint. Visualize that structure as a pyramid.Big individual donors and large foundations form the base of the pyramid. They finance conservative research centers like the Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute and the Intercollegiate Studies Institute, entities that make up the second level of the pyramid.The ideas these organizations develop are then pushed up to the third level of the pyramid - the political level. There, strategists like Karl Rove take these new ideas and, through polling, focus groups and careful attention to Democratic attacks, convert them into language that will appeal to the broadest electorate.That language is sometimes in the form of an assault on Democrats and at other times in the form of advocacy for a new policy position. The development process can take years. And then there's the fourth level of the pyramid: the partisan news media. Conservative commentators and networks spread these finely honed ideas.At the very top of the pyramid you'll find the president. Because the pyramid is stable, all you have to do is put a different top on it and it works fine.To understand how the Democratic Party works, invert the pyramid. Imagine a pyramid balancing precariously on its point, which is the presidential candidate.Democrats who run for president have to build their own pyramids all by themselves. There is no coherent, larger structure that they can rely on. Unlike Republicans, they don't simply have to assemble a campaign apparatus - they have to formulate ideas and a vision, too. Many Democratic fundraisers join a campaign only after assessing how well it has done in assembling its pyramid of political, media and idea people.There is no clearly identifiable funding base for Democratic policy organizations, and in the frantic campaign rush there is no time for patient, long-term development of new ideas or of new ways to sell old ideas. Campaigns don't start thinking about a Democratic brand until halfway through the election year, by which time winning the daily news cycle takes precedence over building a consistent message. The closest that Democrats get to a brand is a catchy slogan.Democrats choose this approach, I believe, because we are still hypnotized by Jack Kennedy, and the promise of a charismatic leader who can change America by the strength and style of his personality. The trouble is that every four years the party splits and rallies around several different individuals at once. Opponents in the primaries then exaggerate their differences and leave the public confused about what Democrats believe.In such a system, tactics trump strategy. Candidates don't risk talking about big ideas because the ideas have never been sufficiently tested. Instead they usually wind up arguing about minor issues and express few deep convictions. A party based on charisma has no long-term impact. Think of the Democrats' last charismatic leader, Bill Clinton. He was president for eight years. He was the first Democrat to be re-elected since Franklin Roosevelt. He was smart, skilled and possessed great energy. But what happened? At the end of his tenure, there were fewer Democratic governors, fewer Democratic senators, members of Congress and state legislators and a national party that was deep in debt. The president did well. The party did not. Charisma didn't translate into structure.If Democrats are serious about preparing for the next election or the next election after that, some influential Democrats will have to resist entrusting their dreams to individual candidates and instead make a commitment to build a stable pyramid from the base up. It will take at least a decade's commitment, and it won't come cheap. But there really is no other choice.
(Bill Bradley, a former Democratic senator from New Jersey, is a managing director of Allen & Company.)
Bill Bradley
The New York Times Thursday, March 31, 2005
NEW YORK Five months after the presidential election, Democrats are still pointing fingers at one another and trying to figure out why Republicans won. Was the problem the party's position on social issues or taxes or defense or what? Were there tactical errors made in the conduct of the campaign? Were the right advisers heard? Was the candidate flawed?Before deciding what Democrats should do now, it's important to see what Republicans have done right over many years. When the Goldwater Republicans lost in 1964, they didn't try to become Democrats. They tried to figure out how to make their own ideas more appealing to the voters.As part of this effort, they turned to Lewis Powell, then a corporate lawyer and soon to become a member of the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1971 he wrote a landmark memo for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in which he advocated a sweeping, coordinated and long-term effort to spread conservative ideas on college campuses, in academic journals and in the news media.To further the party's ideological and political goals, Republicans in the 1970s and 1980s built a comprehensive structure based on Powell's blueprint. Visualize that structure as a pyramid.Big individual donors and large foundations form the base of the pyramid. They finance conservative research centers like the Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute and the Intercollegiate Studies Institute, entities that make up the second level of the pyramid.The ideas these organizations develop are then pushed up to the third level of the pyramid - the political level. There, strategists like Karl Rove take these new ideas and, through polling, focus groups and careful attention to Democratic attacks, convert them into language that will appeal to the broadest electorate.That language is sometimes in the form of an assault on Democrats and at other times in the form of advocacy for a new policy position. The development process can take years. And then there's the fourth level of the pyramid: the partisan news media. Conservative commentators and networks spread these finely honed ideas.At the very top of the pyramid you'll find the president. Because the pyramid is stable, all you have to do is put a different top on it and it works fine.To understand how the Democratic Party works, invert the pyramid. Imagine a pyramid balancing precariously on its point, which is the presidential candidate.Democrats who run for president have to build their own pyramids all by themselves. There is no coherent, larger structure that they can rely on. Unlike Republicans, they don't simply have to assemble a campaign apparatus - they have to formulate ideas and a vision, too. Many Democratic fundraisers join a campaign only after assessing how well it has done in assembling its pyramid of political, media and idea people.There is no clearly identifiable funding base for Democratic policy organizations, and in the frantic campaign rush there is no time for patient, long-term development of new ideas or of new ways to sell old ideas. Campaigns don't start thinking about a Democratic brand until halfway through the election year, by which time winning the daily news cycle takes precedence over building a consistent message. The closest that Democrats get to a brand is a catchy slogan.Democrats choose this approach, I believe, because we are still hypnotized by Jack Kennedy, and the promise of a charismatic leader who can change America by the strength and style of his personality. The trouble is that every four years the party splits and rallies around several different individuals at once. Opponents in the primaries then exaggerate their differences and leave the public confused about what Democrats believe.In such a system, tactics trump strategy. Candidates don't risk talking about big ideas because the ideas have never been sufficiently tested. Instead they usually wind up arguing about minor issues and express few deep convictions. A party based on charisma has no long-term impact. Think of the Democrats' last charismatic leader, Bill Clinton. He was president for eight years. He was the first Democrat to be re-elected since Franklin Roosevelt. He was smart, skilled and possessed great energy. But what happened? At the end of his tenure, there were fewer Democratic governors, fewer Democratic senators, members of Congress and state legislators and a national party that was deep in debt. The president did well. The party did not. Charisma didn't translate into structure.If Democrats are serious about preparing for the next election or the next election after that, some influential Democrats will have to resist entrusting their dreams to individual candidates and instead make a commitment to build a stable pyramid from the base up. It will take at least a decade's commitment, and it won't come cheap. But there really is no other choice.
(Bill Bradley, a former Democratic senator from New Jersey, is a managing director of Allen & Company.)
Thursday, March 31, 2005
Going out for Indian
By Thomas Donnelly
Posted: Thursday, March 31, 2005
ARTICLES
Daily Standard
Publication Date: March 31, 2005
With the news from Iraq relegated to the back pages recently, last Friday's State Department briefing--especially since it was not devoted to Condoleezza Rice's latest fashion statements--attracted little attention. The subject: the evolving strategic partnership between the United States and India. The news? It is the "goal" of the Bush administration "to help India become a major world power in the 21st century."
This is indeed a monumental and welcome development; it's the clearest sign to date that the Bush Doctrine has a genuine strategic logic, that it's more than a justification for the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. To realize the president's goals, particularly the commitment to spreading freedom that was the core message of his Second Inaugural Address, the United States needs a workable, how-to plan, one that bends the instruments of international politics--most notably, the tools of "hard" power like military force and political alliances--to American purposes. A U.S.-India strategic partnership, if fully developed, would be the single most important step toward an alliance capable of meeting the 21st century's principal challenges: radical Islam and rising China.
Unlike our almost erstwhile allies in western Europe, India shares an equal strategic concern with both these challenges. Perhaps even more important, India shares a commitment to democracy that transcends ethnic nationalism--Hindu nationalism, in this case, will not suffice to govern a state that includes 120 million Muslims--and an understanding of the necessity for armed strength. India's position in South Asia puts it in an essential geostrategic location from both a continental and maritime perspective. In sum, the United States could hardly dream up a more ideal strategic partner.
A number of commentators have missed the shift in U.S. strategic priorities by drawing an analogy between the administration's policies on arms sales to Pakistan and India, and in the bestowing of "major non-NATO ally" status on Pakistan. And in the minds of others, the practice of strategy invalidates the commitment to democracy--Pakistan being something less than a fully free state. The New York Times and Los Angeles Times columnist Robert Scheer denounced the sale of F-16s to Pakistan as "A Con Job by Pakistan's Pal, George Bush." But, as so often, Bush-hatred blinds these sorts to the larger strategic picture.
It would be useful for them to listen to the new voices emerging in New Delhi; Indians see the importance of this change more than many Americans do. "The F-16s don't matter," Raja Menon writes in the March 30 Indian Express. "The March 25 Statement"--it's already taken on an almost-iconic status in India--is creating "opportunities like never before" for India. "If India has the boldness to dump the non-aligned rhetoric of the past," Menon argues, "the country stands to gain in many areas."
Militarily, Menon is quite right; the F-16s are almost a waste of money for Pakistan, whose primary security worries come from the Sunni Islamists inside its borders. A major conventional war with India would be suicidal for the Pakistanis, as, of course, would any nuclear exchange. The guerilla war in Kashmir is a ball and chain that Pakistan cannot seem to lose. Fretting about the F-16s is myopic; as Menon concludes, "If 24 F-16s make Pakistan feel secure, all the better."
By contrast, he notes, "On India's access to high-tech military technology, the American offer today is stunning. Our 30-year complaint [about] denial regimes [that] have targeted India has now been rubbished with the American offers of joint production of world class combat aircraft. This is not to be mistaken for a hardware sale, but a realization that the Americans can live with a regional power like India."
The fact is that the United States can not only live with India as a regional power but, as Secretary Rice frankly told India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the Bush administration is willing to help India become a great power, even--especially--in the military sense: "We understand fully the implications, including military implications" of this shift in policy, says the State Department. Singh is scheduled to visit the Bush ranch this summer to seal these deals.
Indeed, one danger is that some Indians are getting ahead of themselves, imagining that they have the upper hand in a partnership that's still in the courtship phase. It's an understandable emotion--U.S.-Indian relations have been frustrating for decades and Indians have a lot of issues that are played out in "non-aligned rhetoric." And with the romance comes great risk and responsibility; the Europeans have refused the offer of continued partnership with the United States for a reason: It has a price tag measured in blood and treasure.
Nevertheless, "The March 25 Statement" should be thought of as a very big deal, with great credit due to Rice and probably to Robert Blackwill, former ambassador to India and the man called in by Rice to sort out U.S. Iraq policy while she was still National Security Adviser. Not only does this signal a new direction for U.S. India policy, but it's a reflection that the administration is beginning to understand the global logic of the Bush Doctrine. And it may signal that the president and his senior lieutenants are even thinking through the problem of how to assert the Bush Doctrine and deal with China.
Thomas Donnelly is a resident fellow at AEI.
By Thomas Donnelly
Posted: Thursday, March 31, 2005
ARTICLES
Daily Standard
Publication Date: March 31, 2005
With the news from Iraq relegated to the back pages recently, last Friday's State Department briefing--especially since it was not devoted to Condoleezza Rice's latest fashion statements--attracted little attention. The subject: the evolving strategic partnership between the United States and India. The news? It is the "goal" of the Bush administration "to help India become a major world power in the 21st century."
This is indeed a monumental and welcome development; it's the clearest sign to date that the Bush Doctrine has a genuine strategic logic, that it's more than a justification for the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. To realize the president's goals, particularly the commitment to spreading freedom that was the core message of his Second Inaugural Address, the United States needs a workable, how-to plan, one that bends the instruments of international politics--most notably, the tools of "hard" power like military force and political alliances--to American purposes. A U.S.-India strategic partnership, if fully developed, would be the single most important step toward an alliance capable of meeting the 21st century's principal challenges: radical Islam and rising China.
Unlike our almost erstwhile allies in western Europe, India shares an equal strategic concern with both these challenges. Perhaps even more important, India shares a commitment to democracy that transcends ethnic nationalism--Hindu nationalism, in this case, will not suffice to govern a state that includes 120 million Muslims--and an understanding of the necessity for armed strength. India's position in South Asia puts it in an essential geostrategic location from both a continental and maritime perspective. In sum, the United States could hardly dream up a more ideal strategic partner.
A number of commentators have missed the shift in U.S. strategic priorities by drawing an analogy between the administration's policies on arms sales to Pakistan and India, and in the bestowing of "major non-NATO ally" status on Pakistan. And in the minds of others, the practice of strategy invalidates the commitment to democracy--Pakistan being something less than a fully free state. The New York Times and Los Angeles Times columnist Robert Scheer denounced the sale of F-16s to Pakistan as "A Con Job by Pakistan's Pal, George Bush." But, as so often, Bush-hatred blinds these sorts to the larger strategic picture.
It would be useful for them to listen to the new voices emerging in New Delhi; Indians see the importance of this change more than many Americans do. "The F-16s don't matter," Raja Menon writes in the March 30 Indian Express. "The March 25 Statement"--it's already taken on an almost-iconic status in India--is creating "opportunities like never before" for India. "If India has the boldness to dump the non-aligned rhetoric of the past," Menon argues, "the country stands to gain in many areas."
Militarily, Menon is quite right; the F-16s are almost a waste of money for Pakistan, whose primary security worries come from the Sunni Islamists inside its borders. A major conventional war with India would be suicidal for the Pakistanis, as, of course, would any nuclear exchange. The guerilla war in Kashmir is a ball and chain that Pakistan cannot seem to lose. Fretting about the F-16s is myopic; as Menon concludes, "If 24 F-16s make Pakistan feel secure, all the better."
By contrast, he notes, "On India's access to high-tech military technology, the American offer today is stunning. Our 30-year complaint [about] denial regimes [that] have targeted India has now been rubbished with the American offers of joint production of world class combat aircraft. This is not to be mistaken for a hardware sale, but a realization that the Americans can live with a regional power like India."
The fact is that the United States can not only live with India as a regional power but, as Secretary Rice frankly told India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the Bush administration is willing to help India become a great power, even--especially--in the military sense: "We understand fully the implications, including military implications" of this shift in policy, says the State Department. Singh is scheduled to visit the Bush ranch this summer to seal these deals.
Indeed, one danger is that some Indians are getting ahead of themselves, imagining that they have the upper hand in a partnership that's still in the courtship phase. It's an understandable emotion--U.S.-Indian relations have been frustrating for decades and Indians have a lot of issues that are played out in "non-aligned rhetoric." And with the romance comes great risk and responsibility; the Europeans have refused the offer of continued partnership with the United States for a reason: It has a price tag measured in blood and treasure.
Nevertheless, "The March 25 Statement" should be thought of as a very big deal, with great credit due to Rice and probably to Robert Blackwill, former ambassador to India and the man called in by Rice to sort out U.S. Iraq policy while she was still National Security Adviser. Not only does this signal a new direction for U.S. India policy, but it's a reflection that the administration is beginning to understand the global logic of the Bush Doctrine. And it may signal that the president and his senior lieutenants are even thinking through the problem of how to assert the Bush Doctrine and deal with China.
Thomas Donnelly is a resident fellow at AEI.
