Tuesday, September 23, 2003
A view from one of our main supporter's capital:
U.S. Bid for UN Support Means End of "Best Political Climate" for Poland By Radek Sikorski
Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw)
Publication Date: September 13, 2003
The first shots fired in Iraq at our soldiers coincided in time with the George W. Bush Administration's decision to take a new draft resolution to the United Nations. This thereby brings to an end the period of the best political climate for such countries as Poland, which were bold enough to support United States without waiting for a UN resolution, and there is nothing to be heard about us particularly standing to gain from this. Everything indicates that we are on the best way to scoring another unutilized victory.
There is already talk in Washington that Russia will have to be paid for its support of a new resolution, through recognition of the contracts the country signed with the Saddam regime, and also through the payment of a portion of Russian debts. France and Germany make no secret of the fact that their price will be involvement in the reconstruction of the country. One doesn't have to be overly astute to understand what this means. It is interesting insofar as both countries are already so militarily engaged in Afghanistan and Africa that it will be difficult for them to send a contingent to Iraq bigger than the Polish one, even if their leaders decide to take a radical turn. They will attempt to gain influence over a key region of the world and multi-billion-dollar concessions at the expense of having their ambassadors raise their hands in New York. France and Germany have the advantage that their votes will enable the U.S. to benefit from the assistance of such countries as India and Pakistan, which make sending their personnel to Iraq specifically contingent upon a UN decision. If Paris or Berlin manage to do so, this will be no small diplomatic success. What does Polish diplomacy look like against this backdrop? Several months ago, when foreign policy seemed to be perhaps the only field in which the Leszek Miller government behaved decently, I publicly supported its decisions on the issue of Iraq. I argued that it was a good idea to invest in the Polish-U.S. alliance. And this was not only about creating a sense of mutuality with Washington with regards to Polish security needs. I argued that if we achieve success in the Iraqi operation, Poland's bargaining position would improve within the EU itself. Instead of being treated as a poor cousin, one that is accepted at family celebrations out of a sense of pity, we could become a player that cannot be ignored. Here we achieved a certain progress, although it will prove to be a Pyrrhic victory if France and Germany, in order to punish Poland and Spain for their pro-Americanism, manage to revise the decisionmaking principles in the EU set forth by the Treaty of Nice.
I also indicated that in exchange for support of the U.S. position at the moment when the United States needed it most, just before starting to deal with Saddam Husayn, countries like Bulgaria, Turkey, and Israel received tangible aid in the form of the payment of Iraqi debts and economic support. But I haven't heard, on the other hand, about Poland gaining anything more than what was allocated in the Pentagon budget for assisting with transport and equipping the forces to support the U.S. Army.
I thought that perhaps behind-the-scenes agreements had been made, the results of which the government would dazzle public opinion with at the appropriate moment. But successive convenient moments have passed--President Bush's visit to Krakow, Poland's takeover of command over the international division--but there is nothing to be heard about serious decisions. A bit more, and one will have to come to the conclusion that the government sent the Polish Armed Forces on their greatest operation abroad since the time of the disgraceful invasion of Czechoslovakia 1968 in exchange for a good word. If so, this is not only a reprehensible failure of Polish diplomacy, it also does irreparable harm to Polish-U.S. relations. I hasten to explain why.
In its relations with United States, Poland is interested in three main issues. Firstly, we should strive to conclude a bilateral, Polish-U.S. military agreement after the model of those that the United Kingdom, Spain, or Germany have. Such agreements normalize and regulate in detail the practical side of the alliance between these countries.
It lies in our interest to ensure that future U.S. bases on the territory of new NATO members will not just be arms storehouses, but rather centers of true military cooperation, and that their construction and outfitting will be contracted to our companies, and that Poland will retain the right of veto with respect to the way in which the forces stationed at them can be utilized. It should be important to the United States for the agreement to allocate financing for the Polish program to build expedition forces. If the Polish Armed Forces are supposed to be a valuable ally in the field, they have to have equipment and training compatible with the U.S. Armed Forces, and it is clear that we do not need to build armed forces of this sort for our own needs.
It does not need to be spoken of loudly, but it is a fact that a bilateral agreement would also be an additional warranty of our security in the event that the tendons of the North Atlantic alliance should begin to loosen.
Secondly, it would be an unacceptable situation if countries that sabotaged the sanctions imposed upon Saddam's regime by the UN for entire years, that sold him arms and strategic raw materials, and opposed his being removed by force up to the last minute, should now obtain more advantageous political and commercial conditions in Iraq than the states that supported the Iraqi nation and the United States in its confrontation with the dictator. The United States are under the huge pressure of the situation in Iraq and of world and domestic public opinion, which is demanding the greater engagement of international forces in normalizing the situation.
U.S. leaders, on the other hand, undoubtedly know that we in the countries of the anti-Saddam coalition remember whether it is worth being a friend to the United States in time of need, or whether it is more advantageous to kick it while it is down and to wait until it agrees to our demands. And let's not let ourselves be deceived that the entire effort should rest with the Polish companies striving for contracts. They have solid services to offer, as well as references from many years of activities in Arab countries. But the decisions about who will spend the tens of billions of dollars the White House asked Congress for to rebuild Iraq, and how they will be spent, will be made by the United States.
Thirdly, the time has come to settle the issue of visas for Poland.
This issue is not new, and not easy in the present climate of tightened control over U.S. borders. On the other hand, in light of the sympathy that Poland has enjoyed in Washington since the time the appearance of Solidarity, if there is no progress on the issue of visas now, another opportunity may not come soon. Poles have a right to ask why, if Poland is such a good ally, they have to pay $ 100 for the privilege of submitting an application for a U.S. visa, when the French and the Germans travel to the states freely.
Indicative this context is parliamentary deputy Roman Giertych's appeal that visas be introduced for U.S. citizens. Generally the head of the Sejm Commission for Ties with Poles Abroad acts reassuringly with regards to plans to introduce reciprocity in visa relations between Poland and the United States, realizing, after all, that many of our compatriots in the United States only hold U.S. passports, and the introduction of visas would complicate their visiting the country. The U.S. authorities should appreciate the level of Polish society's irritation on this issue, seeing as even the head of this commission is proposing that sanctions be introduced.
Besides, as an individual who supervised the work of the Foreign Affairs Ministry's consular department for three and a half years, I believe that the introduction of visas for U.S. citizens is a move that we should keep in reserve. It would suffice if, after the model of Turkey, we introduced a border fee equal to the amount of the fee for applying for the U.S. visa. This would signal our dissatisfaction, and would put a stop to our country's subsidizing of the U.S. borders service. Veterans, those decorated with orders, and members of Polish emigre organizations should be exempt from the fees. I once conducted interministerial consultations on this issue, and a ready plan for the necessary organizational action is to be found in the Foreign Affairs Ministry archives.
The government was mistaken if it thought that by agreeing without bargaining, it would score points in Washington. In international relations, just like in interpersonal relations, what comes too easily is not appreciated. Turkey has for years been considered a particular ally of the United States, but despite this, when it came down to the decision to allow a U.S. division to enter Iraq across its territory, Turkey demanded not only political guarantees in northern Iraq, but also financial aid to the amount of $ 90 billion. After bargaining it secured $ 24 billion, but it did not receive these funds only because the deputies of the Turkish parliament decided that the proposal was insufficient, and the decision to allow the forces in was a few votes short of being passed. Against this backdrop, one can only hang one's head at the passiveness of the leaders of our Foreign Affairs Ministry.
The ongoing costs of the U.S. occupation of Iraq come to $ 3.9 billion per month. Dividing this by 130,000 U.S. soldiers, this means an average of $ 30,000 per soldier per month. This, in turn, means that our contingent of 2,500 soldiers means a savings in the order of $ 900 million per year for the U.S. budget. It would be a good idea for the Polish defense minister and foreign affairs minister to demand at least a fraction of the sum.
It is possible to escape in a forward direction. The United States requires additional patrol and police forces in Iraq. Given the proper financing, we should be capable of sending a few thousand additional soldiers and police officers. Without money, on the other hand, the Polish Armed Forces could have trouble preparing the brigade that will have to relieve the present contingent. Those who do not anticipate this, and do not act in time, reduce the chances for the success of the Iraqi operation, and thereby harm the interests of the United States and Polish-U.S. relations.
As the latest polls of public opinion in Europe show, the image of the United States in general, and that of President Bush in particular, are significantly better in Poland that in Europe. We have reasons for this. It was thanks to the United States that Poland was resurrected after WWI. It was President Ronald Reagan who stood up to Communism and helped us regain our independence. It was thanks to the United States that Germany recognized our western border and paid out compensation to the slave laborers of the Third Reich. It was thanks to the United States that we joined NATO, despite Russia's objection.
Nevertheless, in a democratic country--such as ours, thanks, among other things, to U.S. support--foreign policy depends in large part on the position of public opinion. I have the impression that support for the government's policy in Iraq is shallow, and could evaporate quickly once we suffer the first--I fear inevitable--victims. Then Polish public opinion will not be satisfied with platitudes about international solidarity and about bringing peace. It will want to hear about what concrete benefits the Polish Armed Forces are gaining for us. If opinions are then promoted that complicate or prevent our continuation of the Iraqi mission, the guilt will lie with those who did not prepare a convincing response in time.
Radek Sikorski is a resident fellow at AEI.
U.S. Bid for UN Support Means End of "Best Political Climate" for Poland By Radek Sikorski
Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw)
Publication Date: September 13, 2003
The first shots fired in Iraq at our soldiers coincided in time with the George W. Bush Administration's decision to take a new draft resolution to the United Nations. This thereby brings to an end the period of the best political climate for such countries as Poland, which were bold enough to support United States without waiting for a UN resolution, and there is nothing to be heard about us particularly standing to gain from this. Everything indicates that we are on the best way to scoring another unutilized victory.
There is already talk in Washington that Russia will have to be paid for its support of a new resolution, through recognition of the contracts the country signed with the Saddam regime, and also through the payment of a portion of Russian debts. France and Germany make no secret of the fact that their price will be involvement in the reconstruction of the country. One doesn't have to be overly astute to understand what this means. It is interesting insofar as both countries are already so militarily engaged in Afghanistan and Africa that it will be difficult for them to send a contingent to Iraq bigger than the Polish one, even if their leaders decide to take a radical turn. They will attempt to gain influence over a key region of the world and multi-billion-dollar concessions at the expense of having their ambassadors raise their hands in New York. France and Germany have the advantage that their votes will enable the U.S. to benefit from the assistance of such countries as India and Pakistan, which make sending their personnel to Iraq specifically contingent upon a UN decision. If Paris or Berlin manage to do so, this will be no small diplomatic success. What does Polish diplomacy look like against this backdrop? Several months ago, when foreign policy seemed to be perhaps the only field in which the Leszek Miller government behaved decently, I publicly supported its decisions on the issue of Iraq. I argued that it was a good idea to invest in the Polish-U.S. alliance. And this was not only about creating a sense of mutuality with Washington with regards to Polish security needs. I argued that if we achieve success in the Iraqi operation, Poland's bargaining position would improve within the EU itself. Instead of being treated as a poor cousin, one that is accepted at family celebrations out of a sense of pity, we could become a player that cannot be ignored. Here we achieved a certain progress, although it will prove to be a Pyrrhic victory if France and Germany, in order to punish Poland and Spain for their pro-Americanism, manage to revise the decisionmaking principles in the EU set forth by the Treaty of Nice.
I also indicated that in exchange for support of the U.S. position at the moment when the United States needed it most, just before starting to deal with Saddam Husayn, countries like Bulgaria, Turkey, and Israel received tangible aid in the form of the payment of Iraqi debts and economic support. But I haven't heard, on the other hand, about Poland gaining anything more than what was allocated in the Pentagon budget for assisting with transport and equipping the forces to support the U.S. Army.
I thought that perhaps behind-the-scenes agreements had been made, the results of which the government would dazzle public opinion with at the appropriate moment. But successive convenient moments have passed--President Bush's visit to Krakow, Poland's takeover of command over the international division--but there is nothing to be heard about serious decisions. A bit more, and one will have to come to the conclusion that the government sent the Polish Armed Forces on their greatest operation abroad since the time of the disgraceful invasion of Czechoslovakia 1968 in exchange for a good word. If so, this is not only a reprehensible failure of Polish diplomacy, it also does irreparable harm to Polish-U.S. relations. I hasten to explain why.
In its relations with United States, Poland is interested in three main issues. Firstly, we should strive to conclude a bilateral, Polish-U.S. military agreement after the model of those that the United Kingdom, Spain, or Germany have. Such agreements normalize and regulate in detail the practical side of the alliance between these countries.
It lies in our interest to ensure that future U.S. bases on the territory of new NATO members will not just be arms storehouses, but rather centers of true military cooperation, and that their construction and outfitting will be contracted to our companies, and that Poland will retain the right of veto with respect to the way in which the forces stationed at them can be utilized. It should be important to the United States for the agreement to allocate financing for the Polish program to build expedition forces. If the Polish Armed Forces are supposed to be a valuable ally in the field, they have to have equipment and training compatible with the U.S. Armed Forces, and it is clear that we do not need to build armed forces of this sort for our own needs.
It does not need to be spoken of loudly, but it is a fact that a bilateral agreement would also be an additional warranty of our security in the event that the tendons of the North Atlantic alliance should begin to loosen.
Secondly, it would be an unacceptable situation if countries that sabotaged the sanctions imposed upon Saddam's regime by the UN for entire years, that sold him arms and strategic raw materials, and opposed his being removed by force up to the last minute, should now obtain more advantageous political and commercial conditions in Iraq than the states that supported the Iraqi nation and the United States in its confrontation with the dictator. The United States are under the huge pressure of the situation in Iraq and of world and domestic public opinion, which is demanding the greater engagement of international forces in normalizing the situation.
U.S. leaders, on the other hand, undoubtedly know that we in the countries of the anti-Saddam coalition remember whether it is worth being a friend to the United States in time of need, or whether it is more advantageous to kick it while it is down and to wait until it agrees to our demands. And let's not let ourselves be deceived that the entire effort should rest with the Polish companies striving for contracts. They have solid services to offer, as well as references from many years of activities in Arab countries. But the decisions about who will spend the tens of billions of dollars the White House asked Congress for to rebuild Iraq, and how they will be spent, will be made by the United States.
Thirdly, the time has come to settle the issue of visas for Poland.
This issue is not new, and not easy in the present climate of tightened control over U.S. borders. On the other hand, in light of the sympathy that Poland has enjoyed in Washington since the time the appearance of Solidarity, if there is no progress on the issue of visas now, another opportunity may not come soon. Poles have a right to ask why, if Poland is such a good ally, they have to pay $ 100 for the privilege of submitting an application for a U.S. visa, when the French and the Germans travel to the states freely.
Indicative this context is parliamentary deputy Roman Giertych's appeal that visas be introduced for U.S. citizens. Generally the head of the Sejm Commission for Ties with Poles Abroad acts reassuringly with regards to plans to introduce reciprocity in visa relations between Poland and the United States, realizing, after all, that many of our compatriots in the United States only hold U.S. passports, and the introduction of visas would complicate their visiting the country. The U.S. authorities should appreciate the level of Polish society's irritation on this issue, seeing as even the head of this commission is proposing that sanctions be introduced.
Besides, as an individual who supervised the work of the Foreign Affairs Ministry's consular department for three and a half years, I believe that the introduction of visas for U.S. citizens is a move that we should keep in reserve. It would suffice if, after the model of Turkey, we introduced a border fee equal to the amount of the fee for applying for the U.S. visa. This would signal our dissatisfaction, and would put a stop to our country's subsidizing of the U.S. borders service. Veterans, those decorated with orders, and members of Polish emigre organizations should be exempt from the fees. I once conducted interministerial consultations on this issue, and a ready plan for the necessary organizational action is to be found in the Foreign Affairs Ministry archives.
The government was mistaken if it thought that by agreeing without bargaining, it would score points in Washington. In international relations, just like in interpersonal relations, what comes too easily is not appreciated. Turkey has for years been considered a particular ally of the United States, but despite this, when it came down to the decision to allow a U.S. division to enter Iraq across its territory, Turkey demanded not only political guarantees in northern Iraq, but also financial aid to the amount of $ 90 billion. After bargaining it secured $ 24 billion, but it did not receive these funds only because the deputies of the Turkish parliament decided that the proposal was insufficient, and the decision to allow the forces in was a few votes short of being passed. Against this backdrop, one can only hang one's head at the passiveness of the leaders of our Foreign Affairs Ministry.
The ongoing costs of the U.S. occupation of Iraq come to $ 3.9 billion per month. Dividing this by 130,000 U.S. soldiers, this means an average of $ 30,000 per soldier per month. This, in turn, means that our contingent of 2,500 soldiers means a savings in the order of $ 900 million per year for the U.S. budget. It would be a good idea for the Polish defense minister and foreign affairs minister to demand at least a fraction of the sum.
It is possible to escape in a forward direction. The United States requires additional patrol and police forces in Iraq. Given the proper financing, we should be capable of sending a few thousand additional soldiers and police officers. Without money, on the other hand, the Polish Armed Forces could have trouble preparing the brigade that will have to relieve the present contingent. Those who do not anticipate this, and do not act in time, reduce the chances for the success of the Iraqi operation, and thereby harm the interests of the United States and Polish-U.S. relations.
As the latest polls of public opinion in Europe show, the image of the United States in general, and that of President Bush in particular, are significantly better in Poland that in Europe. We have reasons for this. It was thanks to the United States that Poland was resurrected after WWI. It was President Ronald Reagan who stood up to Communism and helped us regain our independence. It was thanks to the United States that Germany recognized our western border and paid out compensation to the slave laborers of the Third Reich. It was thanks to the United States that we joined NATO, despite Russia's objection.
Nevertheless, in a democratic country--such as ours, thanks, among other things, to U.S. support--foreign policy depends in large part on the position of public opinion. I have the impression that support for the government's policy in Iraq is shallow, and could evaporate quickly once we suffer the first--I fear inevitable--victims. Then Polish public opinion will not be satisfied with platitudes about international solidarity and about bringing peace. It will want to hear about what concrete benefits the Polish Armed Forces are gaining for us. If opinions are then promoted that complicate or prevent our continuation of the Iraqi mission, the guilt will lie with those who did not prepare a convincing response in time.
Radek Sikorski is a resident fellow at AEI.
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