Monday, January 12, 2004
Europe Gets Real: The New Security Strategy Shows the EU's Geopolitical Maturity
by
Peter van Ham
On December 12, 2003, the European Council approved the long-awaited European Security Strategy entitled A Secure Europe in a Better World. The EU finally has a concise document that offers a coherent assessment of today's security threats and Europe's policy responses. The Iraqi imbroglio confirmed that such an attempt to forge a shared European security culture was long overdue. Past attempts within the Western European Union (WEU)-the EU's now defunct defence arm-to formulate such a security paper had failed to set clear priorities and adequate strategic options. The EU's Security Strategy does exactly that, aiming to address the weakest link in Europe's role as an emerging global power: the connection between its lofty objectives and its uncoordinated policy instruments.
A draft-version of the strategy was first published at the EU's Thessaloniki summit last June. Often referred to as the "Solana paper" (after the EU's foreign policy coordinator Javier Solana), the text was intensely scrutinized not only by EU member states, but also by strategic analysts and policymakers in Washington D.C. There are three key reasons for the EU to finally agree upon a shared security strategy.
First, a shared security strategy aims to reposition the EU in the post-9/11 security environment by formulating a cohesive joint strategy for advancing Europe's economic and political interests. The EU often takes pride in its "soft power," the ability to influence events by diplomatic rather than coercive means. But influenced by the British diplomat Robert Cooper-the most prominent strategic thinker within the European Council-the EU Strategy now aims to go beyond mere "soft power" and "get real." Cooper argues that Europe needs to understand that the world beyond the cozy confines of today's postmodern EU is still characterized by hard-nosed Realpolitik where military power remains an essential policy instrument to avert threats and get things done. Cooper believes that Europe can no longer wait and hope that the rest of the world will soon recognize and emulate the bliss of its own oft-heralded model of Kantian peace and prosperity. Instead, the EU has to become an active and, if necessary, forceful global player prepared to fight for its own interests. Obviously, Cooper's ideas have provoked heated debates within the EU, ruffling feathers of all kinds, especially those of member states who cling to the obsolete Zivilmacht model.
Taking these qualms into account, the draft EU Security Strategy has been changed on a number of important points. The document still refers to five key security challenges for Europe: terrorism; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); regional conflict; state failure; and organized crime. However, the opponents of a tough EU-stance have succeeded in removing earlier references to a strategy of "preemption" from the final text. Member states still agree, however, that "in an era of globalization, distant threats may be of as much concern as those that are near at hand," and that "when necessary, robust intervention" is called for. The document also calls for what it now labels "preventive engagement," but without clear indications as to when the use of military force may be considered legitimate to prevent (for example) WMD-proliferation or humanitarian emergencies.
These alterations have been inspired by the political will to put some distance between the EU and the United States. This seems to be paradoxical, since the second reason for the EU to agree on a joint Strategy was to repair the damaged transatlantic relationship and prove Europe's continued relevance to Washington's security agenda. To that end, the EU document makes frequent and prominent mention of America's crucial role. It opens with the remark that "the United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security," and closes with the statement, "acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world." These words do not only cater to the Atlanticists in Europe who may otherwise have been wary of EU policies too far outside the traditional NATO-mainstream. They are also intended to convince skeptics within the Bush administration that a Europe with global political ambitions does not challenge the United States but instead aims to position itself as a strategic partner. To make this message unmistakably clear, the paper confirms that the "EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus" is a reflection of "our [i.e., the transatlantic] common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century."
What is more, the EU Strategy acknowledges that multilateralism needs to be enforced and that Europe "must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken." The document also emphasizes that "the best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states." Both statements should be read in the light of the recent policy declarations by President Bush that call for both effective multilateralism and the democratization of the greater Middle East. For the EU, they imply a remarkable shift towards accepting the conceptual underpinnings of the current U.S. administration's worldview.
A final reason for formulating a European security document is to contain the looming threat of strategic fragmentation within the EU itself. The debate around Iraq has laid bare the limits of the Union's institutional framework to forge consensus on matters of supreme strategic importance. The European Convention was supposed to fix these structural problems and prepare the EU for the accession of ten new members in May 2004. Nice ideas such as creating the new post of European "foreign minister" and the introduction of simplified decision-making rules were rejected (or at least postponed) at the December 2003 summit. But despite all the doom and gloom over the failed European Convention, the EU Security Strategy has now been finally adopted, offering an acquis stratégique by establishing priorities and setting clear policy goals.
This will be all the more important since the enlarged EU will see more "structured cooperation" than in the past. Coalitions of "able and willing" member states will be tempted to take the lead without waiting for the EU-25 to reach consensus. Last year's controversy over the "Tervuren-option" on a possible autonomous European military headquarters (initiated by France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg) illustrates these centrifugal tendencies within the EU on security and defense matters. The EU's new Security Strategy may not be able to paper over all the existing political cracks within Europe and the transatlantic relationship. It is, however, a necessary step in the slow and painful process towards the EU's geopolitical maturity. Without it, both the EU and the transatlantic relationship would be a lot worse off.
Peter van Ham is Deputy Head of Studies at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael" in the Hague, and Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges (Belgium).
by
Peter van Ham
On December 12, 2003, the European Council approved the long-awaited European Security Strategy entitled A Secure Europe in a Better World. The EU finally has a concise document that offers a coherent assessment of today's security threats and Europe's policy responses. The Iraqi imbroglio confirmed that such an attempt to forge a shared European security culture was long overdue. Past attempts within the Western European Union (WEU)-the EU's now defunct defence arm-to formulate such a security paper had failed to set clear priorities and adequate strategic options. The EU's Security Strategy does exactly that, aiming to address the weakest link in Europe's role as an emerging global power: the connection between its lofty objectives and its uncoordinated policy instruments.
A draft-version of the strategy was first published at the EU's Thessaloniki summit last June. Often referred to as the "Solana paper" (after the EU's foreign policy coordinator Javier Solana), the text was intensely scrutinized not only by EU member states, but also by strategic analysts and policymakers in Washington D.C. There are three key reasons for the EU to finally agree upon a shared security strategy.
First, a shared security strategy aims to reposition the EU in the post-9/11 security environment by formulating a cohesive joint strategy for advancing Europe's economic and political interests. The EU often takes pride in its "soft power," the ability to influence events by diplomatic rather than coercive means. But influenced by the British diplomat Robert Cooper-the most prominent strategic thinker within the European Council-the EU Strategy now aims to go beyond mere "soft power" and "get real." Cooper argues that Europe needs to understand that the world beyond the cozy confines of today's postmodern EU is still characterized by hard-nosed Realpolitik where military power remains an essential policy instrument to avert threats and get things done. Cooper believes that Europe can no longer wait and hope that the rest of the world will soon recognize and emulate the bliss of its own oft-heralded model of Kantian peace and prosperity. Instead, the EU has to become an active and, if necessary, forceful global player prepared to fight for its own interests. Obviously, Cooper's ideas have provoked heated debates within the EU, ruffling feathers of all kinds, especially those of member states who cling to the obsolete Zivilmacht model.
Taking these qualms into account, the draft EU Security Strategy has been changed on a number of important points. The document still refers to five key security challenges for Europe: terrorism; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); regional conflict; state failure; and organized crime. However, the opponents of a tough EU-stance have succeeded in removing earlier references to a strategy of "preemption" from the final text. Member states still agree, however, that "in an era of globalization, distant threats may be of as much concern as those that are near at hand," and that "when necessary, robust intervention" is called for. The document also calls for what it now labels "preventive engagement," but without clear indications as to when the use of military force may be considered legitimate to prevent (for example) WMD-proliferation or humanitarian emergencies.
These alterations have been inspired by the political will to put some distance between the EU and the United States. This seems to be paradoxical, since the second reason for the EU to agree on a joint Strategy was to repair the damaged transatlantic relationship and prove Europe's continued relevance to Washington's security agenda. To that end, the EU document makes frequent and prominent mention of America's crucial role. It opens with the remark that "the United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security," and closes with the statement, "acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world." These words do not only cater to the Atlanticists in Europe who may otherwise have been wary of EU policies too far outside the traditional NATO-mainstream. They are also intended to convince skeptics within the Bush administration that a Europe with global political ambitions does not challenge the United States but instead aims to position itself as a strategic partner. To make this message unmistakably clear, the paper confirms that the "EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus" is a reflection of "our [i.e., the transatlantic] common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century."
What is more, the EU Strategy acknowledges that multilateralism needs to be enforced and that Europe "must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken." The document also emphasizes that "the best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states." Both statements should be read in the light of the recent policy declarations by President Bush that call for both effective multilateralism and the democratization of the greater Middle East. For the EU, they imply a remarkable shift towards accepting the conceptual underpinnings of the current U.S. administration's worldview.
A final reason for formulating a European security document is to contain the looming threat of strategic fragmentation within the EU itself. The debate around Iraq has laid bare the limits of the Union's institutional framework to forge consensus on matters of supreme strategic importance. The European Convention was supposed to fix these structural problems and prepare the EU for the accession of ten new members in May 2004. Nice ideas such as creating the new post of European "foreign minister" and the introduction of simplified decision-making rules were rejected (or at least postponed) at the December 2003 summit. But despite all the doom and gloom over the failed European Convention, the EU Security Strategy has now been finally adopted, offering an acquis stratégique by establishing priorities and setting clear policy goals.
This will be all the more important since the enlarged EU will see more "structured cooperation" than in the past. Coalitions of "able and willing" member states will be tempted to take the lead without waiting for the EU-25 to reach consensus. Last year's controversy over the "Tervuren-option" on a possible autonomous European military headquarters (initiated by France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg) illustrates these centrifugal tendencies within the EU on security and defense matters. The EU's new Security Strategy may not be able to paper over all the existing political cracks within Europe and the transatlantic relationship. It is, however, a necessary step in the slow and painful process towards the EU's geopolitical maturity. Without it, both the EU and the transatlantic relationship would be a lot worse off.
Peter van Ham is Deputy Head of Studies at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael" in the Hague, and Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges (Belgium).
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