Tuesday, March 16, 2004
Campaign of Terror
by Robert Lane Greene
By no stretch is it a good thing for the integrity of democracy when an elected government publicly announces that it will renege on one of its central campaign planks immediately after taking office. But if ever there was a moment that required a government to do exactly that, it has now arrived in Spain. In the wake of yesterday's election, in which the opposition Socialists swept to a come-from-behind victory just days after an Al Qaeda attack on Madrid, the obvious question will be whether the terrorist group's first attempt to meddle in Western electoral politics was a success. And the obvious answer--given that before the attacks the incumbent center-right Popular Party (PP) was leading in polls and that the PP's support of the war in Iraq was one of the campaign's defining issues--seems to be yes.
But that answer isn't wholly correct--at least not yet. It is still not too late for the incoming Socialist government to deny Al Qaeda an election victory: The Socialists must under no circumstances pull Spanish troops out of Iraq by the summer, as they said they might do during the campaign. If they do not break this promise, they will be allowing Al Qaeda to dictate policy outcomes in a democratic country--which will surely encourage further attacks in democratic countries, especially those that were part of the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq. The Socialists have a right to their views on the war. But they also have an obligation to the community of free nations, all of which will suffer the consequences if Al Qaeda believes it can use bombs to play electoral politics. For the moment, that obligation trumps the promise the Socialists made to Spanish voters.
To be sure, it is not clear that the bombings alone determined the election's outcome. The ruling government's response to the bombings--which seemed incompetent at best, dishonest at worst--helped swing the election to the Socialists. It now appears beyond question that the attack was the work of Al Qaeda, but the government initially insisted that the bombings were the work of the Basque separatist group ETA. Immediately following the attack, the interior minister said there was "no doubt" ETA was behind the attacks. He backed off that statement when a van was found with bomb detonators as well as tapes of Koranic verses in Arabic--but he, as well as Prime Minister José María Aznar, continued to call ETA the primary focus of investigation during the next few days.
They made these claims despite the fact that the attacks bore none of ETA's hallmarks. They were far bigger than any in ETA's history: The deadliest ETA bombing had killed 21 in a supermarket in 1987, whereas 200 died in last week's massacre. ETA has made a practice of warning the public before any attack that was likely to kill civilians; the group also usually claimed responsibility soon after bombs exploded. It did neither this time: In fact, a spokesman for the group's political wing quickly denied responsibility, while a group claiming affiliation to Al Qaeda took credit in a letter to a London-based Arab newspaper. Then there was the physical evidence: On Friday, investigators determined that an unexploded bomb did not have the same type of detonator or explosive normally used by ETA. Despite this evidence--and despite the fact that multiple simultaneous bombings are a hallmark of Al Qaeda's style--the government continued to call ETA the likeliest suspect until the day before the election. At that point, with the arrest of three Moroccans and two Spanish citizens of Indian origin, the government was forced to admit that the bombings were probably the work of Islamists.
Whether or not Aznar's government lied on purpose, the perception that it misled voters was unavoidable, because the current dynamics of Spanish politics meant that an ETA attack would have helped the PP, while an Al Qaeda attack would have boosted the opposition. Why? The PP's hard line against ETA has been popular with voters; an attack showing that Basque extremists remained a deadly threat would have helped the party that appeared tougher on them. On the other hand, an attack by Al Qaeda would have created the impression that Spain was a target because of its support of the war in Iraq--a war that Aznar backed despite its unpopularity with the Spanish public. Hence, the PP's immediate and incorrect fingering of Basque separatists looked politically self-serving, whether or not it really was.
As a result, one could argue about whether it was the Al Qaeda attack or the government's botched response that opened the door for the Socialists. But it's an irrelevant debate because, whatever the truth, Al Qaeda itself will perceive that it influenced the outcome of the election--and the group's perception will determine how it acts in the future. Believing that it has influenced the results in Spain, Al Qaeda may be tempted to play politics in other countries where governments supported the war. Will the group move on to Britain or Italy? Or America's allies in Eastern Europe? What about America itself?
All of which is why the Socialists, under the leadership of incoming prime minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, must back away from one of their central promises to Spanish voters. The Socialists had pledged to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq by the summer if the United Nations did not give them a stronger mandate. But a withdrawal of the troops would be an unmitigated disaster, proving to the bombers that Westerners' nerves are easily broken, and that terrorists can dictate policy outcomes in democratic countries. Zapatero has promised that his first priority in office will be to "combat all forms of terrorism." But pronouncements are not enough. Al Qaeda wants Western troops out of Iraq; Spain must not appear to be delivering what Al Qaeda wants.
The United States and Britain must do their parts to give Zapatero the political cover he needs to go back on his campaign promise. France and Russia, veto-wielding Security Council members that have experienced Muslim terror and have now promised to help Spain fight it, must do the same. They must work quickly to craft a Security Council resolution that strengthens the organization's blessing of the coalition's efforts. While it is unlikely that the United Nations will take a major political role in Iraq at this point, a strong symbolic resolution could give Zapatero enough political cover to extend the stay of Spain's troops. If not, a Spanish retreat from Iraq, traceable directly to the massacre in Madrid, would mean that March 14 will go down in history as Al Qaeda's first-ever victory at the ballot box.
by Robert Lane Greene
By no stretch is it a good thing for the integrity of democracy when an elected government publicly announces that it will renege on one of its central campaign planks immediately after taking office. But if ever there was a moment that required a government to do exactly that, it has now arrived in Spain. In the wake of yesterday's election, in which the opposition Socialists swept to a come-from-behind victory just days after an Al Qaeda attack on Madrid, the obvious question will be whether the terrorist group's first attempt to meddle in Western electoral politics was a success. And the obvious answer--given that before the attacks the incumbent center-right Popular Party (PP) was leading in polls and that the PP's support of the war in Iraq was one of the campaign's defining issues--seems to be yes.
But that answer isn't wholly correct--at least not yet. It is still not too late for the incoming Socialist government to deny Al Qaeda an election victory: The Socialists must under no circumstances pull Spanish troops out of Iraq by the summer, as they said they might do during the campaign. If they do not break this promise, they will be allowing Al Qaeda to dictate policy outcomes in a democratic country--which will surely encourage further attacks in democratic countries, especially those that were part of the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq. The Socialists have a right to their views on the war. But they also have an obligation to the community of free nations, all of which will suffer the consequences if Al Qaeda believes it can use bombs to play electoral politics. For the moment, that obligation trumps the promise the Socialists made to Spanish voters.
To be sure, it is not clear that the bombings alone determined the election's outcome. The ruling government's response to the bombings--which seemed incompetent at best, dishonest at worst--helped swing the election to the Socialists. It now appears beyond question that the attack was the work of Al Qaeda, but the government initially insisted that the bombings were the work of the Basque separatist group ETA. Immediately following the attack, the interior minister said there was "no doubt" ETA was behind the attacks. He backed off that statement when a van was found with bomb detonators as well as tapes of Koranic verses in Arabic--but he, as well as Prime Minister José María Aznar, continued to call ETA the primary focus of investigation during the next few days.
They made these claims despite the fact that the attacks bore none of ETA's hallmarks. They were far bigger than any in ETA's history: The deadliest ETA bombing had killed 21 in a supermarket in 1987, whereas 200 died in last week's massacre. ETA has made a practice of warning the public before any attack that was likely to kill civilians; the group also usually claimed responsibility soon after bombs exploded. It did neither this time: In fact, a spokesman for the group's political wing quickly denied responsibility, while a group claiming affiliation to Al Qaeda took credit in a letter to a London-based Arab newspaper. Then there was the physical evidence: On Friday, investigators determined that an unexploded bomb did not have the same type of detonator or explosive normally used by ETA. Despite this evidence--and despite the fact that multiple simultaneous bombings are a hallmark of Al Qaeda's style--the government continued to call ETA the likeliest suspect until the day before the election. At that point, with the arrest of three Moroccans and two Spanish citizens of Indian origin, the government was forced to admit that the bombings were probably the work of Islamists.
Whether or not Aznar's government lied on purpose, the perception that it misled voters was unavoidable, because the current dynamics of Spanish politics meant that an ETA attack would have helped the PP, while an Al Qaeda attack would have boosted the opposition. Why? The PP's hard line against ETA has been popular with voters; an attack showing that Basque extremists remained a deadly threat would have helped the party that appeared tougher on them. On the other hand, an attack by Al Qaeda would have created the impression that Spain was a target because of its support of the war in Iraq--a war that Aznar backed despite its unpopularity with the Spanish public. Hence, the PP's immediate and incorrect fingering of Basque separatists looked politically self-serving, whether or not it really was.
As a result, one could argue about whether it was the Al Qaeda attack or the government's botched response that opened the door for the Socialists. But it's an irrelevant debate because, whatever the truth, Al Qaeda itself will perceive that it influenced the outcome of the election--and the group's perception will determine how it acts in the future. Believing that it has influenced the results in Spain, Al Qaeda may be tempted to play politics in other countries where governments supported the war. Will the group move on to Britain or Italy? Or America's allies in Eastern Europe? What about America itself?
All of which is why the Socialists, under the leadership of incoming prime minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, must back away from one of their central promises to Spanish voters. The Socialists had pledged to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq by the summer if the United Nations did not give them a stronger mandate. But a withdrawal of the troops would be an unmitigated disaster, proving to the bombers that Westerners' nerves are easily broken, and that terrorists can dictate policy outcomes in democratic countries. Zapatero has promised that his first priority in office will be to "combat all forms of terrorism." But pronouncements are not enough. Al Qaeda wants Western troops out of Iraq; Spain must not appear to be delivering what Al Qaeda wants.
The United States and Britain must do their parts to give Zapatero the political cover he needs to go back on his campaign promise. France and Russia, veto-wielding Security Council members that have experienced Muslim terror and have now promised to help Spain fight it, must do the same. They must work quickly to craft a Security Council resolution that strengthens the organization's blessing of the coalition's efforts. While it is unlikely that the United Nations will take a major political role in Iraq at this point, a strong symbolic resolution could give Zapatero enough political cover to extend the stay of Spain's troops. If not, a Spanish retreat from Iraq, traceable directly to the massacre in Madrid, would mean that March 14 will go down in history as Al Qaeda's first-ever victory at the ballot box.
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